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This Capstone project focused on the considerations and interfaces needed to 
successfully field and support a system that would launch, recover, replenish, stow and 
transfer information between current and future Large Vehicle Class Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) and host submarines, specifically submarines with the VA 
Class Block III payload tube concept.  This system will provide a capability to support 
persistent–ISR missions identified in the UUV Master Plan of 2004 by providing stealthy 
information collection capabilities, threat and harbor monitoring, WMD identification 
and sea floor object reconnaissance.   
To accomplish the project objectives, the Capstone team used a Systems 
Engineering approach to analyze and develop system requirements and functions which 
led to the establishment of five (5) proposed concept alternatives.  These alternatives 
were compared and contrasted with respect to performance, life-cycle costs, risks and 
suitability through modeling and simulation, direct cost analysis and qualitative analysis.   
Of the concept alternatives explored, Alternative 4 (a high tech option featuring a 
carbon fiber structure, electro-mechanical pulse launch and recovery device and 
proximity vice contact battery charging and UUV stowage features) provided the best 
value to the stakeholders for the investment.  Alternative 4 demonstrated superior model 
performance times with an acceptable rate of success.  Acquisition costs were mid-range 
while sustainment costs were comparatively low due to high reliability and 
maintainability of the structure, redundant features and lack of frictional wear issues. 
Specific technologies for concept component packages and the pros and cons for 
the technologies were based on Capstone team experience, discussions with peer-groups 
 xiv 
and available literature.  Future technologies may result in alternative groupings that 
provide superior value to the stakeholder at equal or less investment.  However, the 
Capstone team concluded that several characteristics, detailed below, are keys to any 
successful system: 
• Structural components are the most significant cost driver, both in acquisition 
and maintenance.  Solutions should consider mixed materials such as molding 
metallic parts into the composites at manufacture to increase strength at 
component attachment points while still providing a light-weight, corrosion-
resistant and cost-stable structure that is upgradeable without extensive re-
fabrication. 
•  Successful launch and recovery mechanisms must be adaptive to UUV size, 
shapes and materials and must minimize submarine dwell time.  Mechanisms 
should consider ways to attract or repel the UUV without physical contact.   
• Technology packages should focus on systems that multi-task and adequately 
function in the event of minor failures.  Components that offer redundant 
functions and fault-tolerance increase overall reliability. 
The Capstone team identified several lessons learned for consideration which may 
enhance follow-on UUV/submarine integration projects and studies: 
• Requirements Stability - Stakeholders should consider re-visiting the 
mission and operational parameters established for persistent –ISR operations 
in the 2004 UUV Master Plan.  Particular emphasis should be focused on 
endurance requirements for perceived missions and whether it is feasible, in 
 xv 
the near term, to field UUVs that meet those endurance requirements and 
enable submarines to support those endurance requirements. 
• Submarine/UUV System Certification Issues – Due to operational 
environment and contained structure, UUVs and their launch/recovery 
mechanisms can pose a widespread and detrimental effect to the host 
submarine and submarine personnel not seen with air or ground unmanned 
vehicles.  While governing ASTM guides provide guidelines for the 
capabilities of UUVs, they do not specifically address constraints related to 
submarine launch and recovery platforms.  Integration issues, particularly 
those related to Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) require early and on-going 
teaming between submarine and UUV stakeholders.  
• Modularity/Flexibility - UUV manufacturers continue exploration of 
technologies meant to break through constraints that limit current capabilities.  
As newer technologies affect UUV size, materials and capabilities, early and 
close relationships with UUV designers is paramount to ensure launch and 






























A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Background 
Submarines provide the Navy the ability to deliver effects or conduct operations without 
adversary warning or detection.  However, due to many factors including draft, size, and 
personnel considerations, submarines do not operate on station for deployments longer than 
about 90 days and, in particular, cannot operate in littoral waters off an adversary’s coastline.  
Submarine launched Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) can help conduct missions and 
reduce the risk to manned platforms, while increasing the range and endurance of a mission. 
In 2009, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed his staff to develop unmanned 
system plans for near-term (5 years) and mid-term (10 year) timeframes, as well as a 30-year 
vision.  In parallel with the CNO staff planning efforts, the Director of Undersea Technology, 
SEA073, initiated a study, published as the UUV Roadmap, to coordinate Navy-wide UUV 
efforts and develop a plan for UUV operations from a variety of platforms.   The 2004 UUV 
Master Plan documented a vision for unmanned undersea vehicles (Figure 1) and determined that 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations was the most important mission 
for UUV military applications.   Persistent–ISR capabilities support the “Sea Power 21” Pillars 
by providing stealthy information collection capabilities, threat and harbor monitoring, WMD 
identification and sea floor object reconnaissance (Figure 2).  Large Vehicle Class UUVs, 
defined as multi-platform compatible vehicles, which displace approximately 10 long tons and 
are typically over 21 inches in diameter, is one type of UUV identified to support ISR missions.  
The Large Vehicle Class UUVs that support ISR operations generally have an on station time of 
at least 300 hours and a mission range of at least 75 nautical miles [UUV Master Plan 2004].  
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The increased size inherently provides Large Vehicle Class UUVs payload, power and 
endurance advantages over smaller UUVs. 
 





Figure 2 – ISR UUV Sub Pillar [UUV Master Plan, 2004] 
2. Need Statement 
Launching of UUVs from submarines has been accomplished using the host platform’s 
21-inch diameter torpedo tubes.  The conversion of four ballistic missile (SSBN) submarines to 
guided missile submarines (SSGN) resulted in an added capability of launching and interfacing 
with larger diameter UUVs by utilizing the SSGN’s 88-inch tactical payload tubes.  Beginning 
with the construction of Virginia (VA) Class Block III fast-attack nuclear submarines (SSNs 
784-791), this submarine class will be equipped with 2 SSGN-like payload tubes rather than the 
12 smaller vertical launch tubes found on Block I and II VA Class submarine designs.  This 
gives the Block III and later increments of the submarine class the ability to launch and interface 
with Large Vehicle Class UUVs.  For submarine launched Large Vehicle Class UUVs to be an 
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effective tool for undersea warfare persistent-ISR operations, a system is required to integrate the 
host submarine and the Large Vehicle Class UUVs.  This system must provide launch, recovery, 
replenishment and communication capabilities without adversely affecting the certification of the 
host submarine for unrestricted operations. 
3. Project Objective 
Using System Engineering principles and following the guidance established in the 
Project Management Plan (Appendix A), the Capstone team developed the concepts and 
functions necessary and offered a conceptual preliminary design of a system that integrates the 
Large Vehicle Class UUVs with the VA Class Block III Submarine payload tube concept.  The 
analysis focused on a family of systems (FOS) and their interfaces that supports launch, 
recovery, replenishment, communication with and stowage of a Large Vehicle Class UUV on a 
submarine with a VA Class Block III payload tube concept.   
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
This project sought to identify the functionality (and the physical architecture needed to 
accomplish the functionality) of a standard launch, recovery and communication mechanism that 
integrates with the external boundaries of the submarine launched Large Vehicle Class UUV and 
a host submarine which employs the VA Class Block III payload tube concept.  Through analysis 
of the requirements, mission, functions, components and interfaces, the scope of this project was 
to identify the concepts necessary to define the interactions between the UUV and the host 
submarine.  The Capstone team developed several key assumptions to establish the guidelines 
and boundaries of this research project: 
• The Capstone team recognized that design and development of UUV systems is a 
rapid and dynamic environment and, due to the classified nature of future threat 
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planning and assessment, only general missions, threats and scenarios were 
realistically and reasonably assessed.  Additionally, it was considered acceptable that 
this project not decompose system functions and physical architecture into detailed 
designs where specific interactions between human operators, submarine 
communication systems and UUV control systems became classification sensitive. 
• For the starting point of design and capability research, this project leveraged off of 
existing and similar concepts for a Large Vehicle Class UUV launched and recovered 
via torpedo tubes (Figure 3) and a SSGN large missile tube launch and recovery 
system (Figure 4).  This project sought to improve upon these concepts. 
• The main challenges of the project remained what they are for existing systems; 
namely power needs for replenishment of Large Vehicle Class UUVs, difficulties 
encountered with UUV recovery, impacts on host submarine safety and system 
operational parameters, which limit the effectiveness of existing concepts. 
• The system-engineering approach employed on this project captured and verified the 
many divergent stakeholder needs associated with fielding of future UUV launch and 
recovery concepts and will provided a basis for examination and analysis of future 
UUV/host submarine integrated concepts with a concentration on performance and 
total ownership costs. 
• To establish the “fixed” external boundaries necessary for interface, cost, 
performance and design examination, this project was specific for integration of a 
“standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV with VA Class Block III and later submarines 
only.  This project did not examine Large Vehicle Class UUV integration with any 
other class of submarine.  However, it is expected the results and conclusions of this 
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project would apply to any US Navy or foreign submarine which exhibits 
dimensional and functional characteristics similar to the VA Class Block III 
submarine payload tube concept.  
   
Figure 3 – AN/BLQ-11 Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) (Torpedo Tube 
Launch and Recovery System) [White, D. P., 2007] 
 
 
Figure 4 – Universal Launch and Recovery Module (ULRM) (SSGN Missile Tube Launch 




C. SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH 
1. Overview 
The Capstone team focused on the identification of and verification of stakeholder needs 
while applying a Systems Engineering approach in a phased plan strategy.  To this end, the team 
delivered a System Engineering solution to satisfy the current need of the stakeholders seeking to 
launch, recover, communicate with, replenish and stow Large Vehicle Class UUVs with 
submarine host platforms, specifically the VA Class Block III submarine.  The topics addressed 
herein outline the approach and structure to successfully define system requirements, 
functionality, synthesis and design.  To mitigate risks and maximize stakeholder satisfaction, the 
active stakeholders and Subject Matter Experts (SME) were involved throughout the engineering 
process. 
a. Systems Engineering Process Model 
The Capstone team utilized the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
System Engineering Process Model, Figure 5, to identify the stakeholder needs and deliver the 
best recommended solutions.  The IEEE System Engineering Process Model has six process 




Figure 5 – IEEE System Engineering Process Model [IEEE Standard 1220, 1998] 
2. Systems Engineering Process Phases 
The process phases, shown in the IEEE System Engineering Process Model, Figure 5, 
and actions taken to accomplish the phases of the process model, are detailed as follows: 
a. Requirements Analysis Phase  
Input:    Stakeholder needs 
Output:   Requirements baseline 
Actions:   Define Needs, Define Risks, Manage Requirements, Prioritize System 
Design, Assess and Trade-Off Requirements 
The stakeholder needs were used to identify design requirements and prioritize system 
capabilities.  During the stakeholder needs analysis, the stated need requirements were base 
lined.   
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System risks were identified throughout the development of the design process.  Risk 
mitigation strategies were used throughout the process to avoid and manage the risks associated 
with the development of the system.  System requirements were generated with the continuous 
involvement of stakeholders throughout all phases of the project.  This supported requirement 
management and reduced the risk of misinterpreting the stakeholder needs, values and priorities.  
With the involvement of the identified stakeholders, system design capabilities and performance 
requirements were prioritized with the use of various system metrics and traced to their needs.  
The scaled level of priority supported future trade-off analysis when evaluating alternative 
solutions.  Requirement trade-off analysis was performed to resolve conflicts, including funding, 
schedule, performance and quality needs.  Risk levels and mitigations were used throughout the 
requirement trade-off analysis.  The ultimate deliverable was a final assessment of system 
requirements that governed the design of the Large Vehicle Class UUV interface to the host 
submarine.    
b. Requirements Verification Phase  
Input:    List of requirements for stakeholder verification 
Output:   Validated requirements baseline 
Actions:   Define System Functions, Conduct Functional Traceability, Validate 
Functions to Requirements  
The establishment of the requirements baseline was followed by the functional analysis, 
which established the functional architecture and validated the requirements baseline.  The 
requirements baseline was analyzed, and from the baseline, the top level functions were 
identified and the functional decomposition was performed with enough granularity such that the 
end state of each decomposition contains the backbone (and vertebrae) of each of the top level 
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functions.   The functions that were not directly concerned with the engineering aspects of the 
project were decomposed to lesser degrees of granularity due to the focus/bulk of the work 
needing proper definition in the engineering realm.  A functional hierarchy of system 
requirements was drafted so requirements were traceable to the particular stakeholder need.  
Information flow block diagrams were established and functions were allocated to system 
components and performers. 
c. Functional Analysis Phase  
Input:    Validated requirements baseline  
Output:   Functional needs and requirements 
Actions:   Create Alternative Design Concepts, Examine Feasibility, Score 
Alternative Design Concepts, Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis, Conduct Functional Trade Studies 
& Assessments 
Alternative design concepts were created using the base lined requirements proposed by 
the stakeholders.  The team members prioritized system capabilities so that critical functions and 
their sub-functions supported the system’s mission.  Quality Functional Deployment (QFD) 
models with weighted values were used to assess the proposed alternative design solutions and 
establish component concepts that could perform the required functions.  The alternative designs 
were evaluated for design feasibility with regard to budget, acceptable risk and schedule.  
Feasibility criteria defined by the stakeholders and team members were used to screen all 
alternative design concepts.  Failure to satisfy the feasibility criteria would deem the concept to 
be infeasible and, as such, the alternative was discarded to reduce strain on the project’s 
resources, so that time and value assets were not wasted.   The team used metrics to score 
concept design alternatives.  The active stakeholders participated with the team to verify and 
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validate that the final conceptual alternatives satisfied the needs at an acceptable level of risk.  
Any requirement conflict observed was addressed and adjudicated with the involvement of 
stakeholders.    
A cost-benefit analysis was performed to formally identify and assess benefits associated 
with design alternatives in addition to the costs anticipated from the project.  The cost analysis 
evaluated the value associated with the system over its life cycle in relation to its stakeholder 
benefit.  The cost-benefit analysis was one of the factors that resulted in a recommended design 
for prototyping that offered the greatest value to the stakeholders while meeting all design Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP) and schedule requirements.  Once the functional analysis was 
accomplished, the functional trade studies and assessments of the top level functions and their 
decomposition were conducted.  The analysis looked at tradeoffs for identified functions and 
evaluated related functions that may not have been originally identified to see if they were useful 
or necessary for the efficient completion of the project (e.g. is anything missing from the 
functions?  Could there be an alternate function that provides a better solution?  Have the 
engineering functions been decomposed such that their bottom level provides the building blocks 
to meet the stakeholder needs with the top level function?).  The results of the trade-offs were 
analyzed and the best solution was worked into the final functional decomposition.  
d. Functional Verification Phase  
Input:    Functional Needs  
Output:   Verified Functional Needs and Concepts 
Actions:   Conduct Life-Cycle Cost Analysis, Conduct Model Simulations, Conduct 
Sensitivity Analysis, Analyze Performance and Costs of Concepts 
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From the functional needs/requirements, the functional verification took place.  This 
analyzed the top level functions and their decomposition to make sure that the chosen 
architecture met all stakeholder requirements.  Modeling was utilized to simulate the Operational 
Situations (OPSITs) which defined the theater of operation and mission requirements.  
Simulation results provided the team with critical information pertaining to system performance 
and operation.  Aspects such as, but not limited to, operational availability, successful launch, 
successful recovery, system causality, communication failure and other potential risks were 
analyzed to evaluate the capability of alternative designs.  Results were utilized to weigh design 
selection.  A sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the system design parameters 
relationships and the results of the baseline analysis to ensure that the overall life-cycle costs and 
model generated were valid.  Critical input parameters were identified that directly impact cost 
(more than 10% of total cost).  The identified critical input parameters were evaluated in a model 
to simulate the cost impact associated with the model’s output.  Critical input parameter 
variations were modeled over a designated range which considered appropriate distributions for 
the system design critical items.  It was essential for the analyst to be confident with the 
identified critical inputs interrelationships, their impact on cost, the sensitivities of the model in 
the identification of cause-and-effect relationships and the potential areas of risk associated with 
the Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) analysis results. The analysis resulted in the sensitivity of a system’s 
LCC in relation to potential variations such as but not limited to operational availability, mean 




e. Synthesis Phase  
Input:    Verified Functional Architecture 
Output:   Physical Architecture 
Actions:   Initiate Design Process, Conduct Design Trade Studies & Assessments 
Once the functional need and requirements were verified, the design process began to 
establish the physical architecture.  Here, the interface documents were developed as well as the 
specifications for the hardware and software.  Utilizing the developed interface documents, the 
hardware and software design and development would progress.  Hardware and software 
components were researched and conceived to conceptual, performance and interface standpoint.  
From the physical architecture, the last of the trade-offs were conducted.  The design trade-off 
examined the way the design was assembled and explored alternate means of construction (e.g. 
did we pick the most efficient way to integrate the Large Vehicle Class UUV and the host 
submarine?   What is the relationship between different combinations of hardware and reliability 
of successful UUV launch/recovery?).   From the explored trade spaces, the most efficient 
solution was put forward and finalized as the physical architecture for the UUV Launch and 
Recovery System (LRS). 
f. Design Verification Phase  
Input:    Physical Architecture  
Output:   Verified Physical Architecture 
Actions:   Accomplish Verification, Decision-Making and Conclusion Analysis 
The Design Verification phase implemented the test and evaluation strategy to make sure 
that the physical architecture met all derived and stated stakeholder requirements.  The 
successfully executed test plan, based on the system’s requirements verification matrix and the 
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II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION 
A. STAKEHOLDER NEEDS ANALYSIS 
1. Background 
Stakeholder needs analysis captured the functions, attributes and relationships of the 
system proposed to meet the perceived capability gap.  [Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, pg. 57-59]  
The results of needs analysis were a set of requirements based on a solid foundation of customer 
desires to ultimately create a system that not only functions as the engineers expected, but also 
accomplishes the goals, either expressed or implicit, by the stakeholders. 
Upon initial review, the needs for this project can seem to be rather basic; develop the 
systems required for a submarine to launch, control and recover Large Vehicle Class UUVs.  
However, such a system may endure a costly and short life if it is simply developed to the 
personal whims, political pressures or particular interests of one or a few stakeholders.  
Therefore, the focus on needs analysis during this project was to examine as many credible 
sources as possible and develop many varied and, at times conflicting, needs from these sources.  
Upon determination of the functions, attributes and relationships, or the “wants” required for the 
system, the team translated these into more specific system-level requirements.  To ensure the 
team captured the intent of the customers, the system-level requirements were documented and 
verified against the clear statements of intent from interviews and literature.  The outcome of this 
process allowed the team to develop a ranked and weighted list of Stakeholder Requirements for 
the system that supports not only immediate needs, but also potential UUV scenarios in the 




The team used their experience, discussions with proxy stakeholders (Subject Matter 
Experts or SMEs), and literature research to determine the stakeholder needs and value system 
associated with the needs.  These needs were then ranked using an Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP).  This AHP uses pair-wise comparisons to rank the stakeholders needs.  Each team 
members used the information obtained from the SMEs, along with the literature research and 
team member experience to conduct a pair-wise comparison of the stakeholder needs.  The 
average of the team member’s pair-wise comparisons was used to determine the priorities of the 
needs by assigning a weighted value to each need.  These rankings were used when determining 
the system performance objectives, the KPPs, and the component requirements and risks for the 
conceptual design alternatives.  
3. Stakeholders 
There are two categories of Stakeholders, identified in Table 1, active and passive.    
Active stakeholders directly influence the requirements development phase of the project while 
passive stakeholders provide indirect influence into project requirements development.    
The team met with the active stakeholders as practical and used feedback from these 
active stakeholders to verify the conceived system requirements.   Their validation of the 
proposed requirements resulted in the team’s identification of the verified requirements baseline.    
The passive stakeholders were existing entities with interests and/or policies concerning 
UUVs and UUV missions.  The passive stakeholders’ needs were derived from the literature 
published directly by stakeholders and their representatives or literature published by experts in 
the field.   The literature research identified several areas of interest with respect to deployment, 




• Past systems “did not address Submarine Safety (SUBSAFE) issues or field usable 
systems.  Current systems Mission Reprogrammable Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
(MRUUVs) also will not address those long-standing safety issues and will not field a 
usable system by 2013.”  Additionally, “the development of (systems) to be launched 
from SSN torpedo tubes is difficult and requires design compromises.” [Button, 
2009] 
• “Safety justification is likely to be harder if divers are required to work in and outside 
(an external launch, recovery and stowage mechanism).” [Hardy, 2008] 
UUV Recovery: 
• “Recovery is arguably more difficult when the submarine is in transit.” [Hardy, 2008] 
• It is “very unlikely to be able to retrofit (an enlarged torpedo tube concept) system 
into an existing submarine.” [Hardy, 2008] 
• Large diameter UUV challenges with respect to operations include “Contact 
avoidance with high traffic density including low signature fishing trawlers and high 
speed vessels” (requires considerations for rapid recovery).  [Ashton, 2010] 
UUV Power Challenges: 
• “Energy has long been a major consideration due to its effect on the ultimate 
performance of extended vehicle missions.” [Fletcher, 2005] 
• Forward ends of “SSN submarines lack electrical power distribution systems needed 




Concerns for Total Ownership Costs: 
• “The size and number of vehicles to be used, the overall system costs, and the 
interchangeability of modules all need to be considered as a critical part in developing 
the needed capabilities.” [Fletcher, 2005] 
• The “technology (of UUVs) has not lived up to where the Navy thought it was going 
to be at this point.  If you want autonomous vehicles underwater, you have to advance 
the technology further before it is really capable - RADM Hilarides, Program 
Executive Officer (PEO) Submarines” [Fein, 2007] 
Table 1 – Project Stakeholders and Needs 
Stakeholder Needs 
Project Advisors (Active) Ensure successful completion of the Capstone 
project 
  
Launch and Recovery Mechanism End 
Users (Passive) 
Operating Parameters and Capabilities, Safety, 
Reliability, Maintainable, Stealth 
UUV Manufacturers  (Passive) New Platform for Equipment – Increased 
Market Share, Cost, Long-Term Commitment 
Host Submarine Force Operators 
(Passive) 
Flexible UUV Missions, Interoperable, 
Reliable, Safety 
Naval Intelligence Community 
(Passive)  
Data Transfer Security and Range, 
Interoperability, Persistent ISR Support 
Naval Sea Systems Command  - 
(Technical Concerns) (Passive) 
Safety, Reliability, Operational Capabilities 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Passive) 
Affordability, Flexible UUV Missions, Safety, 
Performance  
System Logistics and Maintenance 
Suppliers (Passive) 
Long Term Commitments, Total Ownership 
Costs, Reliability 
Program Offices (Host Sub & UUV) 
(Passive) 
Operational Parameters, Flexibility, Support 
Multiple Needs, Long-Term Commitments, 





Figure 6 provides a hierarchical chart, which illustrates the passive stakeholder’s 
relationships and interactions.  In Figure 6, the stakeholders are color coded to reflect Technical 
Authority (Red), Operational Authority (Green), and Program Authority (Gray). 
 
Figure 6 – Hierarchal Representation of Passive Stakeholder Relationships  
In addition to the passive stakeholders identified needs, the team interviewed SMEs with 
current or past interests in Large Vehicle Class UUV programs.  Although the resultant needs 
identified from some of these interviews constituted personnel opinions and/or interests in 
specific aspects of UUV programs, taken as a whole, these interviews provided the team 
invaluable information as to the perception of programs as well as exposed gaps and liabilities in 
past attempts to integrate UUVs and submarines.  Table 2 provides a synopsis of the results from 
team interviews with SMEs.  These SME results were consistent with the needs analysis of the 
stakeholders developed by the team through literature research and identified in Table 1.   
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Table 2 – SME Interviewees and Results 
Name Date Organization Title Key Points 
 Mr. Jon Erickson 
 
30 Sep 2010 SEA 073, 
Undersea 
Technology Office 
073RX • Guidance on the key technical points  








• Recovery system is key 
• Power is constraint 
• Desire a standard UUV which could 
be configured with multiple sensors 
Mr. Steve Southard 08 Oct 2010 
And 





is responsible for 
integration of new 








• Support additional power 
requirements (recharging) or 
communications be extendable from 
100 nm to 200 nm. 
• Use set based design approach to 
develop a range of possibilities to be 
included in specifications  Dr. Norbert Doerry Technical 
Director 









• Communications – Direct UUV/host 
sub communications hard.  
Recommend host sub communication 
with satellite and one-way 
communication to UUV. 
• Off-board: Acoustic Communications 
Issues - robustness, range, bandwidth, 
content of data messaging 
• Off-board: RF or SATCOM with 
UUV, i.e. @ PD 
• Launch and Recovery:  Mechanical, 
secure of vehicle (i.e. stow) shock, 
vibrations 
• CONOPS - platform speed for 
communications, platform speed for 
L&R, Communication reliability 
during L&R, water space mgt...., 
depth of operations. 
• UUV Certification (the biggies) – 
shock, energy (stow, charge, 
discharge, out gassing, etc...), 
implodable volumes (limits 




Table 2 – SME Interviewees and Results (Continued)  
Name Date Organization Title Key Points 
















• Mission profile needs to be down 
loaded by sub crew and installed into 
UUV prior to launch. 
• Work could be done on UUV with 
portable equipment – maintenance 
laptops. 
• LDUUV launched from back of ship. 
• UUV would have to be controlled 
from submarine (or surface ship) – 
fiber optic or acoustic interface. 
• Sensor data transferred to sub, sensor 
field or to another device, Hydro 
Acoustic Information Link (HAIL) is 
one system. 
• Digital acoustic communications with 
encryption. 
• Ship might work with a homing 
device.  Look at ASDS, or DSRV. 
• A cradle might be  installed topside 
• Theoretically, UUV could be re-
launched from a submarine 
• A UUV operator can only control one 
UUV at a time unless they were 















• UUV launcher needs interface to 
Weapons control console which 
causes the gas generator to fire. 
• MAC  would be removed for the 
large UUV to be installed with 
launcher interface or else space  
restrictions would limit size to 
tomahawks 
• Restraint system would need to meet 
Grade B shock. 
• Provided an integration checklist 
which included such things as 
Physical Characteristics,  
environmental considerations, 
material considerations 
Cmdr William B. 
Smith 






• Goal is first mission ready of 
LDUUV by 2017 with 30 days up to 
eventual 120 day endurance.  Lengths 
of 20 feet to 45 feet, increased 
autonomy and redundancy. 
• Submarine host platform considered 
desired but not exclusive.  
Dr. Edward 
Ammeen 










• Block IV and V VPT designs still 
under review. 
• UUV “mission creep” presents 
problems.  Still potential tech issues 
with fielding on VA Class sub. 
• Greater teaming with UUV 
manufacturers would be beneficial. 





-4. Analysis of Interviews/Research 
a. Operational Setting 
Submarine based large UUV systems provide a broad spectrum of ISR collection 
capability to support joint combatant forces in worldwide peace, crisis, and wartime operations.  
As discussed in the UUV Master Plan of 2004, “UUVs are uniquely suited for information 
collection due to their abilities to operate at long standoff distances, operate in shallow water 
areas, operate autonomously, and provide a level of clandestine capability not available with 
other systems.”  The capabilities of the UUV systems, coupled with the host submarine, provide 
for adaptive real time planning of current operations to include; monitoring enemy offensive and 
defensive positions, deception postures and combat assessments.  This includes missions in 
support of battle assessment and the global war on terror.  This system of systems will provide a 
rapid turnaround of raw data to aid a robust targeting cycle.  Figure 7 below provides examples 
of threats and consequences, which could be deterred /mitigated by persistent-ISR UUV 




                 
   Somali Pirates [Dollard, 2009]            Underwater Ordinance (WMD) 
     [AMPRO, 2010] 
 
USS Cole Bombing [Maritime Quest, 2000] 
Figure 7 – Threats Suited to Deterrence by Persistent-ISR UUV Operations 
VA Class Block III submarines will be aligned under Commander, Submarine Forces 
Command/Submarine Force Atlantic/Allied Submarine Command and Commander Submarine 
Forces Pacific and assigned to an Atlantic or Pacific Fleet Squadron (e.g., Norfolk or New 
London, and Pearl Harbor).   Figure 8 and Figure 9 provide a view of this command structure.  
Submarine commands are organized by operations and maintenance.  All personnel will have a 
commitment to deploy in support of tactical operations or other tasking.  The capability to 
support launch, replenishment and recovery of a Large Vehicle Class UUV from a VA Class 
Block III submarine will provide twenty-four hour, high-quality sensor coverage of a critical 
Area of Operation (AO), giving the theater Commander in Charge (CINC) intelligence 










Figure 9 – Submarine Force Organization Structure  
b. System Functionality and Tasks 
The Uniform Navy Tactical Task List [UNTL, Jan 2007] was utilized to focus 
stakeholder wants and desires into a context of standard tasks the UUV/Launch and Recovery 
Mechanism/Host Sub FOS should perform.  This hierarchy of tasks, outlined in Table 3 below, 
provided an initial basis for a concept of operations for the FOS and supported future functional 
and architectural development.  It provided starting points for the team to develop measures of 
performance (MOP) for the launch and recovery system functions and assisted in defining 
achievable and clear needs from interview responses and literature.  
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1. DEPLOY/CONDUCT MANEUVERS 
1.1 Move Naval Tactical Forces - [Move naval units and their systems from 
one position to another in order to gain an advantage or avoid a 
disadvantage]  
1.1.2 Move Forces 
1.1.2.5 Employ Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) 
1.2 Navigate and Close Forces – [Determine track for movement of naval 
forces to overcome challenges] 
1.2.8 Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
2. DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE 
2.2 Perform Collection Operations and Management – [Gather data, 
information and previous intelligence to satisfy identified requirements] 
2.2.2 Collect Tactical Intelligence on Situation  
2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
6. PROTECT THE FORCE 
6.1 Enhance Survivability – [Protect personnel and resources from enemy 
and friendly operations and systems and natural occurrences] 
6.1.1 Protect Against Combat Area Hazards  
6.1.2 Conduct Perception Management 
 
Four (4) main tactical tasks defined the purpose of the UUV/Launch and Recovery 
Mechanism/Host Sub family of systems: 
• Move Naval Tactical Forces 
• Navigate and Close Forces 
• Perform Collection Operations and Management 
• Enhance Survivability 
Team analysis of these tasks determined top-level functions performed by the LRS must 
include, as a minimum, launch, recover, communicate, replenish and stow.  With respect to these 
functions, team members articulated system needs and ensured that needs defined for the project 
did not encompass an attribute outside the bounds of the LRS.  For instance, the Special 
Operations Command - Naval Science and Technology Strategic Plan of 2009 [USSOCOM, 
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2009] recognize that advanced power systems are needed to support persistent-ISR missions with 
UUVs.  Concepts may include larger, renewable systems, which place more demand on UUV 
charging sources.  However, this project’s scope did not include development of new power 
systems, a component inherent to UUVs themselves, but instead focused on flexibility of the 
LRS to support future concept changes and upgrades.    
c. Stakeholder Value System 
To support development and ranking of stakeholder needs by the Capstone team, a 
stakeholder value system was established.  The stakeholder value system reflected not only the 
needs of the stakeholders, as determined through literature search and interviews, but also 
assigned an importance to each need with respect to other needs.   The team identified the four 
(4) most important stakeholder’s needs as: 
• Operational Safety 
• Support Increasing Power Demands 
• Launch and Recovery Performance 
• Minimization of  Life Cycle Costs (LCC) (Acquisition, Maintainability and  
Reliability Considerations) 
5. Conclusions 
Using the results of stakeholder needs analysis, the team developed a list of requirements 
for the system.  To rank the importance and weight the requirements, each team member 
accomplished a pair-wise comparison, using the stakeholder values and team member 
knowledge/experience.  The cumulative results of the pair-wise comparisons are provided in 
Figure 10.  Figure 11 displays the ranked and weighted stakeholder needs in descending order of 




Figure 10 – Cumulative Pair-Wise Comparison Results  
 
 
Figure 11 – Ranked and Weighted Stakeholder Requirements  
B. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
1. Background 
 Once functional, performance, interface, and other requirements were identified, a 






















performance, in the form of a functional architecture.  This was accomplished by arranging 
functions in logical sequences, decomposing higher-level functions into lower-level functions, 
and allocating performance from higher- to lower-level functions.  
In order to do this, functional hierarchy diagrams were first developed.  These diagrams 
identified top-level functions, and successively define lower-level functional and performance 
requirements at ever-increasing levels of detail.  This was done until there was sufficient detail to 
provide design and verification criteria to support the integrated system design.  These diagrams 
were used to trace the requirements back to the stakeholder needs. 
Integration Definition for Function Modeling was also performed, resulting in IDEF0 
models.  IDEF0 models defined process and data flows.  They were composed of functions, and 
data and objects that inter-relate those functions.  IDEF0s illustrated controls, inputs, data or 
objects acted upon by inputs, and mechanisms that provided supporting means for performing a 
function.  
Finally, Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagrams (EFFBs) were developed.  These 
described the systems functions and the order in which they are to be executed.  
2. Architectural Views and Products 
The LRS functions were decomposed and the architecture of the system was created.  
The systems engineering tool, CORE®, by Vitech Corporation, was used to conduct the analysis.  
The analysis consisted of mapping functions, operational activities, performers, and requirements 
to each other to ensure all attributes correlated and to determine if any gaps existed.  Several 
Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF) views were created to display this 




a. System Functional Hierarchy 
The team analyzed the functions that were derived in the requirements analysis.  It was 
determined that the LRS has four top-level functions and all other functions are sub-functions of 
these.  The top-level functions for the LRS are: “Launch”; “Recover”; “Replenish” and 
“Maintain”. 
 Launch Functional Hierarchy   
Launch - This function prepares the LRS and then executes the launch of the UUV from 
the HostSub Payload Tube.  The launch function consists of initiating the launch; commutating 
with the external systems which it interfaces (HostSub and UUV), to upload mission data; 
obtaining the HostSub environmental data and then using this data to determine system 
readiness; and finally executing the launch of the UUV.  The launch functional hierarchy is 





Figure 12 – Launch Functional Hierarchy 
 
1.0 Launch 
  1.1 Initiate Launch Sequence 
  1.2 Communicate 
  1.2.1 Establish LRS - Host Sub  
  1.2.2 Establish LRS - UUV Communications 
Link 
  1.2.3 Download ISR  from HOSTSUB 
  1.2.4 Upload ISR Data to UUV 
  1.3 Obtain Environmental Information 
  1.3.1 Determine Host Sub/UUV Depth 
  1.3.2 Determine threats (geological/enemy) 
  1.3.3 Determine Host Sub/UUV Speed 
  1.4 Determine System Readiness 
  1.4.1 Receive indication of UUV(s) readiness 
level 
  1.4.2 Perform Self-Check of LRS 
  1.4.3 Determine LRS Ready Status 
  1.4.4 Communicate (to host ship) LRS ready 
to launch 
  1.4.5 Receive indication of Host Sub 
readiness level 
  1.5 Execute Launch 
  1.5.1 Unsecure/unlock LRS from tube 
  1.5.2 Extend LRS 
  1.5.3 Release UUV(s) 
  1.5.4 Retract LRS 
  1.5.5 Resecure/lock LRS in Payload Tube 
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Recover Functional Hierarchy   
Recover - The recovery function prepares the LRS and executes the recovery of the UUV 
until the UUV and LRS are stowed in the HostSub Payload Tube.  The recovery function is 
similar to the launch function in that it established communications with the HostSub, obtained 
environmental information and assesses whether the LRS is ready to recover the UUV.  The 
recover function also has the capability to execute the recovery by extending the LRS, activating 
the location device, capturing the UUV and then retracting the recovery mechanism.  The UUV 
will be secured to the LRS which will engage and lock in the HostSub Payload Tube.  Recovery 
functional hierarchy is displayed in Figure 13.  
 
2.0 Recover 
  2.1 Initiate Recovery Sequence 
  2.2 Communicate 
  2.2.1 Establish UUV - LRS - Host Sub 
Communications Link 
  2.2.2 Transmit Data between LRS – HOSUB 
  2.3 Obtain Environmental Information 
  2.3.1 Determine Host Sub/UUV Depth 
  2.3.2 Determine Threats (geological/enemy) 
  2.3.3 Determine Host Sub/UUV Speed 
  2.4 Determine System Readiness 
  2.4.1 Receive indications of Host Sub readiness 
level 
  2.4.2 Perform Self-Check of LRS 
  2.4.3 Determine LRS Ready Status 
  2.4.4 Communicate  LRS ready to recover 
  2.4.5 Receive indication of Host Sub 
  2.5 Execute Recovery 
  2.5.1 Extend LRS 
  2.5.2 Activate Location Device 
  2.5.3 Grab UUV 
  2.5.4. Verify UUV Grab 
  2.5.5 Retract Recover Mechanism 
2.6 Secure LRS  
 2.6.1 Obtain information that retraction is complete 
 2.6.2 Engage lock 








Figure 13 – Recovery Functional Hierarchy 
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Replenish Functional Hierarchy   
Replenish - This function consists of the LRS providing the interface between the UUV 
and the HostSub to replenish the UUV for the next mission.  The LRS has the capability to refuel 
the UUV and will also be able to establish connections with the HostSub and the UUV to 
upload/download mission data.  Replenish functional hierarchy is displayed in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 - Replenish Functional Hierarchy 
 
Maintain Functional Hierarchy   
Maintain - This function consists of providing diagnostics of the LRS and providing 
underway repair and maintenance.  This function is all inclusive and does not interface with any 





Figure 15 - Maintain Functional Hierarchy 
b.   Allocation of Functions to Components 
Once the functional hierarchy was established, each function was mapped to the 
corresponding operational activity, performer, component and requirement to provide 
traceability.  This ensured that all attributes were defined and allocated.  The IDEF0 graphical 
output from CORE® was used to describe the allocation of the system functions to its 
components.   
(1) Traceability to System Requirements 
A part of tracing the functions to system requirements included mapping the functions to 
their forms during the decomposition to ensure every function had a component.  Figure 16 



























































































F.1.1. Initiate Launch Sequence X
F.1.2 Communicate to Support Launch X
F.1.3 Obtain Environmental Launched Based Information X
F.1.4 Determine System Readiness X
F.1.5. Execute Launch X X
F.2.1 Initiate Recovery Sequence X
F.2.2 Communicate to Support Recovery X X X
F.2.3 Obtain Environmental Information X
F.2.4 Determine System Readiness for Recovery X
F.2.5 Execute Recovery X X X X
F.2.6 Secure UUV X
F.3.1 Establish connection with UUV/HostSub X X
F.3.2 Transfer data from/to UUV X
F.3.3 Transfer data from/to HostSub X
F.3.4 Repower UUV X
F.3.5 Release connection with UUV/HostSub X X
F.4.1 Perform on-board diagnostics X X X
F.4.2 Accomplish underway maintenance X
  
Figure 16 – Form vs. Decomposed Functions 
 
c. System Performers and Information Needs 
The LRS has one top level system performer, the LRS operator.  The LRS operator 
interfaces with two external systems – the UUV, which is autonomous, and the HostSub 
operator.  The DoDAF OV-2, which is presented in Figure 17, displays the operational nodes 
with the informational need lines that connect the LRS to the external systems.  This information 
triggers the system to perform the launch and recovery functions.   The information passed 
between these interfaces includes information collected during the mission as well as information 
to maintain the LRS and determine if it is ready to perform a certain function.   
In addition to the top-level interface, to provide a more detailed view of the system, there 
are two other performers that were mapped.  These are the operational nodes, which connect to 
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the HostSub, the US Navy Support Agency and the UUV Equipment Providers.  The US Navy 
Support Agency are where the mission parameters are generated and all information collected 
during the mission is sent.   The UUV equipment providers help troubleshoot the UUV while 
underway.  While maintaining the UUV is outside of the scope of this document, it was 
recognized since it is a critical attribute in having the LRS mission be successful.   
 
Figure 17 – System Performers and Information Needs 
d. Operational Flows 
The system operational views were displayed via the extended functional flow block 
diagram and the IDEF0 views that were generated in CORE®.  This view displays the 
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information given in the DoDAF OV-5 and SV-4 views.  Both the EFFBD and the IDEF0 give 
the controls, inputs and output, operational activities and functions; the EFFBD shows the 
sequence of activities whereas the IDEF0 shows the allocation of operational activities, and 
input/outputs and controls better than the EFFBD.    
Launch IDEF0/EFFBD - The launch EFFBD and IDEF0 are presented in Figure 18 and 
Figure 19, respectively.  The launch function is started by initiating the launch sequence via the 
launch mechanism that is triggered by the UUV mission objectives report being supplied to the 
system.  Communications, via the control system, will then be established between the LRS and 
HostSub, and LRS and UUV to upload and download required ISR mission data.  The LRS has 
the capability to obtain environmental information from the HostSub and UUV, including the 
depth and speed of the submarine and UUV, along with the environmental threats that impact 
launching the UUV.  This data will be used to determine if the LRS is ready to launch.  Along 
with the environmental data, the LRS performs a self-check prior to declaring the LRS is ready 
to launch the UUV.  Finally, the LRS undocks from the payload tube, extends to launch the UUV 
and then retracts and re-docks into the payload tube.  This sequence was conceived to be 
conducted up to three times consecutively to launch three UUVs during one mission.   
 
 





Figure 19 - Launch IDEF 0 
 
Recovery EFFBD/IDEF0 - The recovery function starts with the UUV Mission 
objective status triggering the start of the recovery sequence and whose EFFBD and IDEF0 are 
presented in Figure 20 and Figure 21, respectively.  Communications, via the control system and 
RF and acoustic communications, will be established between the LRS/HostSub to obtain 
environmental information from the HostSub and UUV, including the depth and speed of both 
the submarine and UUV, along with the environmental threats that would impact launching the 
UUV.  This data will be used to determine if the LRS is ready to support recovery.  Along with 
the environmental data, the LRS performs a self- check prior to declaring the LRS is ready to 
recover the UUV.  Once the system is ready, the LRS will extend and capture the UUV.  The 
UUV will then be secured and locked into the LRS which will then be stowed in the HostSub 





Figure 20 - Recovery EFFBD 
 
Figure 21 - Recovery IDEF0 
 
Replenish EFFBD/IDEF0 - Once the LRS has recovered the UUV, the UUV 
replenishment activities will occur.  The Replenish EFFBD and IDEF0 are presented in Figure 
22 and Figure 23, respectively. This is done by first establishing a connection with both the 
HostSub and UUV for power and communications.  Information will be uploaded or downloaded 
from the UUV, LRS, and HostSub, along with repowering of the UUV.   These events may occur 
in parallel.  Once the system has determined that the UUV is repowered and all information has 
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been downloaded or uploaded, the connection between the UUV, LRS and HostSub will be 
terminated.   
 
Figure 22 - Replenish EFFBD 
 
 
Figure 23 - Replenish IDEF0 
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Maintain EFFBD/IDEF0 - The last function to be performed is maintain whose EFFBD 
and IDEF0 are presented in Figure 24 and Figure 25, respectively.  The LRS will provide a UUV 
and LRS Readiness status.  The LRS in-service maintenance component, a part of the control 
system architecture, will perform an on-board diagnostic of the system.  If necessary, the system 
will accomplish maintenance and then be ready for the next mission.   
 
Figure 24 - Maintain EFFBD 
 
Figure 25 - Maintain IDEF0 
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C. MISSION ANALYSIS 
1. Background 
Mission analysis was a process which determined the overall purposes or objectives and 
capabilities of the system and the circumstances and environment in which the system must 
operate [SC-21, 1998].  Figure 26 identified the activities and process used to support mission 
analysis.  Mission analysis for this project included analysis of stakeholder needs and coupled 
boundary conditions,  analysis of the specified areas of operations (AO), constraints encountered 
in the AO, threats to the mission, personnel and/or organizational units needed to support the 
mission and resources needed to successfully support the mission.   
The mission analysis was used to first develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 
the UUV/Launch and Recovery Mechanism/Host Submarine Family of Systems.  The CONOPS 
is a high-level viewpoint of how the system operates within its intended environment and was 
developed using the list of critical tasks, derived from the UNTL.  From this CONOPS, specific 
AOs, constraints and threats were considered to develop several important mission scenarios that 
would be supported. 
These mission scenarios assessed the functionality of the proposed system concepts.  The 
functionality was traced upward to ensure that the needs of the stakeholders met the plausible 
missions of the system and traced downward to measure performance of physical concepts 
against each other.  With these mission scenarios, the project team analyzed the operational 
environment and boundaries of the system and identified potential interactions with external 
entities, which might have been otherwise missed, and created performance requirements for the 








2. External Boundary Conditions 
a. UUV System 
There are numerous large UUVs built for ISR-type operations by different vendors.  To 
support the success of this project and define the interfaces necessary to support integration, a 
“standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV system was defined.  The “standard” Large Vehicle Class 
UUV captured most, if not all, of the major performance requirements and functions inherent to 
currently conceived large UUV systems.  The following sources were used to capture the major 
requirements and functions: 
• Overarching system design requirements specified in the UUV Road Map Report 
issued by NAVSEA 073R, Director of Undersea Technology. [SEA 073R, 2008] 
• The Survey of Large Unmanned Maritime Vehicles prepared by Johns Hopkins 
Applied Physics Laboratory [Hopkins, 2010] 
• The identified mission requirements based on the Stake Holder Goals concerning 
CNO Requirements for a 30 Day Mission in Seven Years from ”Inside The Navy” 
[Inside The Navy, 2010] 
• The technology requirements based on the information specified in Department of 
Defense, Militarily Critical Technologies List Section 13: Marine Systems, 
Technology, January 2009, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics Pentagon. [MCTL, 2009, Section 13] 
• The review of ASTMs established to define common parameters for UUV 




• Consideration of other technical factors and design requirement, including shock, 
safety and commonality. 
Following examination of the source documentation, several existing large UUVs 
designed for specific use on ISR-type missions, including Bluefin Robotics Corporation 
BPAUV, Sea Otter MK II and REMUS 6000 (see Figure 27) were evaluated for common 
features and functions.  Through this analysis and determination of threshold and objective 
requirements for the existing systems as well as review of standards and possible developments 
for “near-future” systems, a “standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV were defined.  Table 4 
provides the detailed attributes of the “standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV utilized for this 
project. 
 
   
     Bluefin BPUAV [Keller, 2008]           REMUS 6000 UUV [Kongsberg, 2008] 
 
SEA Otter MK II UUV [AUVAC, 2008]   












Vehicle Class UUV 
Capability 
Length 12.6 FT 28.5 FT 28.5 FT 
Outside Diameter 28 IN 66 IN 66 IN 
Body Shape Round Hydroplane Multiple 
Weight (Dry) 2000 LBM 17600 LBM 20000 LBM 
Operating Depth 200 FT 1000 FT 1000 FT 




Speed 0-4 Knots 2-12 Knots 2-12 Knots 
Range 22 Hrs @ 4 Knots 1600 Nm @ 3.6 
Knots 
2800 Nm @ 4 Knots 
Propulsion Dual Rotating Props Ducted Pump Jet w/ 
5 Rotating Blades 
Ducted Pump Jet w/ 
5 Rotating Blades  
Power/Capacity Silver-Zinc Battery / 
10kWh 
Li-Ion Rechargeable 
Battery / 360kWh 
Rechargeable 
Battery / 500kWh 
RF 
Communications 
None Freeay LOS-RF, 
Inmarsat Sailor-250, 
Iridium Satellite, 









None Custom WHOI, 
emergency Comms 










0.84 0.95 0.90 
UUV Mission 
Duration 
20 Hrs 18  Days 30 Days (Goal) 
UUV Navigation 
System Accuracy 
+/- 0.5% +/- 0.3% +/- 0.5% 
 
b. Host Submarine System 
The host platform for this project was the USS VIRGINIA Class (VA) Block III attack 
submarines.  The USS VIRGINIA (SSN 774) Class of submarines were designed for both open-
ocean and littoral missions.  Their design is a more economical alternative to the Cold War era 
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USS SEAWOLF Class (SSN 21) attack submarines, and will replace the aging USS LOS 
ANGELES Class (SSN 688) submarines.  This class of submarine, designed by Electric Boat 
Corporation, is being jointly constructed by Northrop Grumman Newport News (NGNN) in 
Virginia (now known as Huntington Ingalls Industries) and Electric Boat (EB) in Connecticut.  
VA Block I and II submarines are equipped with a Vertical Launch System (VLS) 
consisting of twelve individual tubes located in the forward section of the submarine.  This was 
the SSN 688 Class attack submarine VLS configuration.  Starting in 2002, the Navy converted 
four USS OHIO (SSBN 726) Class submarines to SSGNs.  These conversions consisted of 
modifying the existing 88-inch diameter ballistic missile tubes to accommodate up to twenty-two 
(22) Multiple All-Up Round Canisters (MAC) which provide the capability to store and launch 
seven Tomahawk cruise missiles while reserving the remaining two ballistic missile tubes for 
Special Operating Forces (SOF) support or other essential missions.  The successful conversion 
of these large diameter ballistic missile tubes to MACs and other mission uses provided the Navy 
justification to develop this concept on the VA submarines in the Block III hulls.   VA Block III 
submarines will be equipped with two larger diameter tubes known as Virginia Payload Tubes 
(VPT) in lieu of the twelve (12) individual VLS tubes found on Block’s I and II.  Each payload 
tube can accommodate a MAC, used for Tomahawk support, or can be configured to support 
SOF and/or UUV missions.  Figure 28 shows the general configuration envisioned for Block III 








A constraint is a restriction, regulation, or checks that prevents, limits or dictates the 
actions of the system within proscribed bounds.  Through analysis of literature, needs and 
operational concepts, five (5) main categories of constraints were identified:  Natural, Physical, 
Policy, Operational and Man-Made. 
a. Natural Constraints  
Ocean Environment - VA Class Block III submarine launch, communication and 
recovery of Large Vehicle Class UUVs would be subject to weather and sea state conditions.  In 
the worst sea conditions, actual underwater launch and recovery may prove impossible; however, 
even minor conditions might have an adverse impact on system reliability and mechanism 
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performance.  Rough sea states or strong currents could interfere with the transmission and 
reception of data to/from the UUV and submarine or with the navigation capabilities necessary to 
close and recover the UUV with the mechanism.   Sea state and water temperatures could limit 
replenishment and recovery efforts, especially if manned operations are required.   The 
submarine might be limited in its ability to come to periscope depth to transmit data from the 
UUV based on weather conditions.   Warm Water Operations (defined as greater than 90°F) have 
been known to impact equipment reliability, and may contribute to contamination and fouling.  
Corrosion of materials exposed to seawater must also be considered. 
Topography – The submarine would launch and recover UUVs near hostile coastlines.  
Water depth at the coastline may affect the ability for the host submarine to approach the 
coastline.  Currents may be stronger in the intended operational environment than at deep-sea 
operations.  Due to limited depths, underwater mountains and features may affect 
communications and maneuvering of the equipment.  Shallow operations and extended periods 
of hovering or on-site operations could result in exposure to more marine life forms and 
increased biological fouling of equipment. 
b. Physical Constraints 
Vehicle Characteristics – The large diameter, weight and shape of current and future 
Large Vehicle Class UUVs would tax the host submarine and the capabilities of a launch and 
recovery system.  Future iterations would expect larger power supplies for UUVs to support 
persistent-ISR missions.  The submarine must have the capability to recharge the UUV power 
supply.  Additionally, multiple launch capabilities from a single host submarine require 
consideration for storage capabilities within submarine launcher tubes.  To offset weight 
additions, power impacts and shock considerations, lightweight materials with equal strengths of 
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structural steels must be considered in the design of the supporting structure.  Such materials 
must successfully trade off cost considerations with performance considerations. 
Communications - The submarine communications suites have the capability to interact 
with the sensor suites on the UUV, through an interface with the LRS, and retransmit data via 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite relay and line of sight (LOS) links to maintain command, 
control, and sensor data communication paths.  Bandwidth compression would be applied to 
sensor data to maximize area coverage and data throughput.  However, bandwidth capabilities 
might be taxed as more and more data transmission is required, requiring additional and costly 
power sources.  Furthermore, timeliness of the transmitted signals may create problems.  The 
support command has the responsibility to integrate the data transmitted from the submarine 
received from the UUV into the theater Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) to provide 
timely dissemination of collected intelligence to the requesting customer.       
c. Policy Constraints  
Tasking Order - The means for implementing persistent-ISR missions for a VA Class 
submarine was assumed to be the tasking order.  The Tasking Order would include the 
employment plan.  The Fleet Commander tasks the submarine to launch UUVs to accomplish 
specific missions and to provide data with sufficient detail to execute persistent-ISR missions.  
The support element must be capable of generating the mission plan within the time constraints 
of the tasking order cycle.  The Operational Commander issues the tasking order, which is valid 
for a specific period.  The Operational Commander’s Intelligence Division would determine that 
the submarine launched UUV would conduct the mission based on coverage requirements, 
communications connectivity with supported units, and survivability considerations.   The 
tasking order planning, coordination and execution is a continuous process, which may cross 
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several tasking order cycles.  The effective and efficient use of submarine launched UUVs for 
persistent-ISR missions requires coordination between the intelligence and operational 
commanders and multi-service/coalition liaisons within the command.  During mission 
execution, the commander(s) support by the data collected by the UUV might request changes in 
coverage areas or times.  These changes must be coordinated through the submarine immediate 
superior in command (ISIC), and Fleet Commander. 
Water-space Management - The Fleet commander is responsible for the safe operation 
of the platforms under his control.   Operating procedures with adequate margins of safety for 
naval vessels in high traffic areas need to be developed  for current and future  UUV operations   
Likewise, the VA Class Block III submarine commander is responsible for the safe operation of 
his ship, the interfacing launch/recovery mechanism and the UUVs.  Policies must seamlessly 
integrate with over-arching policies and allow control of multiple UUVs, possibly launched and 
recovered from platforms other than the on-station host submarine. 
d. Operational Constraints  
Safe Operations – A system of redundant communications will be required to ensure the 
submarine can adequately navigate with and monitor UUV actions in close quarters.  
Considerations must be made for a UUV vehicle, which cannot make it back to a pre-
programmed recovery point and must be abandoned for future recovery or destroyed either in a 
high traffic sea-lane or in enemy waters.  The LRS must consider speed and flexibility of 
recovery, both features which will likely result in increased costs. 
Force Structure - In general, the U.S. Navy requires multiple VA Class submarines with 
the capability to launch, control and recover large UUVs for persistent-ISR missions, be 
available in the operational area to support training and exercises.  The UUV’s coverage 
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constraints are dictated by power supply constraints, transit distances to the operational area and 
the ability to recover UUVs once deployed. 
Manpower - As the VA Class Block III Submarines are certified for unrestricted 
operations, the Commander Submarine Forces Command must consider training and equipping 
the force for operations and maintenance of the LRS.   
Physical Security - Submarine and UUV protection requirements are based on the 
location of the submarine, the tasked mission, and the Department of the Navy’s physical and 
operational security programs.   Commander Fleet Forces Command, in conjunction with the 
Office of Naval Intelligence will need to develop and implement any additional physical security 
requirements for the VA Class Block III submarines when UUVS are loaded with the appropriate 
support systems installed.  The standards will identify the security priorities and establish 
requirements for security forces and equipment aids. 
Information Security - These requirements include addressing anti-tamper and force 
protection requirements with both received and distributed information.  The information that 
needs to be protected will include the mission profile, and associated operational orders and 
constraint, and the data collected during the ISR Missions. 
Operational Security - Operational Security requirements are designed to prevent 
tampering with critical information.  In this case, it includes the control systems architecture and 
the communications system, both of which must be maintained secure.  This is done by the use 
of controlled work packages for maintenance and configuration changes, as well as encrypted 
secure communications.  It is anticipated that the existing radio and acoustic communications 




e. Man-Made Constraints  
Enemy Actions - Communications systems were engineered to minimize susceptibility 
to jamming and interception.  Dissemination of UUV collected intelligence sent to the submarine 
is made through direct downlinks to national, theater intelligence centers, and exploitation 
systems.  As the proposed system acts as a bridge between the UUV and the host submarine, 
considerations must be made to limit jamming and signal disruption by enemy forces and/or 
spurious signals.  Additionally, components used to launch and recover the UUVs must consider 
minimizing radiated noise and/or signature to minimize detection by enemy threats. 
Noise/Information Pollution - Operation in littoral areas are known to be extremely 
noisy environments and pose issues not only to detection, but also to collecting information on 
targets and disseminating information.  Sensor design and power requirements demand larger 
vehicles to meet persistent-ISR capabilities.  Override controls potentially necessary to support 
maneuvering operations of UUVs at launch and recovery must be robust enough to overcome 
background noise and interference.    
4. Mission Phases and Threats 
There are four (4) distinct mission phases for the LRS:  Pre-Mission (includes transport, 
loading and securing of the UUV and launch/recovery mechanism into the host submarine), 
Launch (includes download of mission parameters), Recovery (including stowage of UUV into 
launch/recovery mechanism and securing of equipment) and Post-Mission (including download 
of ISR data, and in-service maintenance and troubleshooting/diagnostics).  Each phase of the 
mission face a certain level of risk associated with common and/or unique threats to that phase. 
A threat is a plausible risk that could inflict harm on either personnel and/or equipment.  
Threats might be the result of natural events, accidents or intentional acts meant to cause harm.  
55 
 
Plausible threats to the family of systems (UUV, host submarine and launch/recovery system) in 
each phase of the mission were examined as follows: 
Pre-Mission – Threats to equipment and personnel include accidental damage during the 
loading operations and/or transport.  The Large Vehicle Class UUVs can weigh as much as 
20,000 lbs and the LRS is likely to weigh up to 100,000 lbs.  As such, crane operations will be 
required to support loading into the launcher tubes.  Tight clearances and typical risks associate 
with heavy lifting operations can lead to damage to the LRS, UUV and/or the host submarine.  
Of critical concern, is the damage than cannot be visually detected, such as internal damage to 
computer systems, communication systems or any equipment with internal components.  A 
robust testing strategy and pre-mission inspection capabilities would aid in evaluation of system 
capabilities prior to deployment of the loaded system.  
Launch – A rapid and silent launch will be critical to avoid submarine and/or UUV 
detection by enemy forces.  Both the submarine and the UUV are vulnerable to threats during 
launch given its submerged operating envelope.  Operational concepts identified that the 
submarine would launch UUVs at shallow depths (no less than periscope depth).  At shallow 
depths, the threat to the submarine is broad, from detection by enemy sonar and radars to visual 
detection, leading to torpedo and missile attack.  Rapid launch would constrain deployment times 
of LRS components, requiring robust, flexible and technologically advanced equipment to 
prevent damage from accidents and sea conditions at shallow depths.   Additionally, the 
communications between the submarine and the UUV via the interface of the LRS during the 
launch phase must be suitable to prevent deployment of a UUV with incomplete or inaccurate 
mission data.  Although upload of information and mission parameters would likely feedback 
erroneous information to operators, problem with the data interfaces could produce false 
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readings.  Furthermore, positioning of host submarine and LRS equipment will be vital to 
ensuring impact accidents do not occur.  Sensor feedback mechanisms must be robust and 
redundant to the necessary level of reliability. 
Recovery – Similar to the launch phase, rapid and silent recoveries of the UUVs would 
be critical to avoid detection.  As discussed before, the submarine would recover the UUV at 
shallow depths, where enemy risks of detection and/or harm are significant.  Recoveries would 
likely pose a more significant risk of accident as the UUV is affected by ocean movement 
currents/tides and may not be directly attached to the LRS as it is during launch.  Clear and real-
time operator feedback would be essential to prevent the UUV from damaging itself, the host 
submarine and the LRS from accidental impacts.  In addition, recovery encompasses secure 
stowage of the LRS as well as the UUV itself.  Vibrations must be minimized to avoid radiated 
noise and equipment damage due to shock and other lesser differential forces.  Equipment must 
minimize slop between components and false readings concerning interface between the internal 
and external system boundaries.  Finally, recovery might require the use of an active acoustic 
communication feature (such as a sonar “pinger”) that locates the UUV and provides a “homing” 
feature.  Any such acoustic communications feature could lead to detection by enemy forces and 
compromise of the UUV and host submarine assets if not judiciously and sporadically deployed. 
Post-Mission – Interfaces between the UUV and the host platform must be robust and 
compatible to support a rapid transition of the ISR data to the intelligence network.   Systems 
where communications flow through a wireless means may be more rapid than a hardware 
solution, but might also be more susceptible to compromise.  Threats could include active and 
passive detection capabilities by enemies and well as interception, requiring a level of encryption 
and security that may further inhibit timely information transfer.  Post-mission activities were 
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expected to include diagnostic and trouble-shooting activities to prepare the family of systems 
for subsequent missions.  Such activities must provide a technically sound and, at times, a 
cautious approach to prevent hardware/software damage to system components.  Limits to 
underway repairs must be recognized and logistics must support on-board equipment or 
redundant components that maximize times between mission failures.  In addition to trouble-
shooting and diagnostics, replenishment of the UUV through the LRS, primarily re-charging of 
the UUV power source, will occur.  Accidents such as an electrical fire, power surge or an 
interface capability issue could damage the equipment or delay subsequent missions. 
5. Concept of Operations 
The Large Vehicle Class UUV LRS was the interface system between a FOS, brought 
together to support persistent-ISR underwater missions such as intelligence collection, target 
detection and undersea mapping.  The LRS will be installed into a VA Class Block III submarine 
VPT dockside prior to submarine deployment.  A single or multiple Large Vehicle Class UUVs 
will likewise be loaded onto the submarine prior to submarine deployment and physical 
integration between the host submarine and the UUVs will be accomplished through the LRS. 
During host submarine deployment to an area of operations, mission information will be 
received and up-loaded to the UUV(s).  UUV launch would occur at a safe standoff position and 
the UUV would transit from this location to the area of interest.  Minimal operator control of the 
UUV would be expected to support launch.  The UUV would operate autonomously and 
clandestinely within a given range and mission duration.  Mission updates and data transmissions 
would occur, as necessary, via pre-located communication buoys, dropped by ships or aircraft 
within the area of operations.  Future system upgrades might implement the capability for direct 
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host submarine contact with the remote UUV.  If host submarine communications would require 
interaction between the submarine and the UUV, it would be through an upgraded LRS. 
The Launch and Recovery Mechanism Command, Control and Intelligence (C2I) 
component provided the primary interface for the UUV vehicle to the host submarine.  It was 
expected to be a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) open architecture C2I system, designed to 
maintain positive control of the LRS to prevent operational mishaps such as vehicle casualties, 
collision or sensitive technology being compromised by foreign entities [Unmanned System 
Safety Guide for DoD Acquisition Systems, 27 June 2007].    
Following completion of the mission, the UUV would return to a rendezvous point and 
transmit information necessary to support acquisition by the host submarine.  The host submarine 
would recover the UUV, safely stow the vehicle on board and, if necessary transit to a safe zone.  
Some operator control of the UUV was anticipated to support recovery operations.  The interface 
device would support download of data from the UUV to the host submarine and replenishment 
of the UUV, including re-charging of the power supply, changes to the software package and 
routine software testing and maintenance actions.  Under certain conditions, the LRS may allow 
personnel or diver access to the UUV to support underway and/or payload changes.  The LRS 
was expected to support multiple launches and recoveries during a single deployment cycle.  A 
graphical illustration of the operational overview (OV-1) and an expanded view that shows the 





        
 




6. Mission Scenarios 
a. Launch and Recovery Performance 
In a mission scenario, which demonstrated performance of LRS, the host submarine 
would launch multiple Large Vehicle Class UUVs (up to 3) in succession while avoiding 
detection and sea traffic.  After a set mission period, the submarine would then re-establish 
contact with the UUVs and return to rendezvous point where recovery and stowage of the UUVs 
would take place.  Light, average and severe weather conditions typical for a well-travelled AO 
would be used to assess different version of this scenario.   Measures of success would be rapid 
launch and recovery of UUVs with limited mishaps, system availability and factors related to 
detection of UUV/submarine during launch.  
b. Disabled Vehicles 
This mission scenario proposed assessment of retrieval capabilities for Large Vehicle 
Class UUVs with various levels of functionality.  In this scenario, the host submarine would 
arrive a rendezvous point and attempt to establish communications with UUVs in various stages 
of functionality (25%, 50%, 75% and 100%).  Returning UUVs communicate with host ship via 
the LRS and begin the retrieval process.  Measures of success would be determined by timely 
and mishap-free retrieval of UUVs with various capability limitations (communication systems, 
propulsion, hovering, and/or structural damage).   
c. Replenishment Performance 
This mission scenario proposed an assessment of replenishment of UUV systems while 
stowed in the LRS.  It will measure the amount of time necessary to recharge the battery system 
under various conditions and assess the communications and interfaces between the UUV and 
host submarine to transfer data.  Additionally, the underway scenario would evaluate the security 
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of the system, both electronically and mechanically, when stowed.  Electronic security can be 
analyzed via complexity of security issues and how data transfer would occur.  Mechanical 
security is an assessment of radiated noise caused by the stowed systems and resistance to 
vibration and shock loading.   Measures of success would include the timeliness of 
replenishment and data transfer and a qualitative assessment of noise created by a system.   
62 
 
III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION 
A. ALLOCATE SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND DEFINE CONCEPTS 
1. Background 
Following definition of stakeholder requirements, functional architecture and 
mission/operational requirements, the next step was to determine conceptual design alternatives 
for the system.   The team decomposed the stakeholder weighted needs into performance 
measurements, functions and component concepts that reflect the values of the project 
stakeholders.  The result developed the baseline requirement products and conceptual design 
alternatives that were used to accomplish comparisons and analysis in follow-on phases of the 
project. 
2. Establish System Component Concepts 
To identify technologies and component concepts that could be integrated and make up 
the recommended design of the system, the team first sought to establish and weigh system 
performance capabilities and the system-level functional hierarchy.  Based on the stakeholder 
requirements and using the UNTL, literature and the “standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV 
description as starting points, objectives were conceived to meet the requirements and metrics 
were proposed as measurements to assess the satisfactory performance of the objectives.   Next, 
using QFD models, system performance, function and conceptual components were ranked 
against the weighted stakeholder requirements. 
a. Performance Requirements and Metrics 
The Requirements Analysis established the design criteria to produce a preferred system, 
which met customer expectations.  Initial steps served to develop qualitative aspects of the 
system, represented by the customer requirements or “what” the customer wants from the 
63 
 
system.  However, to successfully evaluate competing concepts, quantitative aspects of system 
performance must be applied to each requirement.  As such, evaluation measures were 
established for each of the stakeholder requirements and are displayed in Table 5. 
For each requirement, one or several “objectives” were established.  Objectives 
represented a means of measuring the intent of a customer requirement.  For instance, 
stakeholder interviews determined that the system must accommodate large UUV re-chargeable 
power sources to support extended persistent-ISR UUV missions.  However, the definition of 
“accommodate” in this context left multiple integration issues open for interpretation.  
Accommodate represented spatial considerations (size, volume) but also represented strength 
considerations (weight, structural material properties) and support considerations (energy supply, 
transmission of energy).  Objectives were developed to represent the accommodation 
characteristics in measurable ways, identified as Technical Performance Measures (TPM).  
Evaluations of these measures were expressed in terms of ascending or descending values.  
Assignment of actual values for performance objectives occurred as part of concept development 




Table 5 – System Performance Objectives 
 
Requirement Objective Technical Performance Measure 
(and Evaluation) 
Host Submarine Safety Decrease Mishaps Percent of missions that result in 
damage to sub (lower is better) 
 Resist Shock Damage Percent of shock events that 
result in damage to Grade A 
equipment (lower is better) 
 Decrease Detection Minutes of avoiding detection by 
enemy in operational area (higher 
is better) 
Accommodate Large Power 
Needs 
Maximize Payload Space 
Envelope 
CUIN of payload capacity 
(higher is better) 
 Decrease Load on Submarine 
Power Supply 
Amps required to re-charge UUV 
(efficiency of charging process) 
(lower is better) 
 Maximize Power Transmission 
Transfer (both in the submarine 
and while deployed)  
Hours to re-charge UUV (lower 
is better) 
Operational Performance Decrease Launch Time Launch time in minutes (Tube 
flooded to UUV underway) 
(lower is better) 
 Decrease Recovery Time Recovery time in minutes (Local 
UUV control obtained to UUV 
stowed) (lower is better) 
 Maximize Potential Operating 
Environments  
Launch and recovery capability 
in Sea State Number (higher is 
better) 
Resist Shock and Noise (Subset of Host Submarine 
Safety Objectives) 
 
Reliability Maximize System Time to 
Failure 
Months of satisfactory 
performance before failure 
(higher is better) 
Affordability Reduce Acquisition Costs Current Year Dollars (lower is 
better) 
 Reduce Life-cycle Costs Current Year Dollars (lower is 
better) 
Flexibility Supports Multiple UUV payloads Number of significantly different 
UUV designs supported (higher 
is better) 
 Supports Multiple UUV payloads Time to modify system (pier side) 
to accommodate significantly 
different UUV designs (lower) 
Weight Control Reduce Impact on Submarine 
Stability 
System Center of Gravity (CG) in 
inches (lower is better) 
 Reduce Impact on Submarine 
Weight margin 




Decrease Turn-around Time between successful re-







Table 5 – System Performance Objectives (Continued) 
 
Requirement Objective Technical Performance Measure 
(and Evaluation) 
Multiple Launch Capabilities Increase Missions Number of controlled UUVs in 
operational area simultaneously 
(higher is better) 
Communications Increase Timeliness of ISR Time from transmission of 
request to receipt of information 
(lower is better) 
 Increase Successful Data 
Transmissions 
Percent of received and 
understood data transmissions 
(higher is better) 
(1) Key Performance Parameters 
To direct focus on the performance measurements considered the most important to the 
stakeholders, the team established KPPs.  The KPPs, identified in Table 6, each had an objective 
value (desired goal) and a threshold value (minimum acceptable performance) established by the 
team members to support initial trade-off analysis of concept designs.  Objective and threshold 
values were related to similar parameters identified for the “standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV 
and for the VA Class Block III submarine design criteria. 
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Criteria Objective Threshold 
1 (LAUNCH SPEED) – To decrease risk of detection, 
the system shall minimize launch time (time from 
tube flooded to time UUV is away) 
10 Minutes 20 Minutes 
2 (RECOVERY SPEED) - To decrease risk of 
detection, the system shall minimize recovery time 
(time from UUV manual control is obtained to UUV 
is stowed) 
20 Minutes 40 Minutes 
3 (POWER CAPACITY TO UUV) – The system shall 
replenish the stowed UUV power supply quickly to 
support re-launch 
38 hrs 50 hrs 
4 (PAYLOAD VOLUME) - The system shall maximize 
payload volume to support stowage of multiple UUVs 
3000 CUFT 1000 CUFT 
5 (COMMUNICATION SUCCESS) – The system shall 






6 (RELIABILITY) - The system shall maximize the 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) to minimize 
maintenance requirements.  
24 months 18 months 
7 (SAFE OPERATIONAL DEPTH) - The system shall 
operate at depth to avoid detection and support 
mission flexibility. 
500 feet 150 feet 
8 (SYSTEM WEIGHT) - The system shall minimize 
total weight. 
50000 lbs 100,000 lbs 
9 (NOISE PREVENTION) - The system shall minimize 
radiated noise. (i.e. supertanker creates ~ 200 db) 
125 db 175 db 
10 (SHOCK PREVENTION) - The system shall 
minimize shock related damage. 
Grade A Grade B 
 
(2) Ranked Needs to KPPs (QFD-1) 
To aid with the establishment and prioritization of technical performance measures, QFD 
models were utilized.  The QFD modeling ensured that the customer requirements were reflected 
accordingly in the final LRS design.  When utilized, QFD models established the system 
requirements and translated them into technical solutions. 
The customer requirements identified in QFD-1 were weighted by conducting a pair wise 
comparison of requirements.  The results of the pair wise comparison can be found in Figure 10.   
In QFD-1, the customer requirements were ranked according to design characteristics identified 
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as the LRS KPPs found in Table 6.  By invoking QFD-1, the customer requirements were further 
understood that allowed the design team to prioritize the customer requirements accordingly.  
With the prioritized customer requirements, one design approach was compared to another with 
each customer requirement being satisfied with a technical solution. The results of   QFD-1 can 
be seen in Figure 30 and were incorporated into the QFD-2 model.  From the QFD model, it was 
evident that Launch and Recovery were the two most weighted KPPs identified with an identical 
percentage rank of 18%.   
 



















































Flexible to accommodate multiple size/shape 
UUVs 0.073 0.073 3 6
Support multiple packages/launches 
simultaneously 0.052 0.052 3 3    
charging 0.123 0.123 9
Lightweight 0.072 0.072 9
Affordable 0.091 0.091 3 3
Resist shock and noise conditions 0.102 0.102 9 9
Launch/recover performance parameters 
(time/stealth/moving sub) 0.112 0.112 6 6 6
Reliable 0.101 0.101 9
Host ship safety 0.170 0.170 6 6 3 6
 Maintainable at Sea 0.055 0.055 3 3 6




Weighted Performance 2.3 2.3 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.7 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 12.7
Percent Performance 0.180 0.180 0.105 0.034 0.035 0.137 0.133 0.051 0.072 0.072
0. 00
0. 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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b. High Level Functional Requirements 
Given the performance requirements of the conceptual system, the team sought to 
describe a functional description to the system.  The functional description explains the actions 
that the system needs to take to reach a specified objective or goal.  Using the technical 
performance parameters established to describe the goals of the system, the team established 
eight (8) high level functional requirements for the system: execute launch, communicate, system 
readiness, obtain environmental information, replenish, secure system, power UUV, and 
maintain system. 
(1) Ranked KPPs to Functions (QFD-2) 
In a similar fashion to QFD-1, a QFD-2 was created to scale the priority of design 
characteristics to the high level functional requirements.  The constructed QFD-2, shown on 
Figure 31, effectively ranked the importance of functions in relation to the ranked performance 
derived in QFD-1 for LRS KPPs.  The QFD-2 weighted the performance for each high level 
function respective to a design characteristic KPP and concluded that Obtaining Environmental 
Information was the highest ranked function with a weighted percentage of 19.8%.  Functionality 
for Executing Launch and Communicate shared the second ranking with a weighted percentage 




Figure 31 - QFD-2: KPPs vs. Functions 
 
c. Establish Component Concepts from Functions 
With system high-level functions established, the team focused on the high level 
allocation of these functions to system components.  The high-level components were the 
physical sub-systems that will accomplish the desired actions of the system.  Although specific 
allocation of functions between the system components could not be clearly defined without 
additional examination of the functional architecture, the team established eight (8) core 
component concepts on which to base a LRS conceptual design:  support structure, recovery 
mechanism, launch mechanism, UUV Power and Recharging mechanism, stowage system, 
control system architecture, RF Spectrum communications, and acoustic communications. 
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(1) Ranked Component Concepts to Functions (QFD-3) 
Customer requirements, identified in QFD-1, were scaled to system design 
characteristics, and QFD-2 then analyzed design characteristics which were ranked to high level 
functions.  QFD-3 now used the weighted performances determined in QFD-2 to fit forms to 
functional requirements.  QFD-3 ultimately related LRS form to customer requirements 
identified in QFD-1 and in Figure 32.  QFD-3 concluded that the LRS support structure and 
control system architecture were the most critical forms necessary to satisfy customer 
requirements and functionality.  Support Structure and Control System Architecture obtained a 
ranking of 33.8% and 24.9% respectively.  
 
Figure 32 - QFD-3: Functions vs. Form 
71 
 
3. Conceptual Design Alternatives 
Conceptual design alternatives are possible physical solutions to the customers’ needs.  
For the LRS, the team sought to identify technologies and concepts for the eight (8) component 
forms established in the QFD analysis, which could be explored, compared, analyzed and 
modeled.  The conceptual designs established a starting point for all follow-on activities of the 
project. 
Using stakeholder, SME and literature input, the team established potential technologies 
for each of the component forms.  A Technology Matrix was established, as shown in Appendix 
B, which identified the technology, specific benefits and/or drawbacks to the technology and the 
potential risk associated with the technology.  Risks were assigned a value of high, medium or 
low in three (3) key categories; Programmatic (Cost/Schedule), Technology Maturity and 
Perceived Performance.   
a. Establish Conceptual Design Alternatives (Morphology) 
To determine concepts to analyze further, morphology was used to determine every 
possible combination of component alternatives.  Initially, due to the number of alternatives for 
each of the eight (8) main components, morphology generated a total of 77,760 conceptual 
design alternatives.  In order to narrow down the number of alternatives, the number of choices 
for each component was limited.  The team considered more component choices (up to 3) for 
components that had a higher weight in the QFD-3 and limited choices to 1 or 2 for the lower-
weighted components.  This methodology reduced the morphology list to the top 324 design 
alternative concepts.  
The team established a qualitative measure to compare the remaining alternative 
concepts.  A numerical value was assigned to the remaining components, based on the previously 
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determined levels of programmatic risk, technological maturity, and perceived performance. 
These values were used to calculate the final score for each combination by taking the sum of the 
component scores multiplied by the QFD-3 weights for each of the major component.  Figure 33 
shows the top few lines of the morphology matrix that was used to score the concepts.  
 
Figure 33 - Morphology Matrix 
b. Assumptions for Conceptual Design Alternatives 
Several assumptions were made by the Capstone team members in order to rank the eight 
(8) main component combinations.   
• Risk rankings for each component alternative were correct, based on team experience, 
literature research and discussion with peers. 
• Identified risk ratings were used to narrow down the number of alternatives for each 
component, based on the assumption that the lower rated alternatives would not make 
it into the top ranked concepts. 
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• In scoring the alternatives based on their risk ranking, the team developed a 1/3/9 
point ranking system for risk scores of red, yellow and green respectively.  The 1/3/9 
point system has precedence, being based on QFD ranking models [Clausing, 1994, 
pg. 124], and was found to provide the most robust differentiation between 
alternatives. 
• The team weighed the performance risk twice as much as the programmatic risk and 
technical maturity to align with stakeholder values and needs to field an advanced 
concept.     
Figure 34 shows how the score was calculated for each individual component alternative.  
Figure 34 - Component Alternative Scores 
4. Results, Feasibility and Risks 
The results of the conceptual design alternative analysis, scoring, ranking and team 
decision-making identified top design alternatives suited for additional analysis and comparison.  
74 
 
All alternatives share several key components, such as underwater, short-range radio 
communication capabilities and an acoustic homing communication feature.  These 
communication technologies were deemed the most suitable and cost-effective components 
available to serve the short-range communications needs of the system and no other technologies 
were considered.  Additionally, all alternatives will utilize a portable plug-in type 
hardware/software control system, similar to systems now utilized for many temporary 
alternations supported on submarines.  Such systems are easy to maintain and up-grade when 
compared to hardwired systems as work can be done in a laboratory environment vice an 
industrial facility.  However, all the alternatives did have significant differences, most notably 
with UUV recovery devices, materials for the physical structure and UUV battery charging 
capabilities.  These core component areas address many of the challenges and issues brought up 
during stakeholder needs analysis and provide the best comparisons between conceptual system 
alternatives and baseline systems that currently exist.  The alternatives, identified in Table 7 with 




Table 7 – Composition of Concept Alternatives 
 
 Baseline -  Low 
Cost Option 




Alternative 2 – 
Mechanical 
Recovery Arm 
Alternative 3 –    
ROV Recovery 





Carbon Steel Titanium Carbon Fiber 
Composite 











































































































Baseline – Low Cost Option 
The Baseline Option, considered the lowest cost option available, attempted to mirror the 
technology and design of the ULRM system built and tested on a converted missile tube of the 
USS FLORIDA (SSGN 728) during Operation “Giant Shadow”.  [Galrahn, 2006]  This option 
did not utilize any technology to support UUV recovery.  Instead, the baseline option relied on 
the UUV’s ability to accurately “home-in” on the submarine location and deployed cradle above 
the VPT.  The UUV would be required to navigate to the clamping device which will capture the 
horizontal UUV, re-orient it to the vertical position and stow it within the VPT.  It was expected 
that the host submarine would be nearly stationary to support UUV recovery.  Likewise, the 
76 
 
UUV “swim away” method of launch would require the submarine to come to a virtual stop to 
prevent a collision between the host sub and the slow moving UUV. 
The Baseline Option structural composition was made of variety of materials with the 
major portion being high yield strength carbon steel (HY-80).  While this material is easy to 
machine or weld, it is susceptible to corrosion in a normally wetted environment and must be 
painted to prevent oxidation.  Additionally, as HY-80 weighs more than 2x that of Titanium and 
6x that of carbon fiber reinforced polymers of equal volume, the HY-80 structure adds 
significant weight to the forward end of the VA Class Block III submarine, which must be 
compensated by additional ballast aft.  
The Baseline Option stowed the UUV in its cradle when retracted into the tube.  The 
cradle secures the UUV with a series of mechanical locks and clasps in its vertical position along 
a series of guide rails.  As a UUV might remain in-service for up to 18 months, within a wet 
stowage condition, normal and usual mechanical wear and corrosion of mechanical parts would 
likely create conditions of gear backlash or lost motion.  The result could be a less secure 
stowage of the 20,000 lb UUV and vibration which results in some radiated noise. 
When developed for the SSGN missile tube, the ULRM design leveraged off of the 
existing missile tube flood and drain system to de-water the tube and support dry data transfer 
and battery re-charging.   As a flood and drain system was not a design feature of the VPT for 
the VA Class Block III submarine, the Baseline Option relied on cable re-charging of the battery 
in a wet environment.  This wet environment greatly increased the risk of a flooded cable, which 
would jeopardize underway UUV replenishment.  The Block IV variant of the VA Class 
submarine design may provide a means to dewater and access the VPT; however, this capability 
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will not be explored in this project.  Figure 35 provides a conceptual representation of the 
Baseline Low Cost Option. 
 
Figure 35 – Baseline (Low-Cost Option) Concept Alternative  
Alternative 1– Attraction Recovery 
The Attraction Recovery alternative used technologically advanced components in the 
LRS structure and the recovery mechanism itself to address the concerns of stakeholders with 
regards to currently fielded systems.  The key to this alternative was an Electro-Magnetic 
Propulsion (EMP) device, which accelerated an object using a flowing electrical current and 
magnetic fields.  In seawater, such a device would charge the fluid which then can be repelled.  
The low pressure area near the EMP device, caused by the vacating seawater, would create a 
current which could draw the UUV into a recovery cradle.  If successful, such a device would 
allow rapid recovery of a UUV while both the submarine and UUV maintain a positive forward 
momentum, would be multi-directional and would not impose significant structural stresses on 
the support structure. 
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To counter the stresses put on the structure by mechanical launch and recovery devices, 
the proposed structural material for this option was titanium.  This material provides superior 
strength and elongation properties over the comparative materials, should not have a significant 
galvanic impact with adjacent materials found in the forward end of the VA Class Block III 
submarine and should resist the forces imposed during launch and recovery.  However, titanium 
weighs about 3 times as much by volume as a carbon fiber composite material, thereby affecting 
submarine stability at relatively the same cost per pound.  
Other features found in this alternative were a pressurized gas launch system, found in 
existing missile launch systems, meant to rapidly deploy the UUV away from the host submarine 
and limit collision mishaps.  This alternative featured a dry stowage compartment within the 
VPT where UUV battery charging and information transfer can occur without significant risk of 
electrical shorts or data disruptions.  In the VA Class Block III submarine concept, the dry 
compartment would not be accessible to technicians to support physical contact with the UUV 
while underway.   However, the dry compartment would still provide a benefit of protecting the 
UUV modules from constant seawater exposure and corrosion/degradation during a mission 






Figure 36 – Alternative 1 (Attraction Recovery) Concept Alternative 
  
Alternative 2 – Mechanical Recovery Arm 
The Mechanical Recovery Arm Alternative utilized an articulated mechanical arm to 
support recovery of the UUV.  This type of robotic arm would have approximately a 270° degree 
of motion, with the VPT hatch preventing full field recovery.  The arm would be directly 
controlled from inside the submarine with attached cameras and sensors providing feedback to 
the operator.  Unlike the Attraction Recovery Alternative, interaction between the mechanisms 
would require the UUV to successfully navigate much closer to the host submarine, posing a 
greater risk for collision.  Additionally, the UUV and submarine would likely come to a near stop 
to support recovery.  However, the articulated arm design is currently used in many undersea 
applications and the technology has proven mature and successful. 
This alternative sought to use a carbon fiber reinforced polymer to add stiffness and 
tensile strength to the support structure, at a weight six times less than carbon steel structures of 
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the same volume.  The stiffness of the carbon fiber structure should limit vibrations and 
consequential radiated noise.  It could be designed to limit compressive loading and allow 
modular upgrades by adding or removing sections via mechanical fasteners.  Drawbacks of this 
material would include a low resistance to compression and shear stresses which may be 
countered through careful design. 
The dry stowage feature, dry power charging component and gas launch technology for 
the Mechanical Recovery Arm Option was identical to that for the Attraction Recovery Option.  
Figure 37 provides a conceptual representation of Alternative 2. 
 
Figure 37 – Alternative 2 (Mechanical Recovery Arm) Concept Alternative 
Alternative 3 – Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) Recovery 
The ROV Recovery Alternative utilized small, tethered, ROVs to support recovery of the 
UUV.  These vehicle(s) would swim out to meet the UUV, attach to the UUV and tow it, via the 
tethered feature, back into the VPT.  The ROVs would be controlled from inside the submarine 
with attached cameras or sensors providing feedback to the operator.   This recovery option 
would allow capture of the UUV at a distance, limiting the potential for collision mishaps 
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between the UUV and submarine.  Additionally, the submarine and UUV would be able to 
maintain a forward momentum during the recovery operation.  Although underwater ROVs are 
used in many operations and are a mature technology, such equipment would itself be subjected 
to possible impact damage, demanding a redundancy feature at an extra cost.  Furthermore, 
ROVs are complex and will require significant underway maintenance to ensure the systems 
reliability for the proposed operating cycle.  
The components for dry stowage, titanium structure, battery re-charging and gas launch 
for the ROVs Recovery Option was identical to the components for the Attraction Recovery 
Option.  Figure 38 provides a conceptual representation of Alternative 3. 
 





Alternative 4 – Performance Option 
The Performance Option utilized cutting-edge technology to provide the most superior 
system for the stakeholder.  However, with performance, programmatic issues such as cost and 
schedule may be adversely impacted due to technology development issues. 
Like the Attraction Recovery Option, the Performance Option will use an EMP device to 
recover the UUV at a distance.  Additionally, this option utilized the same EMP device to launch 
the UUV simply by reversing the magnetic field.  If successful, this feature would support both 
launch and recovery of UUV at speed while eliminating the need for an additional launching 
mechanism. 
The Performance option utilized a carbon fiber composite structure to support the 
equipment necessary for an electro-magnetic suspension stowage system within the tube.  The 
electro-magnetic suspension stowage system restrained the stowed UUV within the tube without 
physical contact.  Without physical contact, the UUV would be less prone to vibration damage 
and to generation of radiated noise.  This option would require power and computer-regulated 
feedback of the magnetic field and would require significant technological considerations over 
mechanical stowage systems. 
The battery re-charging component package on the Performance Option used inductive 
charging.  Inductive charging uses an electro-magnetic field to transfer energy between objects, 
in this case, the UUV and a charging pad.  Induction chargers use an induction coil to create an 
alternating electro-magnetic field at the base station (charging pad) and a second induction coil 
in the portable component (UUV) takes power from the electro-magnetic field and converts it 
back into electrical current to charge the battery.  Charging could successfully occur in a wet 
environment even when there is a small gap between the components and has a lower risk of 
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electrical shock or short circuit as there are no exposed conductors.  Disadvantages to this 
technology included lower efficiency of power transfer when compared to conductive charging 
and heat build-up in components.  Figure 39 provides a conceptual representation of Alternative 
4. 
 
Figure 39 – Alternative 4 (Performance Option) Concept Alternative 
 
a. Feasibility Screening 
Feasibility screening was accomplished as an initial step towards risk analysis for each 
conceptual design alternative.  Each conceptual alternative was evaluated against the KPPs, 
identified in Table 6, to determine if the concept could reasonably meet the assigned threshold 
values.  For each KPP, a color-coded value was assigned (Green – Likely to Meet Objective; 
Yellow – Marginal Risk in Meeting Threshold; Red – High Risk in Meeting Threshold).  The 
results of this screening are contained in Table 8. 
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Table 8 – Feasibility Analysis of Concept Alternatives 
 










Launch Speed H L L L L 
Recovery Speed H L M L L 
Power Capacity to 
UUV 
H M M M M 
Payload Volume L M M M L 
Communications 
(Transfer Rate) 
M L L L M 
Reliability L M M M M 
System L & R Depth M L M L L 
System Weight H L M L L 
Noise Prevention M M M M L 
Shock Prevention M M M M L 
Legend –  
H -  High Risk of Not Achieving KPP Threshold 
M -  Moderate Risk of Not Achieving KPP Threshold 
L -  Low Risk of Not Achieving KPP Threshold 
 
Feasibility screening in this context did not eliminate any alternatives from consideration.  
During the analysis of potential technologies conducted in support of the morphology matrix, the 
team discounted any component alternatives that placed personnel (divers) in harm’s way as well 




b. Risk Analysis and Mitigation Approaches 
Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and 
objectives within defined cost, schedule, and performance constraints.  The Risk Management 
Process Model, as described in the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition [DAU, 2006], 
consists of five activities: risk identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation planning, risk 
mitigation plan implementation, and risk tracking.  The Project Management Plan, Appendix A, 
further described the steps taken by the Capstone team to identify, analyze and propose risk 
mitigation solutions for the concept alternatives.  Mitigation plan implementation proposals and 
risk tracking was recommended at final concept selection for potential carry-through into post-
Milestone “A” system development. 
Risk identification and analysis captured system technical, cost, schedule and 
programmatic for each of the concept alternatives.  Technical risks included considerations for 
performance, interfaces, quality of design and components.  Costs risks included acquisition 
considerations such as Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and development costs as well as 
long term costs such as maintenance, manpower and logistics concerns.  Schedule risks included 
material supply issues and resource issues, both in acquisition and long-term maintenance.  
Programmatic risks involved a wide range of internal and external concerns, such as mission and 
requirements creep, contractor issues and sponsor/stakeholder considerations such as funding 
shortfalls.  Risks were identified and analyzed using the judgment and experience of team 
members, literature research, lessons learned from past system acquisition and operations and 
forecasting of future events. 
Risk consists of three components:  (1) future risk root cause; (2) likelihood of 
occurrence; and (3) consequence of the occurrence.  At the concept alternative phase of this 
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project, a qualitative approach to risk analysis was determined to be better, suited as a 
quantitative approach requires specific knowledge with respect to technologies and components.   
For each identified risk, a likelihood of occurrence was assigned and rated on a scale of “A” to 
“E”.  A rating of “A” indicated the risk was “Not Likely” (probability of ~10% occurrence) 
while a rating of “E” indicated the risk was a “Near Certainty” (probability of ~ 90% 
occurrence).  Ratings of “B”, “C” and “D” conform to a probability of 30%, 50% and 70%, 
respectively.  Likewise, the consequence that results from the occurrence of the risk was rated on 
a scale of “1” to “5” where a rating of “1” indicated minimal impact to performance, cost and/or 
schedule which results in no change to program decisions while a rating of “5” indicates severe 
performance, cost and/or schedule impact which will likely jeopardize the program.  Ratings of 
“2”, “3” and “4” designated impacts were considered minor, moderate and significant, 
respectively, to program parameters. 
Technical, schedule, performance and programmatic risks for each concept alternative 
were identified by root cause and assessed a likelihood and consequential severity.  If considered 
feasible, a mitigation solution was recommended for each risk.  Table 9 provides a listing of risks 












Risk that UUV “Swim In” recovery 







Risk that UUV Battery 
replenishment components cannot 
meet KPP for replenishment time / 






Risk that system weight will not 
meet KPP requirements / Assessed 




Cost Risk Risk that choice of materials (HY-
80) and sliding components will 
result in more maintenance costs / 
Assessed at C3 
Create robust underway 
preventative maintenance 
program 
Schedule Risk No schedule risks are anticipated  
Programmatic 
Risks 1 
Risks that requirements/mission 
changes cannot be accommodated 
due to low tech levels / Assessed at 
C3 
Implement flexibility 




Risks that UUV contractors will 
design a future concept that cannot 
be accommodated by cradle design / 
Assessed at B3 
Limit acceptable design 
requirements for contractors 
in baseline design 
considerations 





Risk that recovery system will not 
generate enough seawater current to 
recover UUV / Assessed as B5  




Risk that dry seal stowage 
compartment will not work, 
impacting battery charging and data 
transfer / Assessed as A4 
Add redundancy to stowage 
compartment design 
Cost Risk 1 Risk that Attraction recovery 
system will overrun development 
costs / Assessed as D3 
Budget for technology 
development 
Cost Risk 2 Risk that titanium structure requires 
significant skills and materials for 
manufacture / Assessed as D3 








Root Cause / Rating Mitigation Proposal 




Cost Risk 3 Risk that specialized skills and 
materials are required to maintain 
Attraction Recovery mechanism / 
Assessed as C3 
Stockpile logistic 
equipment and conduct 
robust training program 
early in program 
Schedule Risk Risk that technology development 
of Attraction Recovery system 
could delay fielding system / 
Assessed at B2 
Program float into schedule 
to mitigate delay impacts 
Programmatic 
Risk 1 
Risk that budget constraints could 
reduce funding for program / 
Assessed at C3 
Assign financial roles to 
experienced personnel to 




Risks that UUV contractors will 
design future concept not 
accommodated by Attraction 
Recovery mechanism / Assessed at 
B3 
Limit acceptable design 
requirements for contractors 
in baseline design 
considerations 





Risk that mechanical arm will not 
recover the UUV with system 
requirements / Assessed as C4 
Design system with length, 
rapid recovery features 
Performance 
Risk 2 
Risk that dry seal stowage 
compartment will not work, 
impacting battery charging and 
data transfer / Assessed as A4 




Risk that composite structure fails 
early under launch and recovery 
operations / Assessed as B3 
Design to resist shear/ 
employ shock absorbing 
devices 
Cost Risk Risk that underwater recovery arm 
mechanism will overrun 
development costs / Assessed as B3 
Budget for technology 
development 
Schedule Risk Risk that technology development 
of mechanical arm could delay 
fielding system / Assessed at B2 
Program float into schedule 
to mitigate delay impacts 
Programmatic 
Risks 1 
Risks that requirements/mission 
changes cannot be accommodated 
due to limits of mechanical arm / 
Assessed at B3 
Implement flexibility 




Risks that UUV contractors will 
design a future concept that cannot 
be accommodated by mechanical 
arm recovery mechanism / 
Assessed at B3 
Limit acceptable design 
requirements for contractors 









Root Cause / Rating Mitigation Proposal 





Risk that ROVs recovery will not 
support timely recovery of UUV / 
Assessed as B3  




Risk that dry seal stowage 
compartment will not work, 
impacting battery charging and 
data transfer / Assessed as A4 
Add redundancy to stowage 
compartment design 
Cost Risk 1 Risk that ROV recovery system 
will overrun development costs / 
Assessed as C3 
Budget for technology 
development 
Cost Risk 2 Risk that titanium structure 
requires significant skills and 
materials for manufacture / 
Assessed as D3 
Conduct early robust 
training/stockpile materials 
Cost Risk 3 Risk that specialized skills and 
materials are required to maintain 
ROV mechanisms / Assessed as D3 
Stockpile logistic 
equipment and conduct 
robust training program 
early in program 
Schedule Risk Risk that technology development 
of ROV Recovery system could 
delay fielding system / Assessed at 
B2 
Program float into schedule 
to mitigate delay impacts 
Programmatic 
Risk 
Risk that budget constraints could 
reduce funding for program / 
Assessed at C3 
Assign financial roles to 
experienced personnel to 
mitigate shortfalls and 
concentrate on resource 
allocation to minimize 
impacts 





Risk that launch/recovery system 
will not generate enough seawater 
current to recover UUV / Assessed 
as B5  




Risk that battery charging system 
will not have enough efficiency to 
charge UUV timely w/o excessive 
heat generation / Assessed as B2  




Risk that composite structure fails 
early under launch and recovery 
operations / Assessed as B3 
Design to resist shear/ 










Root Cause / Rating Mitigation Proposal 




Cost Risk 1 Risk that multiple systems will 
overrun development costs / 
Assessed as D3 
Budget for technology 
development 
Cost Risk 2 Risk that specialized skills and 
materials are required to maintain 
Attraction Device and battery 
charging mechanisms / Assessed as 
D3 
Stockpile logistic 
equipment and conduct 
robust training program 
early in program 
Schedule Risk Risk that technology development 
of multiple systems could delay 
fielding system / Assessed at C2 
Program float into schedule 
to mitigate delay impacts 
Programmatic 
Risk 
Risk that budget constraints could 
reduce funding for program / 
Assessed at C3 
Assign financial roles to 
experienced personnel to 
mitigate shortfalls and 
concentrate on resource 
allocation to minimize 
impacts 
 
Risks were graphically represented and compared on a risk matrix.  The risk matrix was 
made up of three colors that denote increasing levels of risk.  The green, yellow and red blocks 
of the risk matrix indicate low, medium and high risks, respectively.  To support the comparison 
of all five (5) alternatives on one risk matrix, the technical, schedule, performance and 
programmatic risks were weighted to develop one average risk rating for the concept.  Using the 
stakeholder requirements and value system, performance and costs were the two most important 
considerations in fielding a successful system.  Furthermore, while life-cycle costs were 
considered important for all systems, performance issues, particularity UUV recovery and power 
considerations hamper the effectiveness of existing systems.  The following equation was used to 
develop one average risk rating for each concept alternative: 




  Where: PR is Performance Risk; 
 CR is Cost Risk; 
 SR is Schedule Risk; 
 And ProgR is Programmatic Risk 
 
Table 10 provides the results of overall risks for each concept alternative while Figure 40 
shows the comparative risk matrix for the five (5) concept alternatives. 
 Table 10 – Overall Risk Value for Each Alternative 
 
Concept ∑(PR) ∑(CR) ∑(SR) ∑(ProgR) Final Average 
Risk Value 
Baseline C5 C3 NA C3 C5 
Alt 1 B4 D3 B2 C3 C3 
Alt 2 B4 B3 B2 B3 B3 
Alt 3 B3 D3 B2 C3 C3 
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c. Risk Analysis Conclusion 
Risk analysis with the assigned weighting factors found the best concept alternative to be 
Alternative 2, Mechanical Recovery Arm.  This system had a likely chance of UUV recovery 
within the performance parameters while offering a system with lower developmental and long-
term cost risks.  System structural design using carbon fiber composite materials over titanium 
and steel provided a significant weight advantage at a compatible structural strength assumed 
needed for this system.  Cost risks for carbon fiber structures were considered negligible as it 
was assumed that materials will be purchased and received in a completed form (no molds or 
special skills would be required for assembly).    
To verify that weighting method that favored performance risks over the other risks did 
not significantly bias the decision, the team ran another set of calculations, this time with all risk 
factors equal.  These results found no change in the risk rankings of the four (4) alternative 
options; however, with the Baseline Option no longer penalized for poor performance, it was 
now ranked Yellow vice Red.  Since the ranking order of the options remained constant through 
two different weighting options, the team deemed the assumptions made that arrived to the 
results of Table 10 a valid approach. 
Although Alternative 2 was deemed to be the least risky, it was not significant better than 
Alternatives 1, 3 or 4 to completely discount any of these alternatives.  However, the Baseline 
Option was significantly worse than all other options due to performance concerns.  If verified as 
a weak performer via Modeling and Simulation, the Baseline option would not be considered the 





B. COST ANALYSIS 
1. Background 
Referring to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
remarked that “…the nation can no longer afford the quixotic pursuit of high-tech perfection that 
incurs unacceptable cost and risk…”[Scully, 2010]  In response to this and many other examples 
of uncontrolled cost growth in defense spending, the Under Secretary of Defense issued a 
memorandum mandating affordability as a requirement for defense acquisition programs. 
[Carter, 2010]    In this context, affordability was no longer viewed as the cost to design, build, 
test and field a weapons system, but instead is viewed as the life-cycle cost (LCC) of the system 
which included: training, interface and integration with other systems and platforms, to absorb 
the system into a mission area, operational and support costs, and disposal costs.  To understand 
and compare the total life-cycle costs of the five (5) conceptual alternatives in same year dollars, 
the team performed a life-cycle cost analysis to determine economic equivalence.  Material 
choices and decisions made during design and construction of the systems were more often than 
not the result in a false sense of affordability.  Low end products and technologies, while 
affordable in terms of acquisition dollars resulted in exponential sustainment costs due to 
premature failures and the need for constant upgrades.  Likewise, cutting edge equipment might 
not provide its worth if it significantly taxes development budgets and requires modifications to 
many external boundary systems to work.  The results of the life-cycle cost analysis were used as 





Life cycle cost estimates were established for each of the alternatives identified in Table 
7 in three (3) areas; Acquisition, Operations and Sustainment & Indirect Costs.  Primarily, cost 
estimates were developed using cost data from like vendor sources and from team member 
experiences in submarine repair, operations and sustainment.  Beyond obvious acquisition costs 
differences that result from using different materials and technologies, assumptions were 
established to differentiate expected repair cycles and costs for each alternative.  To establish a 
value in current year dollars and eliminate the effects of inflation, a real discount rate of 1.7% 
was used for a system service life of 20 yrs. [OMB, Circ. A-94, 2010]   As no concept alternative 
was expected to contain a significant amount of hazardous materials, disposal costs were deemed 
to be constant for all alternatives and, therefore, were not considered in a comparison analysis.  
Also, since the system concept has established static external boundaries for the Standard Large 
Vehicle Class UUV and the VPT, all concept alternatives were considered equal with respect to 
modifications on external systems.  Finally, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on high cost 
drivers (those items that contributed more than 10% to the overall life-cycle costs) to determine 
how changes in assumptions affected the output costs.  Variations were made to the input 
assumptions and changes were modeled to help establish a valid cost range for each concept 
alternative.    
a. Cost Analysis Assumptions 
To provide a basis for cost analysis, the project team assumed: 
• The UUV LRS would be fielded and maintained is a similar fashion to other major 
submarine support equipment such as a SEAL Delivery Vehicle.   
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• The anticipation is 7 VA Class Block III submarines and 9 VA Class Block IV 
submarines with a VPT would be fielded, with an equal number assigned to the 
Atlantic and Pacific fleets.   
• As persistent-ISR would be only one of many core submarine missions, no more than 
four (4) UUV LRSs would be in use at any one time.  This is consistent with the 
employment concept of VA Class submarines for SOF-type missions. 
• At least two (2) complete systems each would ultimately be fielded on in the Atlantic 
and Pacific areas of operation beginning in FY+10, when VA Class Block IV 
submarines are scheduled to be commissioned.   
• An initial increment (INCR-1) would be fielded upon program inception with an 
improved and upgraded increment (INCR-2) planned for release to coincide with 
Block IV submarines.   
• For concept alternatives where reliability may be at issue (in particular, composite 
and steel structures), at least one (1) spare system would be available which can be 
transported as necessary to support maintenance and repair needs.  For systems 
anticipated to require more maintenance cycles, additional spares would be required. 
• Based on the UUV roadmap report of 2004, the useful life of the LRS will be 
considered at 20 years.  Significant technology advances and mission profiles were 
likely in the future that would render the VPT launched and recovered UUV obsolete 
after 20 years of service. 
• In the 20 year life, each system would be in-service for 50% of the time and awaiting 
deployment or in maintenance for 50% of the time.  During the service life, each 
system would undergo one (1) major overhaul/modernization period at the half-life 
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and minor/moderate sized overhauls every two to four years, depending on the 
assessed reliability of the system. 
• The cost for the materials and labor for each overhaul were considered to 
approximate submarine maintenance costs, as similar facilities are expected to 
maintain the systems. 
• For the moderate/major availability, estimates were considered to be 15% of 
acquisition costs.  For minor availabilities, estimates were 1-3% of acquisition costs.  
These percentages aligned with typical submarine maintenance costs. 
• Because production costs vary greatly between manufacturers and were difficult to 
reliably estimate, open market price per pound of the different materials used in the 
support structure were used in the cost analysis. 
• To validate the assumptions of concept acquisition costs, a comparison was made to a 
similar, fielded system, the Multiple All-Up Round Canister (MAC).  Using 
assumptions for MAC material and labor costs, the team developed an estimate close 
to the known costs of a MAC. 
• By applying the same structure and labor assumptions to the five (5) concept 
alternatives, the obtained acquisition costs were considered reasonable and 
appropriate.   
3. Life Cycle Cost (LLC) Analysis  
a. Concept Acquisition Costs 
Acquisition cost considerations for conceptual alternatives were established by using cost 
data from internet and peer sources for exact or similar equipment.  Appendix C provides more 
detailed sources and estimates as to how the team arrived at the cost estimates for each 
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alternative.  Table 11 provides the summarized Acquisition Cost analysis for each concept 
alternative on a per unit basis. 
Table 11 – Acquisition Costs for One Unit of Each Alternative Concept 
Technology Option Cost Technology Option Cost Technology Option Cost
Support Structure Carbon Steel 1,612,750$        Titanium 12,577,750$     Composite 5,892,000$      
Recovery 
Mechanism
“Swim to Cradle” 350,000$           Electro-Mechanical 
Device
123,375$          Articulated Mechanical 
Arm
462,250$         
Launch 
Mechanism
“Swim Away” -$                  Pressurized Gas Ejection 660,250$          Pressurized Gas Ejection 660,250$         
UUV Re-charging 
Mechanism
Wet Cable Connection, 
UUV Stowed 21,000$             
Dry Cable Connection, 
UUV Stowed 18,425$            
Dry Cable Connection, 
UUV Stowed 18,425$           
UUV Stowage 
System
Mechanical Locks 78,000$             Sealed/Dry 
Compartment in Tube
32,550$            Sealed/Dry 
Compartment in Tube







25,855$             
Portable, Plug-in Control 
Hardware/ Software 25,855$            
Portable, Plug-in Control 





14,325$             Underwater Radio 
Waves
14,325$            Underwater Radio 
Waves





15,025$             Acoustic Homing 
Beacon
15,025$            Acoustic Homing 
Beacon
15,025$           
Total: 2,116,955$     Total: 13,467,555$  Total: 7,120,680$    
Baseline -  Low Cost Option Alternative 1 –  Attraction Recovery Alternative 2 – Mechanical Recovery
 
Technology Option Cost Technology Option Cost





204,250$           Electro-Mechanical 
Device





660,250$           Electro-Mechanical 
Device
172,375$          
UUV Re-charging 
Mechanism
Dry Cable Connection, 
UUV Stowed 18,425$             
Inductive Charging 
(Touch Pad) UUV 
Stowed












25,855$             
Portable, Plug-in Control 





14,325$             Underwater Radio 
Waves





15,025$             Acoustic Homing 
Beacon
15,025$            
Total: 13,548,430$   Total: 6,292,880$    






b. Operations and Sustainment Costs 
Operational and Sustainment costs were established for the fielded conceptual systems 
based on the assumptions provided at the bottom of Table 12.  These assumptions identified the 
number of LRSs that will be fielded for each concept alternative, when they would be fielded 
with respect to a baseline fiscal year (FY BASE) and when they would be maintained by fiscal 
year.  Minor maintenance cycles were identified as “PM” (Preventative Maintenance) with major 
maintenance identified as “OVHL” (Overhaul) or Upgrade.  Time between maintenance was 
assigned by team members based on existing submarine operating cycles and the degree of 
maintenance considered necessary for the different types of components.  Neither Disposal nor 
Salvage costs were considered as all concept alternatives were considered to be identical in these 
respects.    
As costs for each alternative concept provided in Table 12  were identified in future year 
dollars, standardization was conducted to determine single dollar value costs for each concept 
alternative in present year dollars.  Using OMB Circular A-94, a discount factor of 1.7% was 




Table 12 – Operations and Sustainment Costs for Life Cycle of each Alternative w/o 
Present Value Discount Factors Applied  
 
Table 13 – Operations and Sustainment Costs for Life Cycle of each Alternative with 
Present Value Discount Factors Applied  
 
c. Indirect Costs 
Due to different manufacturing processes between metallic (carbon steel and titanium) 
structures and composite (carbon fiber) structures, manufacturing costs were examined.  Each 
metallic structure requires forming, machining, welding and non-destructive testing of the raw 
materials to create the final cylindrical structure.  Although process improvements and 
“learning” may improve the manufacture process over the long run, the relatively small overall 
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number of units required in a single fiscal year was considered to cancel out any long-term cost 
benefits in manufacturing.  As shown in Appendix C tables, labor costs to manufacture each 
metallic structure were considered static and, based on similar work performed in public 
shipyards, estimated to take 250 Man Days at a labor rate of $680/Man Day, or $170K per 
structure. 
Composite (carbon fiber) structures require molds and manufacturing processes such as 
compressive molding, to fabricate the parts necessary to create the structure.  Molds for the 
compressive molding process are typically manufactured from a lightweight metal, such as 
aluminum, and are reusable.  Initial manufacturing costs for the molds must be considered in the 
overall life-cycle costs of composite structures.   
The cylindrical structure for the LRS would be designed for simplicity and uniformity 
throughout, using various circular and truss segments which would be mechanically fastened 
together.  The Capstone team estimated that twenty (20) separate molds would be required to 
fabricate the composite structure.  Using a known price of $7.5K for 4’ x 12’ x 2” aluminum 
plate and an estimated volume of 1500 in3 per mold, the raw material costs for the molds was 
estimated at $600K.  Using machining, tooling, maintenance, rental of presses and profit 
estimates of 250 Man Days per mold at a labor rate of $680/Man Day, the cost per mold equated 
to $170K.  Therefore, the total estimated cost to manufacture, maintain and use the molds was 
$4M.  This capital outlay cost was added to the carbon fiber alternatives when determining life-
cycle costs. 
After accounting for the initial costs of molds, the Capstone team determined that 
fabrication costs for the carbon fiber structures were comparable to fabrication costs for metallic 
structures.  Preparation times and compression times for the molding process are similar to 
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forming, machining and welding times for metallic structures.  Both processes require skilled 
mechanics.  Assembly times for carbon fiber structures were considered negligible.  As such, 
manufacture of each carbon fiber structure was estimated to take 250 Man Days at a labor rate of 
$680/Man Day, or $170K per structure.       
All other indirect costs such as training, specifications, facilities, and other logistical 
concerns were not specifically discussed above nor broken out as these costs were not considered 
significantly different for any of the alternatives.  However, these costs were factored in and 
considered when preparing the costs for engineering, design, program management, material, 
and spare parts.  The worksheets for all related cost estimates are provided in Appendix C – Cost 
Analysis Worksheets.  
4. Cost Sensitivity Analysis  
Titanium Discussion 
Much of the titanium produced today goes into the manufacture of aircraft engine parts 
and structural components.  Titanium dioxide is used in paints, paper and plastics and other 
products.  Titanium has also become indispensible in the marine industry because of it corrosion 
resistant properties in saltwater.  Wall thickness of titanium structural components may be 
reduced because of superior strength qualities and corrosion allowance.  It is difficult to predict 
future prices of titanium but, based on current supply and anticipated demand, prices will likely 
increase in the future as China and India increases industrial demand for titanium materials.   
Figure 41 shows historical prices since 2005 that show a downward trend in price from 2005 to 
2009 as the United States eliminated the remaining strategic Cold War government stockpiles 
[Seong, 2009]. The current price of titanium raw material bars and plates is approximately $7/lb 




Figure 41 – Cost Comparisons Showing Varying Titanium Prices  
The costs of the two alternatives containing titanium were approximately $13.5M, almost 
twice the next lower cost alternative that used a carbon fiber composite structure and six times 
the cost of the carbon steel alternative. A continued upward trend of price would likely make the 
titanium option much less appealing.  Table 14 below provides a comparison of ALT-3 with 
varying costs of titanium and the differences from the lower cost alternatives. The current 
differences in cost of the lower cost options are significant and if the cost of titanium rises, the 
cost gap becomes increasingly excessive. 
 










8$            14,733,945$  12,616,990$   8,441,065$     
10$          18,174,762$  16,057,807$   11,881,882$   
11$          19,895,170$  17,778,215$   13,602,290$   
14$          25,056,394$  22,939,439$   18,763,514$   









Carbon fiber composite is a strong, lightweight material that is at least five times as 
strong as steel and weighs about two-thirds less.  Carbon fiber composite is composed of very 
thin strands of carbon, which are twisted and woven together and then laid over a mold and 
coated with resin to form a permanent shape.  Carbon fiber composite technology has become a 
viable alternative material in the last fifteen years due to the raw material price per pound drop 
from around $150 to about $8 - $10. [Zoltec, 2011]  As more industries explore the use of carbon 
fiber composites in their products, the price per pound should remain relatively stable if not 
decline.  The analysis for the LRS Carbon Fiber Support Structure was based on a raw material 
cost of $8/lb, which resulted in an approximate $9M total cost for the first unit (factoring in $2M 
capital costs for manufacture of molds) and approximately $7M for each successive unit.  Table 
15 compares the differences in varying Carbon Fiber price per pound against the baseline 
alternative cost.  Currently the raw material cost of $8/lb is roughly twice the baseline alternative 
cost. As the price per pound comes down, the cost difference becomes more of a desirable 
alternative. 
When comparing the cost of Carbon Fiber against Alternative 3 (Titanium Option), 
Carbon Fiber is already a preferred choice when only considering cost.  Table 16 compares the 
cost of Alternative 3 using Carbon Fiber vice Titanium for the support structure.  The cost 
difference at the current raw material $8/lb estimate of carbon fiber material is $7.7M.  This 
difference becomes significantly larger if the cost of carbon fiber composite comes down.  The 
future trend for carbon fiber demand is expected to increase at a constant rate through 2013 















4$          3,119,247$  1,002,292$         
6$          4,478,431$  2,361,476$         
8$          5,837,615$  3,720,660$         
10$       7,196,798$  5,079,843$         
14$       9,915,166$  7,798,211$          
 










4$          3,119,247$   10,429,183$       
6$          4,478,431$   9,069,999$          
8$          5,837,615$   7,710,815$          
10$        7,196,798$   6,351,632$          




5. Cost Analysis Results  
Table 17 provides a summary of total costs for operations and sustainment for a life cycle 
of each alternative configuration analyzed.  Because of anticipated reliability differences for each 
alternative, the alternatives that used superior structural materials would require fewer LRS units. 
Currently, the plan was for there to be two units for the east coast and two units for the west 
coast available at any time.  Of the alternatives, titanium was considered the superior material; 
therefore, our acquisition plan is to purchase a total of only four units over two increments to 
accommodate the plan for two units on each coast.  ALT-1 & ALT-3 both use titanium for the 
structure. Total cost for ALT-1 which included life cycle costs is $56.3 M and ALT-3 is $56.6M. 
These were the highest cost alternatives even with only acquiring four total units mainly because 
of the high costs of titanium used in the support structure. 
ALT-2 and ALT-4 were the next highest cost alternatives and are composed of carbon 
fiber composite for the support structure.  The acquisition plans for these alternatives included 
the purchase of five total units, two units at increment one and an additional three at increment 
two.  The additional unit accounted for possible reduction in performance of one of the original 
units.  Total costs for ALT-2 were $41.8M and ALT-4 $37.4M.  
The baseline alternative was the lowest cost alternative even with the acquisition of six 
units which are required because of the inferior carbon steel material has a lower anticipated 
reliability. The total costs for baseline alternative is $21.4M.  If costs were the only factor 
considered, the baseline alternative would be the natural recommendation since it is at least 50% 
less than the next higher alternative cost.  But total cost would not be the only factor and will be 





Table 17 – Total Life-Cycle Costs for Each Conceptual Alternative 
Alternative 








C. PERFORMANCE MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. Background 
The baseline and four concept alternatives identified in Table 7 where modeled using a 
simulation software package known as ExtendSIM®.  Modeling captured the performance of 
each alternative’s four primary functions: Launch, Recovery, Maintain and Replenish.  The 
ExtendSIM® modeling provided a means to evaluate each concept’s anticipated behavior in 
operational conditions.  Modeling parameters are unique for each concept alternative and were 
derived by evaluating the component composition of each alternative.   
To construct the models and simulate operational conditions it was necessary to define 
various assumptions for operation.  The weather assumptions in Table 18 were applied for 
launch and recovery models and were held constant for all simulation runs.  When considering 
success for launch or recovery it was defined as the ability to launch or recover a UUV without 
being detected by a threat and without damaging the host platform, UUV or LRS.  Being 










  2. Evaluation Measures for Concept Alternatives 
Each of the four models, Launch, Recovery, Maintain and Replenish were simulated 
1000 times, creating a database to assess the performance of each concept alternative.  The 
concept alternative parameters identified in Table 19 were derived from subjective evaluation of 
the components expressed in Table 7 using technical knowledge of the team members and their 
experiences with the various technologies.   When reasonable comparisons could be made by the 




Table 19 - Concept Alternative Modeling Parameters 
Modeling Parameters 
Parameter Baseline Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 4 
Launch duration 
[minutes]1 15±2.5 11.25±2.5 11.25±2.5 11.25±2.5 12.75±2.5 
Recovery duration 




92.00% 96.00% 94.00% 95.00% 96.00% 
Communication 
Success 98.50% 98.90% 99.50% 99.00% 98.00% 
Reliability7 96.80% 98.00% 97.30% 98.40% 98.40% 
Diagnostic 




98.90% 98.90% 98.90% 98.90% 98.90% 
Mission Upload 
Success 99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 
Recharging 
Success 99.00% 98.00% 98.00% 98.00% 97.00% 
Replenishment 




99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 99.00% 
UUV Successful 




99.80% 99.80% 99.80% 99.80% 99.80% 
Maintain Duration 









Table 19 Notes 
(1) Based on average time to load mission/launch VLS Weapon, SSN 688 Class.  Weighting 
factors consider speed at which launch method allows UUV to “clear” submarine envelope. 
 
(2) Based on average time to load mission/launch VLS Weapon, SSN 688 Class (time is doubled 
as a baseline for recovery).  Weighting factors include distance required to recover and if 
recovery equipment can operate in a 360° field vice limited direction. 
 
(3) Based on success of torpedo test launches for SSN 688 Class.  Does not account for UUV 
failure or system reliability (covered elsewhere).  Weighting factors considers speed, 
movement of submarine, autonomy of launch/recovery (navigation error of UUV). 
 
(4) Objective charging time assumes 500kWh charge required (energy capacity for the 
“Standard” Large Vehicle Class UUV) using largest available submarine source (440 VAC, 
30 Amps).  For wet conductive charge, assume 95% efficiency plus factor for corrosion 
damage, water leakage.  For dry charge, assume 6 hours to dry stowage compartment and 
95% to 98% efficiency.  For wet inductive charging, assume 80% to 90% efficiency. 
 
(5) Based on AO factor for a SSN 688 Class Torpedo Tube Launch System.  Weighing factors 
consider the complexity of the technology and environment (wet vs. dry). 
 
(6) Factor of noise at launch/recovery, speed of launch recovery, security of equipment when 
stowed. 
 
(7) Measures robustness of the equipment.  The likelihood of failure per 1000 cycles.  Increased 
moving parts, system complexity and corrosion of carbon steel would negatively affect 
system.  Carbon fiber is more prone to shear stress damage and impact damage.  Titanium 
would offer corrosion resistance and reduction in weight with significant strength 
advantages.  A gas launch system creates additional stresses which could potentially induce 
component failure.  Redundancy of ROV is advantageous.  Single point failures are bad 
(technology that requires excessive power, failure to dry the stowage compartment, etc). 
 
3. Model Descriptions and Results 
a. Model Description 
To provide a realistic and germane mission scenario to the model, Operational Situation 
No. 1 (OPSIT #1) proposed the use of the submarine launched Large Vehicle Class UUVs to 
counter efforts by a foreign power to choke off oil exports through a geographically critical area 




Figure 42 – Depiction of Strait of Hormuz  
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, and the shipping lanes 
consist of two-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a two-mile 
wide buffer zone.  The majority of oil exported through the Strait of Hormuz travels to Asia, the 
United States and Western Europe.  In 2007, an average of 15 crude oil tankers passed through 
the Strait of Hormuz daily, along with tankers carrying other petroleum products and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). 
Foreign action to block transit though this area would result in oil shortages, increase the 
price of oil and potentially lead to world-wide financial crisis.  Foreign governments in this area 
of the world have been unstable and consistently have taken an adversarial posture towards 
United States interests.   Persistent-ISR missions by multiple UUVs in this high sea traffic area 
would enable US and allied Intelligence interests to react quickly to challenges by an enemy 
force with minimal risk to US submarines.  Success of this mission requires the success of all 
four functions: Launch, Recovery, Maintain and Replenish.  Failure to satisfy all four functions 




b. Modeling and Simulation Results 
All four functions, Launch, Recovery, Maintain and Replenish, were successfully 
modeled using the parameters specified per Table 19.  The ExtendSIM® models used for 
simulation can be found in Appendix D.  Data derived from each of the models was analyzed 
with descriptive statistics to evaluate the performance of each alternative.  The raw data from 
each model can be found in its respective section of Appendix D.  The critical performance 
results of concern were the likelihood of success for each of the four functions and their average 
operational time as reported per Table 20.   The concept alternatives where then ranked in 
accordance to performance from best to worst in Table 21.  
In respect to OPSIT #1, mission success was defined as the success of all four functions: 
Launch, Recovery, Maintain and Replenish.  When evaluating the results, a concept alternative 
can only be as successful as the system’s reliability to successfully perform all four functions 
when pertaining to OPSIT #1. The likelihood of success for OPSIT #1 and the total operational 
time for each alternative is identified in Table 20. 
Table 20 - Model Simulation Results 
  
  














Baseline 81.50% 14.97 81.00% 37.45 96.70% 15.07 93.60% 45.56 59.75% 2801.09 
Alt 1 90.30% 11.25 88.70% 25.63 96.80% 12.04 93.00% 45.55 72.11% 2781.92 
Alt 2 85.40% 11.25 86.60% 30.05 98.20% 11.99 94.30% 45.54 68.49% 2785.69 
Alt 3 89.40% 11.33 87.70% 26.95 97.10% 12.22 92.40% 45.55 70.34% 2783.5 





Table 21 - Ranked Alternative Performance 
 Launch Recovery Maintain Replenish OPSIT#1 
 Success Time Success Time Success Time Success Time 
System 
Reliability Time 
Best Alt 1 Alt 1 Alt 1 Alt 4 Alt 2 Alt 4 Alt 1 Alt 4 Alt 1 Alt 4 
4 Alt 4 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 1 Alt 3 Alt 2 Alt 4 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 1 
3 Alt 3 Alt 3 Alt 4 Alt 3 Alt 1 Alt 1 Alt 3 Alt 1 Alt 4 Alt 3 
2 Alt 2 Alt 4 Alt 2 Alt 2 Base Alt 3 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 2 Alt 2 
Worst Base Base Base Base Alt 4 Base Base Base Base Base 
 
After review and analysis of the model simulation results of Table 20 it was observed that 
all concept alternatives significantly outperformed the baseline, which only resulted in a system 
reliability of 59.75%, compared to the more advanced alternatives, whose reliabilities ranged 
from 68.49% to 72.11%.  The overall time to complete all four functions, Launch, Recover, 
Maintain and Replenish were negligible between the baseline and alternative LRS designs with 
times ranging from 2671 minutes to 2801 minutes.  This was due to the relatively similar time 
required to successfully refuel the UUV which was grossly more time consuming in comparison 
to the time it took to complete launch, recovery or maintain functions. 
c. Model and Simulation Conclusion 
In an evaluation the model results on a purely performance perspective Table 21 ranked 
the baseline and all concept alternatives from best functional performance to worst functional 
performance.  Alternative-1 proved to be the most reliable, 72.11%, while Alternative-4 proved 
to have the best time performance completing all functions in a total of 2671 minutes.  
Alternatives 1 and 4 dominated Alternatives 2, 3 and Baseline when compared to reliability and 
time performance per OPSIT #1 and, as such, from a performance standpoint, are considered the 
superior alternatives.  However, without additional knowledge of the stakeholder value system or 
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a weighting associated with reliability or speed, no single alternative was be down-selected 
purely on performance.      
d.   Launch & Recovery Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis evaluated the baseline and design concepts sensitivity to variation 
in LRS component success and its effect on a successful launch and recovery.  Simulations were 
conducted on all design models identified in Appendix D, varying the LRS reliability parameter 
by 5%, 10% and 15%.   The simulations were successfully performed and the results are 
identified in Table 22. 
Table 22 - Launch & Recovery Sensitivity 





















Component    
Success 
Alt 1 




93.00% 91.90% 84.90% 92.40% 83.10% 
88.00% 87.10% 80.90% 88.60% 79.80% 
83.00% 81.60% 75.00% 84.10% 76.40% 
Alt 2 




92.33% 91.40% 81.10% 93.70% 82.50% 
87.33% 87.00% 76.40% 87.80% 76.30% 
82.33% 81.00% 71.70% 81.60% 71.80% 
Alt 3 




93.40% 93.40% 82.80% 93.00% 84.70% 
88.40% 87.10% 79.50% 91.10% 81.20% 
83.40% 82.10% 76.00% 82.40% 73.70% 
Alt 4 




93.40% 94.10% 87.00% 94.10% 84.50% 
88.40% 88.10% 81.60% 88.30% 79.00% 
83.40% 83.40% 76.10% 86.60% 78.30% 
Baseline 




        91.80%         92.60%        78.10%         92.10%         77.50% 
       86.80%         87.20%        74.30%         85.00%        70.70% 




The results of Table 22 were plotted to provide a visual representation of the data and are 
provided in Figure 43 and Figure 44.  When evaluating the data, the lower the slope, the less 
sensitive an alternative is to the LRS component reliability changes.  Utilizing this data, it was 
observed that Alternative-4 exhibited the greatest sensitivity, 0.95, to LRS component changes 
effecting reliability during launch, but exhibited the least sensitivity during recovery, 0.79.   
The sensitivity slopes identified in Table 22 defined the predicted effects of varying LRS 
reliability in relation to successful launch and recovery functions, where success was defined as a 
launch or recovery that is not detected and does not cause any damage to the UUV or Host 
Platform.  This information was used when alternative LRS components were evaluated for re-
design of particular concept alternatives and how it will affect functional performance.  The 
graphical plots Figure 43 and Figure 44 identified minimal LRS component reliability necessary 
to satisfy operation threshold and objective requirements. 
In conclusion, assuming that the LRS component reliability was 100%, it could 
extrapolated from the sensitivity slopes the best likelihood of launch and recovery success is for 
each alternative.  Table 23 provides the probability of success assuming 100% LRS reliability.  If 
the probability of success identified in Table 23 is not acceptable, then changes to design and 
other system components must be made to improve the likelihood of success. 
Table 23 - Extrapolated 100% LRS Reliability 
 Launch Recovery 
Alt 1 92.03% 90.18% 
Alt 2 87.99% 88.60% 
Alt 3 89.14% 89.57% 
Alt 4 92.37% 88.63% 











































IV. DETAIL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
A. DESIGN ASSESSMENT 
1. Background 
Design assessment took a qualitative approach to evaluate each conceptual alternative 
design considerations in support of a final recommendation.   Equipment and hardware/software 
interfaces were evaluated to ensure that cohesion, coupling and connectivity are at a level 
necessary to exhibit emergence of system functions.  System reliability was analyzed to 
determine if redundancy was at the correct levels to provide maximum system availability at 
minimum cost.  Safety and usability were assessed to examine concept alternatives with respect 
to risks imposed on the host submarines and users as well as potential mitigations which could 
improve overall safe operation.  Logistics and test strategies were envisioned to help validate the 
acquisition and long term soundness of the concept alternatives.  Finally, decision analysis 
applied a process to the results of the modeling and analysis to recommend an approach to a final 
concept alternative.   
2. Interface Analysis 
Interface analysis compared the inputs and outputs of the LRS with corresponding 
connections to internal and external performers for the overall system.  The analysis assesses 
risks for the physical, power, communications and system level interfaces.  Each input or output 
to the LRS was traced to the part of the overall system that provides that input or output.  Table 







Interface Physical Power Communications Dimensional 
LRS Launcher Mechanism to 
UUV  x x x 
LRS Launcher Mechanism to 
LRS Control Station x x x  
LRS Control Station to Host 
Submarine x x x x 
LRS Control Station to 
Submarine Crew    x 
LRS Launcher Mechanism to 
Payload Tube x   x 
LRS Control Station to LRS 
Operator x    
LRS Recovery Mechanism to 
UUV  x x x 
 
Table 24 – System Internal and External Interfaces 
 
a. Interface Risks 
Risks associated with the four (4) categories of interfaces are detailed below: 
Dimensional: 
• A securing/release mechanism sized for a persistent-ISR UUV should have an ability 
to accommodate a smaller UUV.  Since the size of a smaller UUV was not defined, 
there is a risk with accommodating such a vehicle.  Incorporation of universal 
mechanisms that would accommodate various sized UUV’s is required.  
• The host ship control room or torpedo room must accommodate the physical 
dimensions of the LRS control station.  Because of limited space availability, there 
would be a risk of a non-ergonomic installation because of limited locations available 
for installation.  A study of availability will be required to determine optimal location 
for installing the LRS Control Station.  It might be necessary to integrate LRS control 
into existing workstations.  
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• The LRS Control Station must be located within a specified visual range of the 
Officer of the Deck (OOD) to support real-time continuity with host submarine 
operations.  There was a risk to the launch/recovery if control station operators did 
not have visual observance in the control room environment.  
• The launch and retrieval mechanisms must fit within the length and diameter of the 
payload tube without interference to the payload tube hatch.  A risk of improper 
tolerances could lead to vibration or misalignment of the launch/retrieval mechanism. 
The launch/retrieval mechanism must be designed to accommodate vibration and 
other shipboard motions by incorporation of standard motion dampening mounts. 
Power: 
• Wetted power distribution plugs must provide a watertight connection with UUV 
power receptacle and provide required electrical supply.  The risk of a non-watertight 
seal results in poor reliability and slow power transfer rate which could jeopardize a 
mission and fail to meet the threshold replenishment time.  Design of watertight 
connections should leverage off proven designs currently used in submarine sonar or 
vertical launch systems. 
• A power cable will supply electrical and battery power to the UUV for activation of 
actuators.  Because of the risk of host ship lacking enough reserve power to 
accommodate launcher power requirements, a load analysis should be performed to 
ensure host ship’s ability to power the LRS. 
Communications: 
• The data cable connection from the LRS to UUV must provide a watertight mate and 
provide the required data transfer rate.  The risk of a non-watertight seal resulted in 
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poor reliability and slow data transfer rate which could jeopardize a mission and fail 
to meet the threshold launch time.  Design of watertight connections should leverage 
off proven designs currently used in submarine sonar and vertical launch systems.  
• The noise level in the control room should not exceed a specified level due to 
operating equipment.  There is a risk of misunderstanding commands between the 
control station operator and OOD if noise levels from the control station exceed 
specified levels.  Design of the control workstation must be similar to other 
workstations with regard to noise. 
• The acoustic and Radio Frequency (RF) communications features of the LRS must 
have signal strength to clearly transmit information from the LRS to the UUV to 
support the UUV recovery process.  Signal transmitters should utilize commercially 
successful systems proven to propagate in various water conditions, line-of-sight 
situations and background noise levels without jeopardizing submarine stealth.  
Physical: 
• Shock qualified restraining devices must hold down workstation and associated 
cables piping, etc.  There would be a risk of unrestrained objects/equipment during a 
shock event which could injure or jeopardize the crew or ship.  The required grade 
shock analysis and testing must be performed during design of LRS components. 
• The interface between operator and control station should provide an ergonomic input 
device.  A risk of repetitive stress injury could occur without an ergonomic design.  




b. Software Strategy 
Overview of Required Work 
Requirements and Constraints on the System and Software to be developed:   
• The LRS would be fully integrated into an existing submarine hull and control room.  
The software must accommodate an interface between the LRS control station and 
ship’s communication system, as well as the LRS control station and the 
launch/recover mechanism.  The software must function as a communications link 
and data transfer station between the ship, LRS control station, LRS launch/recover 
mechanism and the UUV.  The software will be required to interface with and 
manipulate the launch/recovery mechanism.   The user at the LRS control station will 
be using a dell laptop and operate the system through a GUI.   
Requirements and constraints on project documentation:   
• The software GUI would be used by enlisted sailors under possibly stressful 
conditions.  Documentation should be simply stated and well organized.   
Position of the project in the system life cycle:   
• The software would be developed to support software specific Developmental Testing 
and software/hardware integration into the LRS for its Developmental Testing, and be 
supported and maintained throughout all Operational Testing and service life of the 
LRS. 
• Constraints from Program/Acquisition Strategy - There were no constraints from the 
acquisition strategy.  The software development process conformed to the acquisition 




Requirements and constraints on project schedules and resources:  
• The software development process would begin early enough to not invoke risk to 
software reliability in order to meet the program testing schedule. 
Other Requirements and Constraints:  
• The software and all associated documentation shall be Distribution Statement D. 
Plan for Performing Software Development Activities. 
Software Development Process: 
•   The software code and supporting documentation should be developed for the 
specific architecture of each viable system concept to support a fully operational 
prototype of each concept. 
General Plans for Software Development:  
Software development methods - Due to the early stage of development, there exists a 
potential for mixing and matching physical concepts as the design matures.  As such, the 
supporting software will need to be interchangeable.  Definition of the interfaces between each 
concept shall be identified at a global software level, and upheld as the development of the 
software code continues.  Consistent format, headers, variable identification and declaration will 
be used throughout the software development phase.  A consistent methodology will also be used 
in development of the algorithms for each module.  Each module will be tied to a specific 
function from the project's functional analysis.  This development scheme allows for the 
maximum flexibility when the final configuration of the physical concept was defined. 
Standards for software products - Consistent format, headers, variable identification and 
declaration will be used throughout the software development phase.  A consistent methodology 
will also be used in development of the algorithms for each module. 
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Reusable software products - Due to the simplistic nature of the functions the software is 
required to fulfill and the desire for maximum commonality between modules for each concept, 
reuse of existing software will not be enacted.   Reformatting existing software to make it 
compatible with each of the concepts will not be an efficient use of time. 
Handling of critical requirements - The design and functions do not contain any Fly-by-
Wire aspects.  As only one penetration for power and data is required, there are no safety critical 
aspects that relate to software.  No software modules would operate components in the 
SUBSAFE boundary.     
Computer hardware resource utilization - The development would take place using 
standard desktop computer hardware.  No special hardware requirements are needed for the 
development of these modules. 
Recording rationale - As each module is tested, a full data log will be kept, recording 
inputs, outputs, total run time and error records. 
Access for acquirer review - The code would be the property of the Department of 
Defense and be available for review at any time. 
Plans for performing detailed software development activities 
 
Project Planning and Oversight - The lead software engineer would prepare an outline of 
the modules to be developed and link the development timeframe of that outline to the project 
design schedule.  The software development must sync up with key design milestones.  The lead 
software engineer would provide weekly status updates to the program manager regarding the 





Establishing a software development environment - Software developers would be co-
located and have ready access to the pre-defined functional decomposition and component 
selection matrix as well diagrams of the component physical architecture and identified 
interfaces.   
System Requirements Analysis - Stakeholders identified their top level requirements for 
the project.  These requirements have been consolidated and formed the basis for the functional 
architecture.     
System Design - The physical architecture was defined and populated with components 
from the component selection matrix.  Different components of the physical architecture were 
mapped to specific functions.  The architecture would not change for the duration of the project 
without redefining the scope of the project.   
Software Requirements Analysis - From the functional decomposition and component 
matrix, the project will identify any function that requires the aid of software.  Each concept 
required its own software modules based on specific components of that concept.  Each module 
would be written with the understanding that concepts could swap components as the design 
matures.  The software must be able to handle that adaption.  
Software Design - Each module would be developed for a specific function and 
supporting component.  Inputs and outputs would be determined by the interfaces between the 
components.   
Software Implementation and Unit Testing - As the software development must match 
the project development milestones, implementation and testing would be scheduled with ample 
time to address implementation issues.  Because each module was developed for this project (no 
re-use of existing software), debugging can be accomplished with project specific inputs and 
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environments.  This would eliminate integration issues that would arise from software re-use.  
Each module would be tested with simulated inputs before software/software integration.  Once 
each module passed individual testing, modules that need to be combined before 
hardware/software integration would be tested with simulated inputs.     
Unit Integration and Testing - Once a series of modules were combined and successfully 
tested, hardware/software integration would be accomplished prior to component integration.  
This would allow for simulated inputs, based on the recognized interfaces, to be used in 
individual component testing. Any bugs would be fixed prior to component integration.  The 
simulated inputs would mimic actual inputs as close as possible.   
System Qualification Testing - The software would be tested in each component prior to 
component to component integration.  The software qualification testing would be considered 
complete if the integrated prototype met requirements satisfied by software implementation. 
Preparing for Software Use - Each member of the design development team or operating 
crew would be trained on the proper use of the software.  Manuals with instructions and 
troubleshooting guides are to be provided to each trainee as well as made available with each 
workstation, which operates the software. 
Software Configuration Management - An outline of variable usage, headers, comments, 
and language is provided to each software developer.  In addition, at weekly meetings, examples 
of current code were displayed for all developers to verify that their efforts mimic the displayed 
code format.  Each developer shall be individually responsible for his own version control of the 
software.  Once he has completed a module, it would be turned over to the lead software 
engineer for archive purposes and is stored until individual or integrated testing is to take place.  
Once software has been successfully integrated into a component, it will have a unique version 
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number identifying it as a working software package.  A standard revision system would be 
levied on the software development efforts.  Each updated version to a software/hardware 
integrated component would follow the revision format.  The lead software engineer would be 
responsible for integration of the software package into the hardware component. 
 
3. Reliability Analysis 
The LRS has a robust reliability strategy that meets current DOD requirements. [OSD 
ETDM, 2011]   Reliability is a system engineering discipline and the requisite actions and 
activities are embedded in the tasks listed in the integrated master schedule.  For example, 
reliability strategies were integrated as part of the overarching design review and test and 
evaluation process.  Reliability program success will be judged by meeting objectives for Mean 
Time between Failures (MBTF) and Mean Time between Operational Mission Failures 
(MTBOMF), which supports system Operational Availability. 
Design for reliability methodologies were planned throughout the design selection and 
development process.   These include: 
• Block Diagrams and Predictions 
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
 Block Diagrams and Predictions were planned to determine preferred system 
redundancies (e.g. dual power supplies, dual software routines, back-up control systems), and 
sparing requirements.  During the concept exploration phase, initial reliability comparisons were 
made between the baseline model and the four identified alternatives.  The output data from the 
ExtendSIM® model provided the early look reliability numbers of each top level function based 
on the percent success report from ExtendSIM®.   Among the different concepts, the reliability 
of each top level function was compared as well as the overall concept reliability.  At this stage 
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of development, predicting or assigning reliability targets/values to any sub level functions 
cannot be done with any degree of fidelity.  The formula for top level reliability analysis based 
on functional reliability is: 
Total Launch Recovery Replenish Maintain( )*( )*( )*( )R R R R R=  
This concept is illustrated in Figure 45. 
 
Figure 45 – Top-Level Reliability Diagram 
 
The second reliability block diagram option, Figure 46, took advantage of the redundancy 
with electronic and software components, which comprise the majority of the “Replenish” and 
“Maintain” function components.  Without a large volume or weight penalty, physical 
components of replenish and maintain were arranged to offer additional redundancy to the 
functions.  The reliability advantage of this redundancy was represented in the reliability 
calculations such that a 0.90 reliability allocation to each replenish or maintain subsystem 
increase the combined reliability of replenish or maintain functions to 0.99, using the formula: 
A B A B( * )R R R R R= + −  
This resulted in a combined replenish and maintain reliability of 0.99 * 0.99, or 0.98.  
While arranged in series, two functions with 0.90 reliability provide a combined reliability of  
A B* 0.9*0.9 0.81R R = =  
Due to large reliability benefit of redundancy in these two systems, early integration of 




Total Launch Recovery Replenish,a Replenish,bReplenish,a Replenish,b
Maintain,a Maintain,b Maintain,a Maintain,b
* *[ ( * )]*
[ ( * )]
R R R R R R R
R R R R
= + −
+ −  
 
Figure 46 –Reliability Diagram with Redundancy 
 
The third and most complex reliability block diagram arrangement, Figure 47, took 
advantage of a highly integrated system.  For this arrangement, launch and recover were again in 
series, but replenish and maintain have redundancy amongst themselves (as in the second 
reliability block diagram concept) while performing simultaneous functions.  For example, a 
diagnostic process could be run at the same time as replenishment.  The reliability advantage of 
this redundancy  was such that a 0.90 reliability allocation to replenish or maintain subsystems 
will again prove to be 0.99, but when these two functions are arranged in parallel, their combined 
reliability (replenish = 0.99 and maintain = 0.99) is 0.9999.   The reliability was then expressed 
as: 




Figure 47 – Integrated System Reliability Block Diagram 
 
A Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) were used to analyze the 
risks or weaknesses of different types of system components which could adversely affect the 
overall system reliability.  This analysis used the requirements analysis, functional analysis, and 
requirements allocation as a starting point.  The failure modes are identified, which includes the 
methodology by which the system fails to function (or a component fails to support the system 
functioning).  The root causes were identified; (Does the hatch fail due to a sealing surface, or 
due a faulty fastener?)   The effects of the failure were then determined, along with the detection 
methods, frequency and criticality. This data is used to recommend changes to the design, as well 
as the supportability requirements.  The analysis would be planned for the design phase to 
minimize re-work.  Table 25 identified potential failures, critical analysis and mitigations for 




Table 25 – Example Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis  
Functional Failure Systems Failures Consequence Mitigations / Design 
Recommendations 
Launch System fails to 
launch UUV when 
command is given 
Launch System software 
fails to initiate system. 
UUV remains in submarine 
in dormant state. 
 
UUV is not available for 
mission. 
 
Mechanical Backup launching 
system or Manual Over-ride. 
 
Redundant Software Systems 
 
Stowage and Support 
Structure fails to securely 
stow the UUV 
Support Structure Failure UUV damage to ship 
 
Potential injury to crew 
 
Damage to UUV could 
preclude it being launched 
 
Structural analysis of failure 
points, additional support to 
UUV 
 





Loose UUV falls and 
damages submarine injures 
crew or damages UUV 









UUV data collected is lost 
and not available for 
subsequent missions.  
Potential enemy recovery of 
classified data and 
technology. 
Redundant communications 
methods.   
 
 
  Mechanical recovery 
mechanisms fail to interface 
with UUV 
Loss of UUV and collected 
data.  
UUV damages ship. 
No ability to re-launch UUV 
for subsequent missions.  
Damage to intelligence if 
recovered by enemy 
 
Design interface with backups  
 
Use remote or proximity vice 
direct interfaces 
UUV control system fails Control of UUV is lost as it 
approaches submarine
  
UUV damages submarine 
pressure and or non-pressure 
hull structure. 
 
UUV itself is damaged, 
causing the data collected 
not to be recoverable. This 
results in the loss of 
intelligence as well as the 
potential loss of the ability 
to re-launch UUV for 
subsequent missions. 
Control System architecture must 
have robust design with safety 
analysis done.  
 
Redundant System to address 
failure of operating laptop with 
ability to port software onto a 





4. Safety and Usability Analysis 
A Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) addressed the Safety 
Risks to the submarine and personnel associated with the launch and recovery of Large Vehicle 
Class UUVs.  Among the risks addressed: 
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• Implodable Volumes – Defined as “any pressure housing containing a non-
compensated compressible volume at a pressure below the external sea pressure (at 
any depth down to the maximum operating depth) which had the potential to 
collapse.”  Externally mounted lights, gauges, bottles/flasks, spheres/tanks and 
beacons are examples of implodable items.  The LRS shall minimize implodable 
volumes.  Structural materials with sealed internal cavities (Carbon Steel, Titanium) 
could pose issues as well as Gas Generator Launch components with gas storage 
flasks. 
• Collision - The consequences of a large UUV crashing into the submarine structure 
are severe, with the potential for damage to the submarine hull, causing an 
uncontrollable flooding casualty.   The risk to the submarine is minimized during the 
time that the UUV is deployed and being recovered by the control system.  Systems 
that control the UUV approach to the submarine such as an EMP Attraction Device or 
ROVs would be favored over systems where the UUV must navigate to a docking 
location. 
• Off-Gassing Hazards - The UUV power systems have the potential to release 
explosive gases (e.g. hydrogen and oxygen).  Sealed and dry stowage systems may be 
more susceptible to the build-up of gases and must consider ventilation to support 
safe operation. 
• System Installation and Removal - The stowage system will be designed to maximize 
the use of cranes and jigs for loading the UUV into its final launch position prior to 
the submarine’s deployment.  The LRS would use of harnesses and jigs, to minimize 
the risk of physical injury to ships force when reloading the UUV into the submarine.   
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Lightweight composite structures that minimize equipment requirements and training 
would be preferred over heavier and rigid equipment. 
• Underwater Explosion Risk – All internal and external components would be 
designed to meet MIL-STD-801 Grade B shock requirements to minimize the risk of 
injury in an underwater explosion event.  Grade B shock means that the equipment 
will maintain structural integrity but not function.  Communications and control 
system equipment must be designed for installation into the existing equipment racks.  
Outboard equipment must not come adrift and impact function and operation of other 
submarine components.  Rigid metallic components and electrical components with 
limited mechanical parts would be desired to best resist shock events. 
5. Test and Evaluation Strategy 
The Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES) for the LRS provides an overview into the 
necessary testing at various stages of concept development.  Specific strategy recommendations 
are provided as Appendix E. 
The test strategy for all potential conceptual alternatives relies on Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) during early development, component specific Demonstration Test and 
Evaluation (DT&E) performed by contractors with Government oversight and Operational Test 
and Evaluation (OT&E) performed on a fully integrated prototype model.  In general, M&S and 
DT&E processes are considered relatively low risk.  Many proposed component alternatives are 
technically mature and those which require laboratory development are based on demonstrated 
scientific principles.  Demonstration testing of integrated mechanical system components, such 
as the launch, recovery, stowage and structural systems, using Large Vehicle Class UUV 
representative models is possible in Government laboratory facilities with minimal resource 
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requirements.  Demonstration testing of control and communication components can effectively 
be combined with operational testing as all component concepts are Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
and/or currently in-service technologies. 
Operational testing represents the highest level of program and performance risk for all 
anticipated concepts.  As such, the test strategy recommends two (2) phases of OT&E to limit the 
testing time with in-service submarine resources.  Phase I would test a fully integrated LRS 
prototype in a Virginia Payload Tube (VPT) model, using representative Large Vehicle Class 
UUV models.  Testing would be accomplished at US Navy test tank facilities at Bethesda, MD 
and would focus on successful operation of a fully integrated system in a controlled 
environment.  Upon satisfactory Phase I testing, environmentally realistic testing (Phase II) 
would be conducted using a target Large Vehicle Class UUV and a VA Class Block III 
submarine.  Phase II testing would concentrate on vehicle deployment and recovery from a 
submerged and moving submarine and would assess the radiated noise from an operating system.  
Additionally, Phase II will address human factors and training of system users as well as 
integration and data flow problems between the UUV and the submarine via the LRS.  
Significant issues identified during Phase II testing would be analyzed for corrections not only 
during successive increments of the LRS, but also during successive builds of the VA Class 
submarines and commercial UUVs.         
6. Logistics Strategy 
As part of the preliminary and detailed design effort a logistics support, trade-off and 
maintainability analysis will be addressed.  A level of repair analysis (LORA) will be done to 
identify what components may be repaired or replace at the operational (O-level), intermediate 
(I- Level), or depot maintenance level.  Consistent with the current U.S Navy policy, a reliability 
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centered maintenance (RCM) concept will be applied to minimize total ownership costs.  In 
addition, the use of unique components would be minimized, specifically components required to 
be carried as on board repair parts (OBRP).  The use of common components minimizes or 
eliminates the need for extra maintenance training.  Components would be analyzed to determine 
which could be “swapped out” and repaired off hull vice shipboard.  The issues and risks to be 
addressed in design development would include: 
● Durability of the carbon fiber vice titanium or carbon steel structure.  
● LRS structural material compatibility with existing host submarine operating 
environments and platform requirements. 
● Preservation costs of high strength carbon steels.   
● Identification of special training and certification requirements for technicians 
maintaining the LRS associated with, but not limited to; installation, preventative and 
scheduled maintenance, equipment, and facilities necessary to accommodate 
maintenance. 
● The use of commonality, open system architecture and interfaces to optimize 
logistical support of LRS for preparation of future system obsolescence. 
● Identification of LRS components located internal to the payload tube and external to 
the host pressure vessel, which are inaccessible during deployment so that design can 
stress reliability needs for maximized availability and component maintainability 
when in port. 
● Limiting the use of unique components and procedures that affect the ability to 
complete availabilities on schedule within cost due to parts availability and the use of 
specialty processes.  
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The final maintenance requirements and logistics support shall be consistent and 
compatible with existing VA class submarine practices.  This should include the use of Re-entry 
Control (REC) processes for work in the SUBSAFE boundary.  All maintenance should be 
scheduled in the ships Consolidated Ships Maintenance Plan (CSMP) for accomplishment.  
Standard Test Procedures should be developed to test the LRS after maintenance and during sea 
trials. 
B. DECISION EVALUATION 
1. Background 
Decision making under risk and uncertainty is the final step in all System Engineering 
processes.  The goal of decision making was to gather information about many different choices, 
convert these choices to comparative quantitative and qualitative measures, establish a model 
that represented the comparisons in a fair and unbiased fashion and demonstrated to the 
stakeholders that the model identifies the best choice when compared to the stakeholder’s value 
system.  [Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, pg. 164]  Decision-making highlighted the importance of 
eliciting stakeholder requirements, requirements traceability and re-iterative validation of 
stakeholder concerns during each process and phase of the Systems Engineering model.  Simply 
put, even the best-engineered systems provide no value to a stakeholder if they do not meet their 
intended needs. 
As would be expected for most engineered systems, the modeling and evaluations 
conducted with respect to the LRS did not identify one preferred concept alternative.   
Additionally, based on stakeholder input, life-cycle costs of the system was only one factor in the 
process.  Therefore, to determine which alternative provided the best solution to the war fighter’s 
needs, the team compared the values of each concept alternative. 
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The value assigned to a system can be considered the “Use” that is expected for the 
“Investment” into the system.  The “Use” of the system can be expressed as the operational 
capability of a system’s functions, performance and quality and can be expressed as a function, 
or “Use” = f(functions, performance, quality).  Not all functional capabilities of a system provide 
equal use to a set of stakeholders or even to one specific stakeholder with respect to other 
stakeholders.  As such, a weighting system was utilized to express those capabilities, which 
provided greater use vice those which provided less use.  This trade-offs of functional 
capabilities, performance and system quality provided a rationalized approach to the team’s final 
recommendations.           
2. Alternative Scoring 
 To determine the “Use” of each concept alternative, the team examined the results of six 
(6) areas of comparison accomplished during the Capstone project:  Risk, Performance, 
Interfaces, Reliability, Safety/Usability and Logistics.  The examination of concept alternative 
performance was accomplished via a quantitative approach using the results of modeling and 
simulation.  The examination of the other five factors was done qualitatively using guidance 
established for each the specific system components.  The following rules/guidelines were 
established to support the analysis: 
• Each concept alternative was compared to the other alternatives with respect to the 
top seven (7) weighted design characteristics (stakeholder requirements) identified in 
Figure 11.  The bottom three (3) weighted design characteristics (System Weight, 
Payload Space and Data Transfer Parameters) add only 13% (weighting of 1.6 
compared to 12.5 total weighting) to the overall concept value.  Additionally, the 
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commonality of many concept alternative components with respect to these 
characteristics provides little separation between rankings of concepts. 
• For each area of comparison, at least one (1) alternative was considered best and was 
assigned a rank of “5” (adds the most “Use”).  If the modeling and evaluations 
resulted in no significant differences between the alternatives, all were assigned a 
rank of “5”. 
• The other alternatives not considered the best alternative received rankings of 
between “1” and “4”.  No alternative was ranked below “1”.  In addition, multiple 
alternatives could be ranked the same if modeling and evaluations resulted in no 
significant differences between them. 
• Comparisons of the alternatives were made against each other alone and not based on 
outside factors (i.e., reliability with respect to battery charging capacity was made 
with respect to the proposed system components and did not consider an alternate, 
theoretical component with anticipated higher reliability). 
• The stakeholder value system ranks “Safety” and “Performance” as two of the most 
desired characteristics for the LRS.  Therefore, Safety/Usability and Performance 
rankings were weighted twice as much as rankings for Risk, Interfaces, Reliability 
and Logistics.  
A table was created for each of the seven (7) design characteristics, comparing each of 
the concept alternatives in each of the six (6) areas of comparison, resulting in 42 data points for 
each concept alternative.  The “Use” for design characteristic “Recovery Speed” is a summation 
of the rankings in the six (6) areas of comparison multiplied by the design characteristic weight 
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identified in Figure 11  provides the comparison matrix of the design characteristic “Recovery 
Speed”.  Detailed tables for all the comparisons are provided in Appendix F. 
The scoring system which potentially ranked one concept 5 times more useful to the 
stakeholders than another concept identified the possibility of unintended bias.  To examine the 
effects of this bias, the team explored different scoring systems, which, increased or shrank the 
spread between the rankings of the alternatives.  Assuming that the ranks of the concepts in the 
six areas of comparison were in the correct order, changing the spread did not significantly 
change the results of the analysis.  For instance, using a scoring system of 1, 10, 25, 50, 100 
(high penalty for lower ranked alternatives) provided a curve similar to that shown on Figure 48 
where Alternative 4 still dominates Alternative 2 for approximately the same cost.  Likewise, 
when the reverse methodology was used and a scoring system of 1, 1.01, 1.025, 1.05, 1.1 (low 
penalty for lower ranked alternatives) was applied, the results were similar.  As such, the team 
concluded that as long as a scoring system with a reasonable spread was chosen, the final shape 
of the curve remained unchanged assuming rankings and cost values did not change. 











Baseline 1 1 1 1 1 5 27.6 
ALT-1 5 4 5 5 5 1 78.2 
ALT-2 2 2 2 2 2 4 41.4 
ALT-3 5 3 3 4 3 3 62.1 
ALT-4 5 5 5 3 5 1 78.2 
     
 By summing an alternative’s “Use” numbers for all design characteristics, an overall 
“Use” to stakeholder number was developed for the alternative.  These numbers identified in 
Table 27 and plotted against the Life-Cycle Cost for each alternative in Figure 48.  Based on the 
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plot, the Baseline, Alternative 4 (High Tech) and Alternative 1 (Attraction Recovery) dominate 
Alternatives 2 and 3.  Furthermore, assuming Life-Cycle Cost is a consideration but was not the 
only consideration; Alternative 4 delivered the best Value, defined as Use / Investment to the 
stakeholders and was recommended for further study.  It is noted, as previously discussed, “Use” 
was a term established to support comparative overall ranking of the alternatives and does not 
provide a factor of Value for one alternative over another.  Hence, Alternative 2 provided nearly 
the same Value as the best choice (Alternative 4) and would also merit further study to validate 
costs and trade-offs.  Alternatives 1 and 3 provided little additional “Use” for cost and were 
eliminated from future analysis.  The Baseline alternative was comparatively inexpensive but 
provided little “Use” to meet stakeholder needs and also was eliminated from future analysis.      
Table 27 – Stakeholder Use/LCC per Alternative 
  
Total 
Use LCC ($M) 
Baseline 140 21.37 
ALT-1 297.3 56.25 
ALT-2 224.6 41.76 
ALT-3 245.8 56.62 
































V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This Capstone project focused on the considerations and interfaces needed to successfully 
field and support a system that would launch, recover, replenish, stow and transfer information 
between current and future Large Vehicle Class UUVs and host submarines, specifically 
submarines with the VA Class Block III payload tube concept.  This system will provide a 
capability to support persistent–ISR missions identified in the UUV Master Plan of 2004 by 
providing stealthy information collection capabilities, threat and harbor monitoring, WMD 
identification and sea floor object reconnaissance.   
  To accomplish the project objectives, the Capstone team used a three-phase Systems 
Engineering approach to analyze and develop system requirements, determine system functions, 
cost and performance guidance and to identify system design needs and constraints.  The 
outcomes and results generated from each phase were validated against a derived value system 
for the stakeholders and used as the foundation for each successive system engineering phase.  
Observations and insights of each phase of the project are highlighted below, culminating in a 
recommended approach to the design and implementation of a system that supports the 
objectives.  
A. PROJECT SUMMARY 
System Requirements Analysis 
The initial step in the system engineering process was to develop a set of requirements 
for the LRS.  As designs currently exist that integrate UUVs with submarine torpedo tubes and 
converted SSGN missile tubes, the Capstone team used these concepts as starting points for 
stakeholder identification and system requirements.  During this process, two (2) significant 
issues were identified; UUV requirements creep and implied problems with current designs. 
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The UUV Master Plan of 2004 remains as the only documented guidance with respect to 
persistent-ISR notional capabilities and concepts of operation.  In particular, the Master Plan 
identifies an on-station endurance of 300+ hours (approximately 2 weeks).  However, during the 
course of the Capstone project, three (3) additional documents [Ashton, 2010; Anderson 2011, 
Taylor, 2011] were issued that discuss on-station endurance goals of between 46 and 120 days.  
Additionally, Taylor, 2011 discusses a maximum length of 45 feet for a LDUUV (which exceeds 
the diameter of a VA Class submarine) and highlights the need for payload upgrades, better 
autonomy and system redundancies.  Although all three documents serve to challenge the UUV 
development community to explore alternate power and control technologies and do not “reset” 
guidance provided by the 2004 Master Plan, they do highlight the challenges that faced the team 
with respect to defining the Large Vehicle Class UUV external boundary for the LRS.     
Interviews with SMEs identified efforts to integrate a ULRM-like system with VA Class 
Block III submarines and, potentially, Block IV and Block V submarines.  However, responses 
indicated a variety of concerns and challenges with this approach.  For instance, hovering 
capabilities of SSGN submarines allow a UUV to swim to a deployed cradle while topside 
recovery by a moving submarine will require both vessels to match speeds and maneuver to 
avoid the submarine sail.  Additionally, current power resources at the forward end of the VA 
Class submarine may require significant modifications to support replenishment of the UUV 
power supply.  Finally, as shown in Figure 49 and discussed in McDermott, 2011, even the 
location and design of VA Class submarines with respect to the location and function of the 
payload tubes remains under review.  Although none of these integration issues appear 
insurmountable, they do represent an approach to UUV/VA Class submarine integration which 
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could increase the cost, schedule and performance risks to the LRS if designers and 
implementers focus on the wrong requirements and wrong future mission scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 49 – Proposed Future VA Class Submarine Payload Tube Configuration 
[McDermott, 2011] 
A primary role of the System Engineer is to develop a set of requirements and a preferred 
approach that provides the best value to multiple stakeholders.  To that end, the Capstone team 
took a long-term approach to establishing system requirements, recognizing that future value 
which stressed flexibility, safety and life-cycle costs would best serve the stakeholder concerns.  
Host submarine safety, accommodation of power sources, maximization of launch and recovery 
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performance and system affordability were ranked as the four (4) most critical needs expected 
for a successful system. 
With the requirements for the LRS established, the Capstone team focused on developing 
the functional architecture.  The functional architecture helped identify the resource requirements 
for the system in terms of equipment and materials, people, support facilities and 
maintenance/logistics considerations.  Using CORE®, by Vitech Corporation, the team 
accomplished the functional decomposition to map functions to physical component and 
performers and to map functions to system requirements.  The top-level functions of “Launch”, 
“Recover”, “Maintain” and “Replenish” were established for the system.  One internal system 
performer (Launch and Recovery System Operator) was identified while first-level external 
performers (Host Submarine Operator, Autonomous UUV) and second-level external performers 
(Navy Support Agency, UUV Equipment Providers, and Maintenance/Logistics Providers) were 
assigned the functional responsibilities.  With the operational and component hierarchies 
established, decomposition continued to allocate functions, tasks and requirement to ensure that 
no necessary actions were missed and no unnecessary actions were included.  Functional flow 
block diagrams were created to verify how information was exchanged between performers and 
components and operational views (OV-2, OV-5) and system views (SV-4) were generated to 
pictorially describe the information flows between the aspects of the system.   
Functional Analysis 
Following development of system requirements and functional architecture, Quality 
Function Deployment (QFD) models were used to translate the system requirements into distinct 
system functions and, ultimately, component modules meant to accomplish those functions.  
Eight (8) component modules were identified and ranked in importance, with the LRS structure 
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and LRS recovery mechanism identified as the two (2) most important.  Next, the project team 
identified technologies, both known and conceptual, which could fulfill system functions for 
each of the component modules.  Finally, these technologies were combined into concept 
alternatives, ranked according to weightings established during the QFD process and 
documented as four (4) conceptual alternatives, which could achieve system requirements and 
provide stakeholder value.  To support comparison between the existing concepts and future 
concepts, a baseline concept was identified to best mirror the functionality of the Universal 
Launch and Recovery Mechanism (ULRM), a system previously integrated with submarine 
missile tubes. 
The next step was to assess the feasibility of each concept and risks (performance, cost, 
schedule and programmatic) associated with each concept.  As done in technology identification, 
the Capstone team used experience, lessons learned and peer recommendations to rate concept 
feasibility and assign risks and potential mitigation plans.  A weighted formula combined all 
risks for a given concept into one value so that concepts could be plotted against each other on 
one risk matrix.  As the four (4) concept alternatives were deemed to perform better than the 
current, baseline alternative, the baseline alternative was identified as the highest risk concept.  
None of the other alternatives markedly separated themselves from one another although the 
Mechanical Recovery Arm alternative offered the lowest risk as the technology is already used in 
undersea environments.  Risk assessment is a qualitative exercise that can instill bias towards 
certain solutions.  However, the Capstone team believed the results of the risk assessment were   





With component concepts and allocated functions for each concept established, lifecycle 
costs were estimated for each conceptual alternative.  Using material cost data from commercial 
sources and labor/production costs from public shipyards for similar submarine work, the 
Capstone team established acquisition estimates for a single unit of each alternative.  For 
comparison, the team used a cost data point for a Multiple All-Up Round Canister (MAC), 
employed in submarine missile tubes.  With acquisition costs established, assumptions were 
made, based on the anticipated reliability of each alternative, to create a maintenance plan over a 
service life of 20 years.  Maintenance costs were determined to be a percentage of acquisition 
costs for each alternative and were based on comparable maintenance and acquisition costs of 
submarines in a shipyard environment.  To determine a single lifecycle cost in current year 
dollars, out-year costs were multiplied by a discount factor and all costs were summed.    
Cost analysis found that the structural materials were the over-arching cost driver for all 
alternatives.  Structural material costs accounted for between 75% and 90% of the overall 
acquisition costs for all considered alternatives.  As maintenance and sustainment costs leverage 
off of the acquisition costs, structural material costs contribute a significant amount of the overall 
lifecycle cost to each concept alternative.  As such, the Baseline Alternative, which uses a 
relatively cheap high strength steel structural material, had a lifecycle cost of $16M less than the 
nearest alternative, even with a more extensive maintenance and sparing plan.  However, the use 
of steel in a seawater environment adds additional risks with respect to corrosion and component 
failure as well as adds weight and reduces payload volume to provide the necessary structural 
strength.  The titanium alternatives, while considered the “soundest” material with respect to 
structural strength per volume of material, were also the most costly alternatives.  Sensitivity 
analysis and examination of future titanium pricing trends vice carbon fiber composite and high 
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strength steel pricing trends found significant pricing risks as growing competition is expected to 
deplete titanium sponge resources.  Carbon fiber composite alternatives provided a middle-of-
the-road cost approach to the metallic alternatives.  Estimates for carbon fiber capital equipment 
such as molds and manufacturing processes were difficult to reflect and may skew current 
estimates somewhat higher than the team estimates of $4M for initial capital costs.  However, as 
the raw materials for carbon fiber materials are inexpensive and plentiful, future costs may trend 
downward as manufacturing processes improve and competition forces pricing consideration.  
As such, the team considers life-cycle pricing estimates valid. 
Additionally, since raw material cost per pound of carbon fiber and titanium are about 
equal and since titanium weights twice as much as carbon fiber, a titanium structure was still 
estimated to cost twice as much to actually fabricate.  The Capstone team agreed that it would be 
possible to make a titanium structure which weighted only ½ as much as a comparable carbon 
fiber structure, this detailed design analysis was beyond the scope of the project.  Furthermore, 
making any structures with hollow tubes would violate principles that restrict implodable 
volumes in submarine external compartments and would make it much more difficult to remove 
half the weight from a titanium structure. 
Concurrent with cost analysis, modeling and simulation was accomplished to analyze the 
performance effects on the LRS concepts under a variety of input conditions.  Using the system’s 
top-level functions of “Launch”, “Recover”, “Maintain” and “Replenish” as starting points, the 
Capstone team generated a mission model in ExtendSIM® designed to focus on testable key 
performance parameters such as launch and recovery success (as a function of overall system 
reliability), launch and recovery speed and system replenishment time.  
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Modeling parameters for each concept alternative and were derived, to the maximum 
extent practical, by evaluating the component composition of each alternative.  The team made 
reliability and speed-related assumptions using known or derived values for USS LOS 
ANGELES CLASS (SSN 688) submarine missile launch data and commercial specification data 
for similar products.  Additionally, to add a sense of realism to the mission model, the team used 
weather and sea traffic assumptions for a potential mission area (Strait of Hormuz). 
Modeling and simulation results showed a mixed solution.  For instance, Alternative 1 – 
Attraction Recovery, performed best with respect to overall launch and recovery success 
(reliability) whereas Alternative 4 – Performance Option, performed best with respect to overall 
cycle time.  Under the Operational Situation (OPSIT) parameters, Alternatives 1 and 4 
dominated Alternatives 2, 3 and the Baseline in all measures.  However, down-select between 
Alternatives 1 and 4 could not be based simply on performance alone. 
The performance models were adjusted to examine component sensitivity and the overall 
validity of the model.  By selecting reliability values of between 5% and 15% different from the 
tolerance values established in the performance input assumptions, model results still showed a 
preference for Alternatives 1 and 4.  As such, barring significant errors made in the team’s 
selection of the input assumptions, the model would be expected to consistently identify 
Alternatives 1 and 4 as the superior choices.  Also of interest, the Launch and Recovery system 
overall reliability was set at 100% so that only external factors (weather, UUV, host submarine) 
would affect launch and recovery success.  For all alternatives except the Baseline, mission 
success was about 90%, which corresponds fairly well with the team’s anticipated Ao and 




Detail Design Considerations 
Design Considerations qualitatively assessed the risks associated with proceeding into 
design and fabrication of the conceptual alternatives.  As the over-arching Feasibility Analysis 
and Concept Risk Analysis conducted during the Functional Analysis Phase, Design 
Considerations assessed the characteristics the LRS should possess to minimize negative cost, 
schedule, performance or programmatic results.  However, Design Considerations focused on 
specific areas, with considerable concentration on interfaces, and recommended not only 
material concerns to mitigate risks but also procedural and planning steps necessary to help 
remove risks from design, production, testing and maintenance/support of the LRS. 
The analysis looked at interfaces between internal and external systems.  While risks 
between internal component interfaces would be managed through sound architecture, the team 
found considerable issues are likely with the internal/external interfaces.  Unlike on SSGN 
submarines, the Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) on VA Class Block III submarine is located 
external to the pressure hull.  Physically interfacing the system components inside the submarine 
with those outside the submarine would require hull penetrator back-fits to both the submarine 
and to the VPT.  Hull penetrators must not only be capable of transmitting data, they are also 
required for power replenishment.  Additionally, the shape and size of the Large Vehicle Class 
UUV and desired number of UUVs stowed in a system will alter considerations for LRS 
clamping devices and stowage devices.  The risks of significant rework to the LRS, host 
submarine and UUV could all be significantly mitigated by early and frequent communications 
between all stakeholders. 
System Safety and Usability Analysis and Logistics Analysis examined potential 
materials/designs for concept alternatives and recommended considerations to lessen the risks 
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associated with fielding a successful system.  While material choices and design were obvious 
considerations to eliminate hazards and maintenance issues, equally important were human 
factors and policy constraints.  With technology advances, needs for skilled craftsmen must be 
identified early to support maintenance needs.  Also, the unique submarine operating 
environment cannot support a system that releases significant amounts of explosive gasses or 
requires submerged operations with obstructed hull closure devices.  Again, early and frequent 
lines of communication would be required to mitigate design issues. 
Reliability Analysis used block diagrams to represent different system configurations, 
seeking to maximize a reliability growth strategy.  While a simple model that places the four top-
level system functions in series results in the lowest cost option, it also creates the lowest system 
reliability output as it is susceptible to a single-switch failure.  Noting that electronics and 
software provide a significant amount of functionality to the system’s “Replenish” and 
“Maintain” functions, the team proposed adding a level of redundancy to these functions.  These 
additions would come at an overall low cost, will focus on system interface areas where risk is 
high and will not add significant weight nor significantly reduce the payload volume.  
Furthermore, as mission and data functionality/requirements evolve, electronic and software 
component alterations provide the best mechanisms to invoke these changes for minimal cost.  
As a result, this alteration would result in an overall system reliability of ~79% vice ~66% for 
system in series (assuming 90% reliability for each component package).  
The Software Development Plan, Test, and Evaluation Strategy provided recommended 
guidelines to minimize the risks at final operational testing and provided areas for technical 
assessment of the system during design and demonstration.  Both processes champion open 
sourcing of materials to the maximum extent practical vice design-from-scratch.  Both processes 
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also recognize the need for significant government oversight of contractors during development 
and leveraging of unit testing, modeling and laboratory demonstration testing as practical.  As 
final operational testing will employ a VA Class Block III submarine asset, integration of all 
systems and combined demonstration / operational testing in a test tank will support the 
necessary troubleshooting prior to the final fielded event.      
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Of the concept alternatives explored, Alternative 4 (Figure 39) provides the best value to 
the stakeholders for the investment.  Alternative 4 demonstrated superior modeling and 
simulation performance times with an acceptable rate of success.  Acquisition costs were mid-
range while sustainment costs were comparatively low due to high reliability and maintainability 
of the structure, redundant features and lack of frictional wear issues.   
Specific technologies for concept component packages and the pros and cons for the 
technologies were based on Capstone team experience, discussions with peer-groups and 
available literature.  Future technologies might result in alternative groupings that provide 
superior value to the stakeholder at equal or less investment; however, the Capstone team 
concludes that there are several characteristics were keys to any successful system.  As shown in 
Table 27, Alternatives 2 and 4 offered similar use to the stakeholders and at a similar investment.  
Characteristics found in these alternatives, detailed below, offer a blueprint for a successful LRS 
that could meet stakeholder requirements and changes into the future: 
• Structural components are the most significant cost driver, both in acquisition and 
maintenance.  While a carbon fiber composite structure (specified for Alternatives 2 
and 4) offer weight reduction, noise reduction and corrosion resistance at a stable 
future price, issues with robustness, especially in torsion, add risk to the design.  
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Additionally, design changes may require re-molding of large parts vice small, in-
place modifications.  Ideal solutions should consider the significant advantages 
composites offer and explore ways of correcting the shortfalls.  Potential solutions 
might involve molding metallic components into the composites at manufacture to 
provide a surface to bear loads and a foundation for simple future modifications. 
•  Successful launch and recovery mechanisms must be adaptive and must minimize 
submarine dwell time.  UUV shapes, sizes and material considerations make systems 
that rely on clamps, magnets and sleds slow and restrictive.  Instead, until UUV 
technology produces a vehicle that matches speed with the submarine and 
automatically maneuvers to its capture device, system should focus on remote capture 
while in motion.  Devices that produce a low-pressure pocket that draws the UUV to 
the submarine or that remotely capture and pull the UUV to the submarine offer the 
most promise to adapt and reduce dwell time. 
• Simple designs not only decrease risk, they also improve reliability.  For the LRS, 
simple did not mean devoid of technological advances; instead, it meant systems that 
multi-task and systems that still function in the event of minor failures.  A 
combination launch and recovery mechanism with similar mechanical components 
and built-in redundancy for the controls and functions of the components should be 
considered as a design solution.  Exploration of mechanisms, which function at or 
near full capacity in sub-optimal situations, such as induction power replenishment, 
can reduce the reliance on other mechanisms to always operate without error.  
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C. LESSONS LEARNED 
The successful implementation of autonomous, unmanned systems into the underwater 
battle space will continue to challenge US Navy leadership, technical experts and the acquisition 
community for decades into the future.  As unmanned air vehicles has allowed the US military to 
conduct around-the-clock air surveillance and targeting of adversaries with little risk to military 
personnel and manned assets, the UUV community will constantly be challenged to perform 
equally well in deep sea and littoral environments.  During the progression of this Capstone 
project, several lessons learned were identified which should be considered for UUV/submarine 
integration projects and studies. 
Requirements Stability - Stakeholders should consider re-visiting the mission and 
operational parameters established for persistent –ISR operations in the 2004 UUV Master Plan.  
Particular emphasis should be focused on endurance requirements for perceived missions and 
whether it is feasible, in the near term, to field UUVs launched from submarines to meet those 
requirements.  If not practical, stakeholders might consider near-term mission guidelines that 
support current capabilities, such as an incrementally fielded approach.  If endurance 
requirements established in Ashton, 2010, Anderson 2011 and Taylor, 2011 are mandatory, 
fielding of multiple Large Vehicle Class UUVs in a rotational pattern might be considered an 
option. 
Submarine/UUV System Certification Issues - UUVs and their launch/recovery 
mechanisms can pose a widespread and detrimental effect to the host submarine and submarine 
personnel.  As the UUV and launch/recovery equipment are stowed within boundaries of 
contained submarine structure, toxic, flammable and explosive materials can result in 
catastrophic effects where similar materials used in unmanned air or ground vehicles may pose 
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little to no issues.  Additionally, equipment weight, launch and separation reliability, shock 
resistance and flood control measures affect the host submarine in ways not shared by other 
unmanned vehicle host platforms.   
While governing ASTM guides provide guidelines for the capabilities of UUVs, they do 
not specifically address constraints related to submarine launch and recovery platforms.  US 
Navy leadership needs to recognize that submarine launched and recovered UUVs are a family 
of systems with constraints unique to land-based systems.  Integration issues, particularly those 
related to submarine safety issues, require early and on-going teaming between the stakeholders 
of the two primary external boundary systems.  
Modularity/Flexibility - UUV manufacturers continue to explore technologies meant to 
break through constraints that limit current capabilities.  Many of these technologies, such as fuel 
cells and increasingly autonomous controls may not be mature enough to support a fielded unit 
for 5 or more years into the future.   However, when successfully implemented, they stand to 
dramatically change the way a UUV would be integrated with a submarine.  For instance, UUV 
diameter and length would be significantly larger to accommodate large energy sources.  In 
addition, re-fueling may come in a form of a gas or liquid vice electricity, or, in some cases, may 
not be required at all.  To support these incremental changes to UUV size, make-up and 
capabilities, future studies should focus on the flexibility and/or modularity of a launch and 
recovery system.  Trade-off studies might examine components, which could effectively be 
modified vice completely re-designed to accommodate change.  Close relationships with UUV 
designers and manufacturers would be required to support plausible visions into the future while 
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APPENDIX A – PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
This appendix provides specific details with respect to the team’s roles, responsibilities, 
actions and deliverables related to the work on this capstone project.   
 
Project Team Organization 
 
The UUV-ISR project team was organized in accordance with Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1 – UUV-ISR Project Team Organization 
The UUV ISR project team consists of seven engineers, all employed by Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA) and co-located at the Washington Navy Yard.  Combined, the 
team possesses 80 years of experience on submarine design, operation, maintenance and 
sustainment.  Engineering experience of team members is general and broad in nature.  No 
member of the team is a Subject Matter Expert on a specific area or technology that relates to 
this analysis. 
Due to co-location of team members and broad vice specialized area of expertise, the use 
of Integrated Project Teams will not be employed for this project.  Instead, all team members 
will participate, in general, on all aspects, with individual team members assigned leads for the 
identified roles and responsibilities.  Additionally, due to small team size, most members will be 
dual-hatted and serve more than one team role.  Table 1 is a listing of each team member’s 
primary roles and responsibilities.  Roles and responsibilities are subject to change as the project 










Librarian (CM) System Engineer and Architect
Modeling & 
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Table 1 - UUV Team Members Roles & Responsibilities 
Name Roles & Responsibilities  Location 
Calvert, Bill Project Lead, Assistant to Editor-in-Chief, Secretary NAVSEA 
Malecki, Sarah Deputy Project Lead, Editor-in-Chief, Secretary NAVSEA 
Goodman, Gail Scheduler, System Engineer and Architect, Secretary NAVSEA 
Lojek, Joe Cost and Business Advocate, Secretary NAVSEA 
Powell, Brian Modeling & Simulation, Secretary NAVSEA 
Heidt, Brian Librarian (Configuration Manager), Assistant to Modeling & Simulation, Secretary NAVSEA 
Cohn, Rachel Risk Manager, Secretary NAVSEA 
 
Project Lead 
The project lead is responsible of overall management and execution of the project in 
accordance with the project management plan.  The lead will develop the agenda for team 
meetings, conduct team meetings, coordinate action items and assign due dates.  The lead will 
ensure the balance of resources was adequately distributed to support the technical abilities of the 
team members and support the scheduled delivery of technical products.  The lead will serve as 
the primary Point-of-Contact (POC) with the project advisors. 
Deputy Project Lead 
The deputy project lead will assume the duties of the project lead in their absence and 
will serve as a secondary POC with project advisors.   
Secretary 
The secretary is a rotating position that will be assigned at each team meeting. The 
secretary will be responsible for the creation and distribution of meeting minutes for the team, to 
include action items and due dates assigned as a result of team meeting discussions.  The 
secretary will maintain the project engineering journal for the team, submitted to the secretary by 
all team members, as practical, on a weekly basis. 
Librarian 
The librarian is the Configuration Manager (CM) for the project team and will be 
responsible for the communications plan for the team.  The librarian will maintain an auditable 
trail of documentation and will enforce version control to project deliverables per the details of 
the communications plan.  The librarian will provide means and traceability for performance and 
effectiveness of alternate system designs back to stakeholder requirements. 
System Engineer and Architect 
The system engineer/architect is responsible for defining and implementing the systems 
engineering approach to the development of the project.  The system engineer/architect will 
serve as project team lead for stakeholder requirements definition, requirements analysis and 
architectural design for the proposed system.  The system engineer/architect will lead 
establishment of system Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measurements of 
Performance (MOP) necessary to evaluate alternate design options.  The system 
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engineer/architect will support functional and process decomposition of operational activities and 
will develop input requirements, functions, components and relationships necessary to develop 
the system architecture. 
Modeling & Simulation 
The modeling and simulation (M&S) lead is responsible for development and 
implementation of functional performance models and operational performance models as means 
to compare the performance and effectiveness of various system alternatives.  The M&S lead 
will provide verification and validation of models to stakeholder requirements and will provide 
analysis of simulation results to support trade space analysis. 
Scheduler 
The scheduler will develop the project schedule and track progress versus planned due 
dates.  The scheduler will maintain and active, real-time model of the project schedule, available 
to all team members and will establish critical path functions requiring the attention of all team 
members. 
Cost and Business Advocate 
The cost and business advocate will develop models to analyze the Life-Cycle Costs 
(LCC) that assess the affordability of various system alternatives. The advocate will utilize Cost 
as an Independent Variable (CAIV) to support cost-benefit analysis for potential system 
alternatives. The advocate will have the lead responsibility to generate estimated life-cycle costs 
of alternatives using historical data, standard parameters or like comparisons with similar 
components, processes and procedures. 
Editor-in-Chief 
The editor-in-chief is responsible for development and delivery of technical documents 
for the project team.  The editor-in-chief’s responsibilities include formatting, spelling/grammar, 
and establishing the cohesiveness of the technical documents from the submittals of the various 
team members.  The editor-in-chief will utilize the text recommended by project advisors for 
development of the team’s technical documents.  
Risk Manager 
The risk manager will assess potential areas of technical, schedule and cost risks 
associated with system requirements and project implementation.  The risk manager will develop 
assessment of risks, recommend actions associated with avoidance, assumption, transfer or 
mitigation of risks and manage actions related to reduction of risks.  Risk Management and 
Analysis will be conducted in accordance with the Risk Management Guide for Department of 
Defense (DoD) Acquisition and NAVSEA Instruction (NAVSEAINST) 5000.8, Naval Systems 
Command (SYSCOM) Risk Management Policy of 21 July 2008. 
Project Advisors 
The UVV-ISR project team advisors are Dr. Jeffery Beach and Professor Mike Green.  
Both are Naval Post-Graduate School (NPS) faculty members in the Department of Systems 





Project Team Configuration Management Plan 
 
The UUV-ISR Team Configuration Management Plan (CMP) provides guidelines for the 
UUV-ISR project. The CMP covers five aspects of the UUV-ISR project:  Electronic Files, 
Communications, Meetings, Classroom Data and Information Distribution. 
Electronic Files 
A.  Document Repository: 
The UUV project will use Google Docs as an online document repository for files 
and information relevant to the project.  Each team member will have access to the 
Google Docs site and obey the configuration management guidelines outlined in this 
plan.  A group account has been set up to allow individual group members or advisors to 
access the Google Docs site.   
Username: NPSTeamA  
Password: NPScapstone 
 
Once a file has been posted to the Google Docs site, the team member responsible 
for posting the file, will send out an email notification (via Google Docs) to the Team and 
if necessary Team Advisors, with any pertinent messages on the file. 
B. File Naming Convention: 
All electronic files supporting the UUV project completion effort are grouped into 
10 categories (represented as folders on the Google Docs site):  Archive, Class Chat 
box, CORE, Engineering Notebook, ExtendSim, Final Report, Interim Assignments, 
IPR#2, Meeting Minutes, and References.  All files are given the following naming 
convention:  
 
“filename.yy.mm.dd.rev” - example, the first revision of the Project Management 
Plan written on October 11, 2010 would be titled: “UUV Project Management 
Plan.11.10.10.0”.  Subsequent revisions on the same day would be titled ““UUV Project 
Management Plan.11.10.10.1” and “UUV Project Management Plan.11.10.10.2” etc.   
 
If a new revision is posted on a subsequent date, the filename description does not 
change, only the date and revision change.  
C. Working Copies: 
To prevent two team-members working off of the same draft simultaneously, the 
latest working entry will be titled “fileanme.yy.mm.dd.rev.working”.  The “.working” 
indicates that active changes are being made to the latest revision, and other team 
members should not attempt to make changes.  The “.working” file can be a dummy 
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document only used as a posted placeholder to indicate that a team-member is modifying 
the latest document.  This posting will be made as soon as modification starts.  The 
“.working” file will be deleted once the new revision has been completed and posted.  
D. E-Mail Policies: 
To prevent clogging and overloading of email inboxes, electronic project files will 
not be emailed to other team members.  All electronic files will be posted to their 
appropriate folder on the designated team site. 
 
Communications 
Team communications will take place via four (4) mediums:  E-mail, telephone, 
Elluminate sessions, and in-person meetings. 
  
E-Mail:  To maintain configuration control of group discussions, e-mail shall not 
be used for group discussions or comments.  Group e-mail will only be used for file 
posting notification and meeting announcements.  One group representative will engage 
professors/advisors via email and post relevant responses on Google Docs.  Other group 
members will not be included on the “cc” or “bcc” fields of these emails.    
 
Telephone:  If the team, or select individuals, participates in a teleconference or 
telephone call, the minutes or results of the conversation shall be posted to the “meeting 
minutes” folder on Google Docs. 
  
Elluminate:  When the group engages in meetings via Elluminate, the session 
shall be recorded and posted (if possible) to the “meeting minutes” folder on Google 
Docs.  If the file was not recorded, or if posting is not possible, minutes shall be recorded 
and posted to the meeting minute’s folder. 
    
In-Person Meetings:  Face to face meetings will be scheduled via email in the 
form of a meeting request.  Minutes will be recorded and posted to the “meeting minutes” 
folder. 
Meetings 
Meetings will be scheduled by the team scheduler and attended by as many team 
members as possible. 
    
Regular team meetings are scheduled for Tuesdays, 1530 to 1700, EST. 
 Elluminate meetings with Project Advisors are scheduled for Wednesdays, 1800 to 1900, 
EST.  Other meetings as necessary will be scheduled by the designated team scheduler. 
    
Minutes will be recorded at every team meeting.  Minutes should include team 
members in attendance, guests, time and date of meeting and any action items from the 
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meeting. Meeting minutes will be posted to the “meeting minutes” no more than 24 hours 
after a team meeting, when practical. 
  
If any action items are assigned at team meetings, the action shall be written down 
in full, as well as the team member the action is assigned to and the date the action is to 
be completed.  Action items will be included in the meeting minutes.  
 
Meetings will take place in one of three venues, In-person, Telephone Conference 
or via Elluminate session.    
 
Class Data 
Class data captures the Monday Elluminate session, if held.  
 
A recording of each Elluminate session will be made and if possible posted to the 
“meeting minutes” folder on Google Docs.  If this is not possible, then the default session 
location on Elluminate will suffice. 
    
A team member will be responsible for copying the entire class chat window from 
every Monday Elluminate session and posted as a separate file to the “class chat box” 
folder on Google Docs.   
 
Information Distribution 
All data will be taken from and released as Distribution A (available for public 
release).  This project will not use any data from distribution sources other than 






Table 2 outlines the deliverables and milestones associated with the proposed project.  
Prior to satisfactorily completing a milestone, all deliverables must be satisfied per review by the 
UUV-ISR team and the system’s active stakeholders.  
 
Table 2 - Deliverables & Milestones 
Deliverable and Milestone Approx. Completion Date 
Final Project Management Plan Submitted 28 Oct 2010 
NPS SE Chair Approves Project Management Plan 19 Nov 2010 
In-Process Project Advisor Review No. 1 6 Dec 2010 
In-Process Project Advisor Review No. 2 14 Mar 2011 
Final Capstone Report Draft Submitted 11 May 2011 
Final Reviewed and Concurred Report Submitted 1 June 2011 
Final Capstone Briefing Accomplished 6 June 2011 
 
Project Risk Management Plan 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Risk Management Plan (RMP) is to outline the strategy that will be 
followed to manage risk within the team’s program. Risk is a measure of future uncertainties in 
achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints. 
 
The RMP will not identify or address specific risks, but rather will serve as general 
guidance and instruction. Individual risks will be identified and managed in a working document 
titled Risk Analysis Document. 
Risk Management Plan Process Model 
The Risk Management Process Model, as described in the Risk Management Guide for 
DoD Acquisition, consists of five activities: risk identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation 
planning, risk mitigation plan implementation, and risk tracking, as illustrated in Figure 2, which 



























Risk Management Activities 
Risk Identification:  Risk identification is the activity during which each element of our 
program will be examined, in order to identify risk root causes, so that appropriate action can be 
taken to manage them. All team members will participate in identifying risk root causes on an 
ongoing basis.  Risks will be identified by: 
 
• Looking at current and proposed staffing, design, resources, etc… 
• Reviewing potential shortfalls against expectations 
• Monitoring results of testing and simulation 
• Analyzing negative trends 
 
Figure 3 is a risk breakdown structure, in which risk is decomposed into categories. This 
is a helpful tool in identifying root causes. 
 
Risk Analysis:  During the risk analysis activity, we will determine how significant a risk 
is by determining the likelihood of the root cause occurrence, and identifying possible 
consequences if the root cause were to occur. This information will be used to plot each risk in a 
Risk Reporting Matrix, Figure 4. 
 
The level of likelihood of each root cause is established using the table shown in Figure 
5, and the level of consequence of each root cause is established using the table show in Figure 6. 
When categorizing the level of consequence for a root cause, we will first identify if the primary 
consideration is performance, schedule, or cost. Thus, if the primary consequence of a root cause 
is a significant degradation in technical performance, but the cost and schedule are not impacted 
considerably, then the level of consequence for this root cause shall be a four (4). Low levels of 
risk are reported in green, moderate risks are in yellow, and high risks are in red on the Risk 
Reporting Matrix. 




Risk Mitigation Planning:  During the risk mitigation planning phase, the team shall 
develop an approach to address each risk. Options for mitigating risk include: 
 
• Avoiding risk by eliminating the root cause and/or consequence 
• Controlling the cause or consequence 
• Transferring the risk 
• Assuming the level of risk and continuing on the current program plan. 
  
Note that assuming the level of risk will not be an acceptable option for moderate and 
high risks. 
 
The following topics will be addressed and documented for each identified risk in the 
Risk Analysis Document: 
 
• Descriptive risk title 
• Description of risk, to include a summary of impacts, likelihood of occurrence, 
consequence, and whether the risk is within the control of the program 
• Root causes leading to the risk 
• Mitigation options 
• Events and activities intended to reduce risk, and subsequent level of risk if successful 
• Recommendation for mitigation 
• Resource needs 
 
Risk Management Plan Implementation:  During the risk mitigation plan implementation 
phase, the chosen risk mitigation strategy identified in the previous phase shall be executed. Risk 
reporting requirements for on-going monitoring shall also be identified. 
  
Risk Tracking:  The risk tracking phase shall be implemented to ensure successful risk 
mitigation. This will be done by monitoring risk mitigation plans, reviewing regular status 
updated, and reviewing program metrics as applicable. 
  
Risk tracking shall be conducted on a periodic basis throughout the length of the 
program. Known risks shall be reevaluated to account for the updated information, and the 
program shall be examined for new root causes. 
  
Responsible Organizations 
All team members will play an active role in risk management. Primary responsibility for 
risk management shall belong to the Risk Manager. The Risk Manager will be in charge of 
creating and updating the Risk Analysis Document. All team members will contribute to the risk 
identification phase. The Risk Manager will be the lead for risk analysis, risk identification, and 
risk mitigation planning. Team members may be asked for input during these activities, and will 
review the Risk Analysis Document for accuracy. Team members will implement the risk 
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Figure 4 - Risk Reporting 
Matrix 
Figure 5 - Levels of Likelihood Criteria 








The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) presented here is the most current revision at the 
time of submission of this document. The WBS will be handled as a separate document to be 
updated throughout the project.  
 
1. Unmanned Undersea Vehicle/Submarine Integration Project 
1.1 Initiate Project 
1.1.1 Establish Team Roles and Responsibilities 
1.1.2 Establish Team Communication/Configuration Management Approach 
1.1.3 Identify Stakeholders/Subject Matter Experts (SME) in Sphere of Influence 
1.1.3.1 Interview Stakeholders/SME and Document Meeting Minutes 
1.1.3.2 Document Key Stakeholders and Proposed Needs 
1.1.4 Establish Capability Need, Scope and Objective of Project 
1.1.4.1 Document Need/Scope/Objective to Advisors 
1.1.5  Establish System Engineering Approach 
1.1.6 Establish Risk Management Approach 
1.1.7 Develop Project Management Plan (PMP) to Codify Project Approaches 
1.1.7.1 Obtain Department Chair Approval of PMP (Deliverable) 
1.2 Conduct Requirements Analysis & Verification Phase 
1.2.1 Compile Capability Gaps/ Needs from SME Interviews 
1.2.2 Compile Capability Gaps/Needs from Literature Research 
1.2.2.1 Establish Proposed Project Requirements and KPPs/KSAs 
1.2.3 Conduct Requirements Trade-off Assessments 
1.2.4 Verify Requirements to SME and Literature Research Gaps/Needs 
1.2.5 Document Ranked Project Requirements and KPP/KSAs 
1.2.6 Define Project Risks and Feasibility 
1.2.7 Define Mission Capabilities and Operational Activities 
1.2.8 Define Proposed Scenarios for System 
1.2.8.1 Document Proposed Measures of Mission Success (MOE and MOP) 
1.2.9 Establish Preliminary Final Report Outline 
1.2.10 Conduct Interim Progress Brief #1 of 1st QTR Work (Deliverable) 
1.3 Conduct Functional Analysis & Verification Phase 
1.3.1 Define Hierarchy and Decompose System Architecture 
1.3.1.1 Document System Architecture into CORE 
1.3.1.2 Identify System Interfaces/Assess Risks 
1.3.2 Develop Functional and Behavioral Models of System 
1.3.2.1 Conduct Trade-offs of MOE & MOP 
1.3.2.1.1 Document Final MOE & MOP and Metric for Measurements 
1.3.3 Verify MOE & MOP Support Stakeholder Needs 
1.3.4 Using Top Level Architecture (Functions), Conduct QFDs 
1.3.4.1 Document Alternatives (Morphological Matrix) 
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1.3.5 Conduct Scoring to Identify Top Alternatives 
1.3.5.1 Conduct Design Trade-off Analysis and Assessments 
1.3.5.2 Establish Value and Worth Scoring for Stakeholders 
1.3.5.3 Define Concept Alternative Risks and Feasibility 
1.3.5.4 Establish Life-Cycle Cost Estimates for Top Alternatives 
1.3.5.5 Model and Simulate OPSITs for Alternatives 
1.3.5.5.1 Determine MOE & MOP Measurements for Alternatives 
1.3.5.5.2 Perform Modeling of Alternative Functions 
1.3.5.5.3 Perform LRS Sensitivity Analysis 
1.3.6 Conduct Team System Functional Review 
1.3.7 Conduct Interim Progress Brief #2 of 2nd QTR Work (Deliverable) 
1.4 Conduct Design Synthesis & Verification 
1.4.1 Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis 
1.4.1.1 Determine CAIV 
1.4.2 Conduct Interface And Design Analysis 
1.4.2.1 Develop Test Strategy 
1.4.2.2 Develop Hardware/Software Integration Plan 
1.4.2.3 Assess Safety and Usability 
1.4.2.4 Assess Logistics Support 
1.4.3 Conduct Reliability Analysis 
1.4.4 Propose Final Design Recommendation 
1.4.5 Validate Final Design Recommendation with Stakeholder Requirements 
1.4.6 Determine Future Exploration Avenues 
1.5 Project Conclusion 
1.5.1 Complete Draft Final Report 
1.5.1.1 Submit to SE Department Advisors and Secretary for Review (Deliverable) 
1.5.2 Adjudicate Comments and Submit Final Project Report (Deliverable) 
1.5.3 Develop Project Presentation 










APPENDIX B – CONCEPTUAL ALTERNATIVE GENERATION 
To support morphology and the eventual development of the components that made up to alternative systems examined in this 
report, technologies were envisioned for each component.   Either these technologies could be known forms that perform similar 
functions necessary per QFD requirements or they could be ideas or concepts which may or may not come to fruition with research 
and development. 
Using literature sources and experiences, the team generated at least two technology concepts for each of the eight (8) major 
components.  Again, using judgment and experience, these technologies were ranked in the areas of “Cost/Schedule”, Technological 
Maturity” and “Expected Performance” to assess the risks/impacts on a final concept which contained the technology.  Text rankings 
were initially used; however, to eventually compare and contrast the technology alternatives for a given component, color coding of 
Green/Yellow/Red where used with Green being the best.  This is because a technology could rank “Low” for Cost/Schedule and be 
considered beneficial, but also rank “Low” for Performance and be considered detrimental.  The rankings were considered with 
respect to the other potential technologies within the same component group.  For instance, a Carbon Steel structure is considered 
lower cost compared to a Titanium structure, which the actual cost in terms of dollars not considered.  Whereas the actual dollar cost 
of the Carbon Steel structure would have been substantially more than the dollar cost of an Acoustic Homing Beacon.   
The table that follows contains the technologies that were considered for each component package, the assessment of each 














Maturity Perform Remarks Ranking Reasoning 
Support 
Structure 
Carbon Steel Low Mature Low Heavy, corrosion, easy to work 
Carbon steels are a low impact to cost/schedule because of their ample availability 
and established trade skill set in working with these materials. They are a mature 
technology and have been in use for many decades in submarine applications. Their 
performance is relatively low due to their corrosive nature when compared with 
readily available alloys. 
Monel Medium Mature Medium 
Heavy, dissimilar 
metal weld issues, 
costly 
Due to longer lead times and expense in procurement of monel alloys, they are 
considered a medium risk to cost/schedule.  However, the technological maturity is 
high because monel alloys have been used in submarine construction for many 
decades. Monel performance is ranked medium because it is preferred to carbon steel 
due to better corrosion resistance and superior strength qualities. 
Aluminum Low Mature Low corrosion, dissimilar metal issues 
Aluminum is a readily available material so the cost and time to procure it is 
considered low. Aluminum has been available and used in various grades for decades 
so the technology is mature. The performance is ranked low due to known corrosion 
problems in seawater applications and the fact that welding aluminum to dissimilar is 
a complex process. 
Reinforced 
Carbon Fiber High Mature Medium 
structural strength 
issues, non-reactive,  
difficult to repair 
Working with fiberglass is a prolonged process and the manpower required for 
fiberglass work is not normally found in shipbuilding industry so cost/schedule is 
considered high. Fiberglass work in recreational boating and automotive industries 
has been around for decades so the technology is considered mature.  Performance is 
considered medium because of the non reactive-to-seawater property of it but 
fiberglass does not have the structural strength required for this application and it is 
difficult and time consuming to repair. 
Ceramics High Conceptual High non-reactive, difficult to repair 
Ceramics are not normally used by the marine industry and especially in structural 
applications so the cost and schedule of procuring and working these materials is 
considered high. The use of ceramics has been around for centuries in pottery-like 
applications but the use of newer ceramic materials in industrial objects is still 
considered conceptual. Their performance is considered high because of their 
resistance to corrosion and relative light weight. However, although ceramics are 
strong in compression, they are weak in shearing and tension. Additionally they are 
difficult to repair. 
Titanium High Mature High corrosion, dissimilar metal issues 
Titanium is a readily available material so the time to procure it is considered low but 
at a high cost. Titanium has been available and used in various grades for decades so 
the technology is mature. The performance is ranked high  due to advantages in 








Maturity Perform Remarks Ranking Reasoning 
Recovery 
Mechanism 
Divers Low Mature Low puts humans in danger, slow 
Use of divers has virtually no impact to cost or schedule. Navy underwater divers 
have been employed in salvage and recovery operations since at least the late 19th 
century so this method of recovery is considered mature.  Use of divers is considered 
a low performance ranking. It is not the preferred method of recovery due to the 
inherent danger associated with the operation and time required to deploy and retrieve 
the divers 
Articulated  
Mechanical Arm Medium Mature Medium 
slow, complex to 
operate, tube door 
open for extended 
period (ship safety) 
Construction of an articulated mechanical arm poses the possibility of high cost and 
schedule impact due to complexity. The technology is mature in normal applications 
but use is limited in underwater applications due to electro-mechanical components. 
The performance is medium because their sluggish operation requires that outer tube 
doors remain open for extended periods. 
 ROV  High Prototype High 
(deploy homing 
ROVs which attach 
to UUV and direct 
back into tube), fast, 
more items to 
maintain 
ROVs are a high impact to cost and schedule due to procurement of additional 
equipment required to procure and design storage for on the host platform.  ROVs for 
this application would be considered a prototype meaning that the technology is there 
to build them but it has yet to be built which also add to the high cost/schedule 





High Prototype High 
fast, high power 
demand, could 
damage electronics, 
detectable by enemy 
Electro-mechanical devices are basically a magnetic apparatus used to retrieve a 
UUV. Constructing this type of device would be cost prohibitive because of the power 
and shielding requirements. This device is considered a prototype due to the know-
how is available and has been done before, but not for this application. The high speed 




Gas Generator Low Mature High 
Current technology 
used on Strategic  
missiles so service 
proven 
Because of their current use on Trident submarines, cost and schedule are considered 
low. Procurement of this equipment would be akin to an off-the shelf purchase. The 
technology is mature and has been in proven use since construction of Ohio class. The 
performance is high because of the speed at which the UUV could be launched and 
due to the relative low maintenance of the equipment.  Using this alternative complies 
with commonality policy 
Release a catch  
(UUV "swims" 
away  
on its own) 
Low Mature Medium 
susceptible to ocean 
currents during 
launch 
Release a catch allows a UUV to swim out of the tube under its own power. This is 
considered a low impact to cost/schedule since no additional equipment is required 
and a mature technology since existing UUV are currently operating on their own 
power.  Potential issue with accidental contact with sub on recovery. 
Articulated  
Mechanical Arm Medium Mature Medium 
slow, complex to 
operate, tube door  
open for extended 
period (ship safety) 
Construction of an articulated mechanical arm poses the possibility of high cost and 
schedule impact due to complexity. The technology is mature in normal applications 
but use is limited in underwater applications due to electro-mechanical components. 
The performance is medium because their sluggish operation requires that outer tube 







Maturity Perform Remarks Ranking Reasoning 
Divers Low Mature Low puts humans in danger, slow 
Use of divers has virtually no impact to cost or schedule. Navy underwater divers 
have been employed in salvage and recovery operations since at least the late 19th 
century so this method of recovery is considered mature.  Use of divers is considered 
a low performance ranking. It is not the preferred method of recovery due to the 
inherent danger associated with the operation and time required to deploy and retrieve 
the divers 
 
ROV High Prototype High 
(deploy homing 
ROVs which attach  
to UUV and direct 
back into tube), fast, 
more  
items to maintain 
ROVs are a high impact to cost and schedule due to procurement of additional 
equipment required to procure and design storage for on the host platform.  ROVs for 
this application would be considered a prototype meaning that the technology is there 
to build them but it has yet to be built which also add to the high cost/schedule 





High Prototype High 
fast, high power 
demand, could  
damage electronics, 
detectable by enemy 
Electro-mechanical devices are basically a magnetic apparatus used to retrieve/repulse 
a UUV. Constructing this type of device would be cost prohibitive because of the 
power and shielding requirements. This device is considered a prototype based on the 
know-how is available and has been done before, but not for this application. The 
relative high speed of repulsing a UUV warrants a high performance ranking. 
UUV Power 





on Host Sub  
(replaced on UUV 
while launched, 
by  
ROV or divers) 
Low Mature Low 
Divers would need 
to rendezvous with 
UUV and recharge it  
Removal and replacement of existing batteries had no cost or schedule risk. The 
existing UUV batteries would be mature, and provide high performance.  However, 





Medium Prototype Medium 
Smaller Scale station 
used for  
REMUS  
This was ranked medium on cost/schedule and performance, since the REMUS 
docking station could be considered a prototype.  The ability to use it for a larger 
vehicle and different battery is what made it medium. 
Pulse Charge  
(while UUV 
launched) 
High Conceptual Low 
feasibility of doing 
this under sea from 
submarine not 
defined 







Maturity Perform Remarks Ranking Reasoning 
Charging pad  
(while UUV 
stowed) 
High Conceptual High 
based on electric car 
battery recharging 
system 
Technology has not been demonstrated for cars.  Undersea wireless communications 
issues have fidelity issues (thus the high cost and schedule risk).  However, if 
successful, could support inductive charging at a distance and in wet environments.  
Host sub  
releases charging  
cable (while  
UUV launched) 
Low Mature Medium cable would be prone to flooding 
Cost of cabling is low; technology is mature with external cables in use in several 
submarine systems; performance is medium because external cables are prone to 
flooding leaving them damaged.  Dry charge would require a dry compartment, but 




in payload tube Medium Mature Medium 
simple, potential for 
binding 
Cost is medium due to additional hardware and heavy duty moving parts required; 
technology is medium; Performance is medium because this system will require the 
UUV to launch and recover under its own power. 
Canister that 
retracts  
into payload tube 
High Conceptual Medium 
would be part of the 
launch/recovery  
system 
Cost is high due to additional hardware and complex precision heavy duty moving 
parts required; Conceptual technology in underwater applications; Performance is 
medium based on relative sluggish operation of moving . 
Magnet in 
payload tube High Prototype High 
large magnets would 
be costly 
Cost is high based on large size of magnet required to retain a large UUV; 
Technology for magnets is mature (even large sizes) but are not in use for this system 
so prototype technology; performance is high because of low number of moving parts 
and clean installation. 
Sealed 
compartments  
in payload tube 
Medium Mature High 
each UUV would 
have designated  
stowage spaces 
Cost is medium base on additional structural work required to create sealed 
compartments in the tube; Current shipbuilding practices could accommodate building 
of separate compartments; Performance is high because each UUV will have its own 




Portable plug-in  
control system Low Mature Medium 
A carry-on 
technology, not 
stored on board 
when subs mission 
doesn't require UUV 
operations 
Cost is low because no additional space has to be designed into submarine to 
accommodate control system hardware; "Carry-On" hardware is currently employed 
on submarines so technology is mature; Performance is medium based on system not 
being fully integrated with sub and taking up space normally used by other 







Maturity Perform Remarks Ranking Reasoning 
Hardwired  
integrated system Medium Mature Low 
System becomes 




Cost of installing additional hardware/software into sub to accommodate control 
system is medium; Most systems on a sub are hardwired system so technology is very 
mature; Performance of a hardwired system is low because additional submarine 
space has to be found to accommodate control system hardware and potential 




Medium Prototype High 
System becomes 
permanently part  
of the submarine's 
on-board systems 
Cost of wireless is medium due to no cabling being required but still need space for 
hardware; Wireless technology is mature but few or no systems exist for this 
application so technology is prototype; Performance is high as there are no additional 














and depth. Usually 
difficult to transmit 
effectively 
underwater. 
Cost of RF is medium due to no cabling being required but still need space for 
hardware; RF technology is mature but few or no systems exist for this application so 
technology is prototype; Performance is high as there are no additional cable 
penetrating the hull which would be prone to cable flooding issues. 
Hard-wired Medium Mature Low 
System becomes 
permanently part of  
the submarine's on-
board systems 
Cost of installing additional hardware/storage into sub to accommodate excess cabling 
is medium; hardwired technology is very mature; Performance of a hardwired system 
is low because additional submarine space has to be found to accommodate cabling 
plus it’s impractical to the mission. 
Acoustic Medium Prototype High 
System becomes 
permanently part of 
the submarine's on-
board systems. 
Subject to multi-path 
propagation, time 
variations of the 
channel and limited 
available bandwidth 
Cost of acoustic system is medium due to no cabling being required but still need 
space for hardware; Acoustic technology is mature but few or no systems exist for this 
application so technology is prototype; Performance is high as there are no additional 
cables penetrating the hull which would be prone to cable flooding issues.   
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 Mhr Rate 85$           50$           80$           85$              80$                  85$           N/A N/A
     Support Structure
Man hours 200 1,500 375 2,000 200 350 4,625
Cost 17,000$  75,000$  30,000$  170,000$   16,000$         29,750$  1,200,000$        75,000$                                   1,612,750$                   
Man hours 200 1,500 375 2,000 200 350 4,625
Cost 17,000$  75,000$  30,000$  170,000$   16,000$         29,750$  12,040,000$      200,000$                                 12,577,750$                 
Man hours 250 1,500 375 2,000 200 350 4,675
Cost 21,250$  75,000$  30,000$  170,000$   16,000$         29,750$  5,400,000$        150,000$                                 5,892,000$                   
      Recovery Mechanism
Man hours 50 200 50 2,000 200 200 2,700
Cost 4,250$     10,000$  4,000$     170,000$   16,000$         17,000$  239,000$            2,000$                                     462,250$                       
Man hours 50 200 50 2,000 200 200 2,700
Cost 4,250$     10,000$  4,000$     170,000$   16,000$         17,000$  165,000$            1,600$                                     204,250$                       
Man hours 15 150 37.5 1,200 120 200 1,723
Cost 1,275$     7,500$     3,000$     102,000$   9,600$            17,000$  27,000$              1,000$                                     123,375$                       
      Launch Mechanism
Man hours 150 200 50 2,000 200 300 2,900
Cost 12,750$  10,000$  4,000$     170,000$   16,000$         25,500$  347,000$            75,000$                                   660,250$                       
Man hours 20 100 25 200 50 50 445
Cost 1,700$     5,000$     2,000$     17,000$     4,000$            4,250$     -$                     -$                                          33,950$                         
Man hours 15 150 37.5 1,200 120 200 1,723
Cost 1,275$     7,500$     3,000$     102,000$   9,600$            17,000$  27,000$              5,000$                                     172,375$                       
      Power and Recharging Mechanism
Man hours 5 10 2.5 80 20 40 158
Cost 425$        500$        200$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     4,500$                1,000$                                     18,425$                         
Man hours 5 10 2.5 80 20 40 158
Cost 425$        500$        200$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     6,550$                1,000$                                     20,475$                         
Man hours 5 20 5 80 20 40 170
Cost 425$        1,000$     400$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     11,050$              2,500$                                     13,625$                         
      Stowage System
Man hours 10 80 20 200 50 50 410
Cost 850$        4,000$     1,600$     17,000$     4,000$            4,250$     38,500$              4,500$                                     74,700$                         
Man hours 10 80 20 200 50 50 410
Cost 850$        4,000$     1,600$     17,000$     4,000$            4,250$     3,100$                1,500$                                     36,300$                         
Man hours 20 80 20 200 50 50 420
Cost 1,700$     4,000$     1,600$     17,000$     4,000$            4,250$     55,000$              3,500$                                     32,550$                         
      Control System
Man hours 5 10 2.5 80 20 40 158
Cost 425$        500$        200$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     11,430$              1,500$                                     25,855$                         
Man hours 5 10 2.5 80 20 40 158
Cost 425$        500$        200$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     11,550$              1,500$                                     24,475$                         
      Radio Communication
Man hours 5 30 7.5 80 20 40 183
Cost 425$        1,500$     600$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     7,500$                1,500$                                     14,325$                         
      Acoustic Communication
Man hours 5 40 10 80 20 40 195
Cost 425$        2,000$     800$        6,800$        1,600$            3,400$     19,180$              1,500$                                     15,025$                         
Other Assumptions
1. For Manufacturing and Installation a man hour rate of $85/hr is assumed
2. For Engineering and Design a man hour rate of $50/hr is assumed
2. For General and Administrative a man hour rate of $80/hr is assumed
3. For every 4 hours of M & I, there is 1 hour of G & A
        Option 1: Portable plug-in control system
        Option 2: Hardwired integrated system
        Radio frequency
        Acoustic
        Option 2: Hostsub releases charging cable 
        Option 3: Induction charging pad device
        Option 1: Catch/lock/clasp in payload tube
        Option 2: Magnet in payload tube
        Option 3: Sealed compartments in payload tube
        Option C: Electro-mechanical Attraction Device
        Option A: Launch Ejection Gas Generator
        Option B: Release a catch 
        Option C:  Electro-mechanical Repulsion Device
        Option 1: Physical cable connection 
        Option A: Carbon Steel
        Option B: Fiberglass
        Option C: Titanium
        Option A: Articulated Mechanical Arm
        Option B: Remote Vehicle (ROV)
APPENDIX C – COST ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS 
Acquisition cost considerations for conceptual alternatives were established by using cost data from internet and peer sources for exact 




1 1 Cable $1,400 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $1,400 $8,400 




$2,000 estimate $2,000 $12,000 
3 1 Internal Connector $200 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $200 $1,200 
Total: $4,550 $27,300 
1 1 Cable $1,400 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $1,400 $8,400 




$2,000 estimate $2,000 $12,000 
1 Internal Connector $200 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $200 $1,200 
3 1 Cable release mech $2,000 estimate $2,000 $12,000 
Total: $6,550 $39,300 
1 1 Cable $1,400 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $1,400 $8,400 




$2,000 estimate $2,000 $12,000 
1 Internal Connector $200 Similar VLS cabling/connectors $200 $1,200 
3 1 Charging Pad $6,500 estimate $6,500 $39,000 
Total: $11,050 $66,300 
Option 1: Physical cable connection 



















Option 3:  Induction charging pad device




1 1 Gas Generator $250,000 estimate $250,000 $1,500,000 
2 1 Associated Piping $75,000 estimate $75,000 $450,000 
3 1 Control System $22,000 estimate $22,000 $132,000 
Total: $347,000 $2,082,000 
1 1 $0 
2 1 $0 
3 1 $0 
Total: $0 $0 
1 1 motor-generator $20,000 similar shipboard models $20,000 $120,000 
2 1 cables/wire/coil $4,000 estimate $4,000 $24,000 
3 1 core material $3,000 estimate $3,000 $18,000 
Total: $27,000 $162,000 
Option 1: Launch Ejection Gas Generator







Option 2: Release a Catch












Option 3: Electro Mechanical Repulsion Device






1 1 Articulating Arm $225,000 estimate $225,000 $1,350,000 
2 1 Software $4,000 estimate $4,000 $24,000 
3 1 Control System $10,000 estimate $10,000 $60,000 
Total: $239,000 $1,434,000 
1 1 ROV $125,000 
price scaled based on smaller 
ROVs
$125,000 $750,000 
2 1 ROV Control System $15,000 estimate $15,000 $90,000 
3 1 ROV Storage $25,000 estimate $25,000 $150,000 
Total: $165,000 $990,000 
Notes: 1. smaller ROVs price around $15,000 - $20,000
1 1 motor-generator $20,000 similar shipboard models $20,000 $120,000 
2 1 cables/wire/coil $4,000 estimate $4,000 $24,000 
3 1 core material $3,000 estimate $3,000 $18,000 
Total: $27,000 $162,000 
Notes: 1. If ship's diesel generator is used to provide current to the coil, a separate generator is unnessary.
Option 1: Articulated Mechanical Arm


















ITEM QTY. DESCRIPTION COST ESTIMATE 
BASED ON




1 1 Cable to TR $1,400 Current VLS weapon control cable $1,400 $8,400 
2 Pigtail to laptop $600 estimate
3 1 External Connector $950 Current VLS outboard 30-pin connector $950 $5,700 
4 1 Internal Connector $200 Current VLS inboard connector $200 $1,200 
5 1 Carry-on Laptop $3,880 




6 1 Software $5,000 high-end custom software similar costs $5,000 $5,000 
Total: $11,430 $43,580 
Note: Total software cost based extending software license to six systems
1 1 Cable $1,400 Current VLS weapon control cable $1,400 $8,400 
2 1 External Connector $950 Current VLS outboard 30-pin connector $950 $5,700 
3 1 Additional inboard cabling $2,000 estimate
4 1 Internal Connector $200 Current VLS inboard connector $200 $1,200 
5 1 Computer $4,000 estimate $4,000 $24,000 
6 1 Software $5,000 high-end custom software similar costs $5,000 $5,000 
Total: $11,550 $44,300 
Notes: 1. Total software cost based extending software license to six systems
2. Computer will be installed in existing fire control console in Control resulting in a dual purpose station
3. Additional inboard cabling will be from hull penetration to Control




ITEM QTY. DESCRIPTION COST ESTIMATE 
BASED ON
Option 2: Hardwired control system
TOTAL FOR 
SIX SYSTEMS
Option 1: Portable plug-in control system







1 1 Carbon Steel Support Structure $1,200,000 
carbon steel price expressed as 
cost of qty. (1) MAC structure 
$1,200,000 $7,200,000 
2 1 Titanium Support Structure $12,040,000 
titanium price expressed as a 
percentage of qty. (1) MAC structure
$12,040,000 $72,240,000 
3 1 Carbon Fiber Support Structure $5,400,000 
Carbon Fiber price expressed as a 
percentage of qty. (1) MAC structure
$5,400,000 $32,400,000 
Total:
Notes: 1. Based on current cost of SSGN/SSN Multiple All-Up Cannisters (sourced through Electric Boat)
2. carbon steel price estimated using current $US/ton (http://www.meps.co.uk/world-price.htm) ($0.40/lb or $815/ton)
3. titanium prices obtained from http://www.metalprices.com/freesite/metals/ti_product/ti_product.asp (approx $7.00/lb or $22,300/ton)
4. carbon fiber price obtained from http://www.compositesworld.com/news/doe-advances-lower-cost-carbon-fiber-rampd ($8/lb or $16,000/ton)
5. $2,000,000 MAC price obtained from EB (Cathy Innes)
6. MAC materials consist of various steels (HY, stainless, etc)
Material Density (g/cm3) Density (lb/ft3) $/lb $/system Pounds Volume
Carbon Steels  7.85 g/cm3 490 0.40$                                                                1,200,000$               3000000 6122.449
Titanium 4.506 g/cm3 281 7.00$                                                                12,042,857$            1720408 6122.449





Options 1, 2 & 3:








$2,500 estimate $2,500 $15,000 
2 1 hydraulic actuator $6,000 
based on VLS fairing 
locking cylinder
$6,000 $36,000 
3 1 locking mechanism $30,000 
based on VLS fairing 
locking mechanism
$30,000 $180,000 
Total: $38,500 $231,000 




$1,100 $/lb of a SmCo magnet $1,100 $6,600 
2 1 Installation hardware $2,000 estimate $2,000 $12,000 
Total: $3,100 $18,600 
Notes:
2. SmCo cost is approx $70/lb
3. Density of SmCo 0.3 lbs/in3
4. Assume a 2" thk x 26" dia (arbitrary diameter chosen)  = 52 in3 = 15.6 lbs = $1,100
1 1
additional structure to 
accommodate seals
$35,000 estimate $35,000 $210,000 
2 1 sealing hatches $20,000 estimate $20,000 $120,000 





Option 3: Sealed compartments in payload tube
ITEM QTY. DESCRIPTION COST ESTIMATE 
BASED ON
1. According to http://www.magnetshop.com/materials.html, Samarium Cobalt (SmCo) is a suitable 






Option 1: Catch/lock/clasp in payload tube












1 1 transmitter/amplifier $5,000 estimate $5,000 $30,000 
2 1 receiver $2,500 estimate $2,500 $15,000 
Total: $7,500 $45,000 
Notes: 1. Assumed a basic radio system that could be used to send a signal to the LRS from inside the host sub 
TOTAL FOR 
SIX SYSTEMS










software & modem 
3880 + 
$15,000





2 1 power supply $300 estimate $300 $1,800 






1. Based estimates on of L3 HAIL system (http://www.l-3com.com/nautronix/products/pdf/NMS-C-SS-
002HydroAcousticInformationLinkSpecificationSheetR2.pdf)




APPENDEX D – FUNCTIONAL MODELING 
A.  LAUNCH MODEL 
 
 
The launch model simulated 1000 LRS launches for each alternative and its results are provided in Table 
A (in this Appendix).  Each launch was independent of the previous launch and independent of the three 
remaining system functions: Recovery, Maintain and Replenish.  Launch condition were described as Fair, 
Moderate or Poor, and each expressed with a constant likelihood.  Launch condition parameters were not 
variable and remained fixed for all launch simulations.  The modeling parameters identified in Table 19 of 
the report were used for Launch Modeling.  The likelihood of a Smooth or Complicated Launch was 
dependent on the launch condition of Fair, Moderate or Poor.  The likelihood of success is more probable 
during a smooth launch than a complicated launch and was defined as Not Detected and No Damage.  The 
parameters used for defining the likelihoods leading to success are described in Table A.  All simulations 
results were outputted to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet where a descriptive analysis was performed to 
evaluate the performance of the launch function. 
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Table A - Launch Model Raw Data 
 Launch Model Raw Data 
 
Not Detected & 


















Alt-1 90.3% 2.5% 1.8% 3.8% 
98.4
% 11.25 
Alt-2 85.4% 2.5% 2.5% 6.8% 
97.2
% 11.25 
Alt-3 89.4% 4.0% 0.6% 5.2% 
99.2
% 11.33 











Table B - Launch/Recovery Likelihoods in Varying Conditions 
 Baseline Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3 Alt 4 




































Smooth Launch: No Damage & Detected 3.50% 2.00% 3.50% 3.50% 3.00% 
Smooth Launch: Damaged & Not Detected 3.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.00% 0.75% 
Smooth Launch: Damaged & Detected 1.50% 0.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.25% 
Complicated Launch: No Damage & Not 
Detected 1.50% 0.50% 1.00% 0.50% 0.25% 
Complicated Launch: No Damage & Detected 3.00% 1.50% 1.50% 1.00% 0.75% 
Complicated Launch: Damaged & Not 
Detected 3.50% 2.00% 3.50% 3.50% 3.00% 









Expected Likelihood of Successful Launch 















B.  RECOVERY MODEL 
 
 
The Recovery Model is nearly identical to that used to evaluate the performance of launching utilizing the 
parameters identified per   
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Table 19 of the report and Table B and simulated 1000 recoveries. Raw data of each alternative model is 
provided in Table C.  A new variable was added to model the likelihood of communication linkage of the 
host platform and returning UUV for retrieval. Failed communication link would ultimately result in a 
failed attempt to recovery the UUV.  If communications is successful the same order of events and 
likelihoods described in the launch procedure are followed.  Although each design concept shared similar 
communication systems it was assumed that the LRS structural material and placement of communication 
devices would vary the likelihood of success for establishing a communication linkage during recovery.  
This variation was captured in the likelihood of communication success in Table 19 of the report. All 
results from the 1000 LRS recoveries were data-based to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet where they were 
analyzed to evaluate recovery performance of the baseline and four alternatives. 
Table C - Recovery Model Raw Data 






















Alt-1 1.8% 88.7% 2.0% 2.0% 3.5% 98.0% 25.63 
Alt-2 0.5% 86.6% 3.4% 1.1% 5.8% 97.4% 30.05 
Alt-3 0.8% 87.7% 3.3% 1.1% 5.7% 98.6% 26.95 
Alt-4 2.9% 87.2% 2.7% 1.1% 4.6% 98.5% 25.47 
Baseline 1.0% 81.0% 3.3% 2.6% 8.1% 96.0% 37.45 
 
C.  MAINTAIN MODEL 
 
The Maintain model captured the performance of the baseline and alternatives to successfully stow 
once recovered and successfully mount within the payload tube for 1000 cycles.  The results of the 
simulation for each alternative are provided in Table D.  Once successfully stowed the LRS is then 
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able to initiate UUV maintain procedures.  The definition of success for maintaining is dependent 
on successful: ISR data retrieval, securing UUV in payload tube, LRS positioning UUV for 
securing, and communication between the LRS and host platform. The variable used to simulate 
each design concept can be found in  Table 19 - Concept Alternative Modeling Parameters.  Unlike 
launch and recovery models, maintain procedures are internal to the host platform and therefore 
are not functions of varying sea conditions. 
Table D - Maintain Model Raw Data 


















Alt-1 1.4% 1.1% 0.6% 0.1% 96.8% 12.04 
Alt-2 0.8% 0.6% 0.2% 0.2% 98.2% 11.99 
Alt-3 1.4% 1.0% 0.1% 0.4% 97.1% 12.22 
Alt-4 1.4% 1.6% 0.6% 0.3% 96.1% 10.98 





D.  REPLENISH MODEL 
 
The replenish model was simulated to represent 1000 replenish cycles and Table E provides the raw data 
to each alternative simulation.  The parameters used for modeling are identified per were 
Table 19 - Concept Alternative Modeling ParametersTable 19 - Concept Alternative Modeling 
Parameters.  The replenish model was  independent of all other models (Launch, Recovery, and Maintain) 
and success is defined by successfully: establishing communication between Host/LRS/UUV, refueling 
UUV, diagnosing LRS/UUV system, reconfiguring system with software updates and uploading future 
mission data.  All data was collected in a Microsoft Excel data-base that was analyzed with descriptive 
statistics to evaluate replenishment performance. 
 
Table E - Replenishment Model Raw Data 






















Alt-1 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 1.4% 0.8% 93.0% 45.55 
Alt-2 0.4% 2.6% 1.7% 0.4% 0.6% 94.3% 45.54 
Alt-3 1.4% 2.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.1% 92.4% 45.55 
Alt-4 1.8% 3.4% 1.4% 1.0% 1.3% 91.1% 43.70 




APPENDEX E – TEST AND EVALUATION STRATEGY 
PART I – INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Purpose. The Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES) provides an overview into testing at various 
phased of design and production for the Launch and Recovery System (LRS).  
1.2. Mission Description. For submarine launched UUVs to be an effective tool for undersea 
warfare persistent-ISR operations, a system is required to integrate the host submarine and the Large 
Vehicle Class UUVs.  This system must provide launch, recovery, replenishment and communication 
capabilities without adversely affecting the certification of the host submarine for unrestricted operations. 
1.3. System Description. The LRS system has 8 major components: Support Structure, Recovery 
Mechanism, Launch Mechanism, UUV Recharging Mechanism, UUV Stowage System, Launch and 
Recovery Control System Architecture, Short-Range RF Communications, and Acoustic Homing 
Communications.  There are 5 top concept alternatives developed which provide various combinations of 
alternatives for the major components.  Support Structure will be either carbon steel, titanium or 
composite.  The Recovery Mechanism has 4 options: Swim to Cradle, Electro-Mechanical Device, 
Articulated Mechanical Arm, or a Tethered Remote Vehicle.  The Launch Mechanism has three options: 
Swim Away, Pressurized Gas Ejection or an Electro-Mechanical Device.  The UUV re-charging 
Mechanism supports three options, all with the UUV in the stowed position: a Wet Cable Connection, Dry 
Cable Connection or an Inductive Charging Method.  The UUV stowage system also has three alternative 
options in: Mechanical Locks, Sealed/Dry Compartments in the Payload Tube or Magnetic Locks.  The 
Launch and Recovery Control Arm System Architecture has been chosen to be a Portable, Plug-in Control 
Hardware/Software.  The Short-Range RF Communications component will utilize underwater radio 
waves.  The Acoustic Homing Communications will use an Acoustic Homing Beacon.  
1.3.1. System Threat Assessment. The LRS will contend with threats in all phases of use, from 
accidental damage during the loading operations and/or transport to detection by enemy sonar and radars 
leading to torpedo and missile attack as well as risk of accident as the UUV movement and operability is 
affected by ocean currents/tides and unwanted detection of acoustic communication leading to 
compromise of the UUV and host submarine assets.  Threats during data transfer also include active and 
passive enemy detection capabilities requiring a level of encryption and security that may further inhibit 
timely information transfer.    
1.3.2. Program Background. From the component matrix, five leading concepts were chosen as 
the most likely concepts meeting the requirements of the LRS.  Since components are in various stages of 
technological development, components will require varied levels of developmental testing to ensure that 
each concept/prototype has adequate technology, when integrated to meet system requirements.  
1.3.3. Key Capabilities. The LRS will provide a launch, recovery, storage and recharging 
mechanism for long range ISR type UUVs.  Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) have been identified for 
the LRS, which will be used in the testing phases to ensure the developed system meets stakeholder needs.  
These KPPs are: safe operation, affordability, reliability, communication success, flexibility, launch 
success and recovery success.   
1.3.3.1. Key Interfaces. The LRS has direct interfaces with the VIRGINIA Block III host 
submarine as well as the ISR UUV.  
1.3.3.2. Special Test Requirements. At this time, no unique testing requirements are identified for 
the LRS.  
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1.3.3.3. Systems Engineering (SE) Requirements. The SE approach for the LRS focuses on 
concept development and exploration of alternate solutions at various early acquisition stages.  The 
requirements definition phase does not rule out technologies nor does it force the solution to a specific 
development effort.  Once the system and physical architecture were defined, component areas were 
identified and could initially be compared to similar components with various Technology Readiness 
Levels.  The beginning stages of design synthesis (concept design) identified top conceptual alternatives.  
The options for each alternative began to identify possible technologies to be developed and tested.  Once 
the down select to one concept design to begin preliminary design happens, component alternatives for the 
concept will be evaluated and developmental testing will be further defined.  
PART II – TEST and EVALUATION PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND SCHEDULE  
2.1. T&E Management. The contractors developing the prototypes are responsible for the 
majority of developmental testing, however, the government is required to approve the test procedures for 
selected developmental tests.  The government will conduct fully integrated operational testing with the 
contractor on hand as a witness and to troubleshoot any problems.  Technology Readiness Levels 
determined by the contractor shall be verified through the Office of Naval Research.    
2.2. T&E Data Strategy. Data collection for LRS testing will include modeling and simulation 
data recording successful/safe launch and recovery operations, using enough modeling and simulation 
runs to provide 95 percent confidence that the developed system will meet its performance requirements.  
Weight data will be taken by calibrated load cells to determine overall system weight and impact on host 
ship.  Acoustic monitoring devices will record radiated noise from LRS operations.  Data transfer rate and 
security will be monitored and recorded to maintain minimum data transfer rate levels.  
2.3. Integrated Test Program Schedule. Competitive prototypes for the LRS are not required.  
The downselect for a single concept will be based on the cost and capability analysis of the chosen 
alternatives.  Once the concept baseline has been chosen, detail design and testing will commence.  The 
project is too early in development to discuss testing schedules; however, certain tests have been 
identified:  bench tests on launch, recovery and stowage actuators, bench tests on communications 
devices, component weight measurements and integration testing for the control architecture as well as 
LRS functionality in a non installed payload tube. All required SUBSAFE testing and necessary OQE will 
also be required.  
PART III – TEST AND EVALUATION STRATEGY  
3.1. T&E Strategy Introduction. At the preliminary design phase, the Test and Evaluation 
Strategy mimics the Test Program Schedule – bench testing on the component level and integration testing 
on the system level.  All components that are identified as SUBSAFE will have appropriate SUBSAFE 
testing and documentation integrated into the test schedule.  Each identified interface for the LRS will be 
evaluated to ensure all requirements of the ICD are met.  
3.2. Evaluation Framework. Early stage testing will emphasize the evaluation of components and 
concepts to determine the best performers and allow insight into possible combinations of components for 
superior performance.  Each component or sub-system will be evaluated for reliability and performance 
values based on the functions each component/sub-system performs.  The testing will provide validation 
for our component selection and the concept modeling and simulation output.  As the concepts mature and 
a prototype is chosen, system integration testing is performed based on the outlined mission scenarios.  
This testing measures concept/prototype performance against required values.  
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3.3. Developmental Evaluation Approach. All selected component options will be developed 
and tested to meet the requirements of the functions they perform.  Component testing shall be designed to 
compare components performance and reliability on each function to which the component is mapped.  
3.3.1. Developmental Test Objectives. Once a concept is selected, developmental items will be 
identified.  Technology Readiness Levels will be assessed and development will be directly influenced by 
LRS mission specific requirements.  To accelerate component development, testing will reflect LRS 
specific mission requirements instead of generic functional requirements.  For example, the UUV stowage 
system development will have design and testing based on the specific constraints of the LRS program 
(VIRGINIA Block III specific constraints).    
3.3.2. Modeling & Simulation (M&S). Early stage modeling and simulation was used to select 
concept alternatives.  The LRS is a mechanical system and limited, if any modeling and simulation will be 
required for follow on testing once a component baseline is selected.  All components can be mechanically 
or electrically tested in their environment or simulated environment.   
3.3.3. Test Limitations. With a specific concept chosen, testing will be based on each 
component’s function within the LRS.  Issues with future integration into the LRS system will arise if the 
interfaces between components are not clearly defined.  An emphasis on proper interface definition will 
enable developmental testing of interfaces and reduce integration issues.  We do not foresee limitations 
with developmental testing.  
3.4. Operational Evaluation Approach. When a leading concept is selected from the top 
alternatives, a more refined operational evaluation (OPEVAL) will be established.  The main approach 
will be to satisfy the identified OPSITS chosen as representative missions for the LRS.  Personnel will 
require training with the LRS to launch, recover, replenish and maintain the LRS prior to OPEVAL.  
3.4.1. Mission-Oriented Approach. As the LRS is limited in external interfaces (host submarine 
and UUV), only two phases of operational testing has been identified at this time.  A LRS will be installed 
into a test payload tube with a remote control station and conduct submerged launch and recovery 
operations on the UUV.  For the 2nd phase of operational testing, the fully functioning LRS will be 
installed on a VIRGINIA Class Block III submarine and run through full launch and recovery operations.  
Successful completion of Phase I will give the green light for Phase II.  If Phase I is unsuccessful, 
redevelopment of the LRS will commence.  Phase II can only begin upon successful completion of Phase 
I.  
3.4.2. Operational Test Objectives. A full theater will be developed to provide realistic 
environments for the stated OPSITS.  The LRS will progress through each OPSIT being evaluated against 
the identified KPPs in each OPSIT.   
3.4.3. M&S. Early stage modeling and simulation was used to select concept alternatives.  The 
LRS is a mechanical system and limited, if any modeling and simulation will be required for follow on 
testing.  All components can be mechanically or electrically tested in their environment or simulated 
environment.  
3.4.4. Test Limitations. No operational test limitations are foreseen at this stage of preliminary 
design.  If a component cannot be tested in its direct environment, a sufficient environment can be 
provided to simulate the actual working environment.  
3.5. Future Test and Evaluation. No future testing has been identified.  Developmental and 
Operational Tests will be expanded upon once a single concept is selected and interfaces are refined with 
concept specific parameters.  
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PART IV – RESOURCE SUMMARY  
4.1. Introduction. Testing will take full advantage of existing DoD ranges, facilities, and other 
resources wherever practical.  Hydrostatic testing of larger components or prototypes required to 
withstand test depth can be tested at NSWCCD or a test tank in Annapolis, Md.    
4.1.1. Test Articles. The first stage if integrated testing will involve a VIRGINIA Class Block III 
Payload Tube (not integrated into submarine), a test facility with sufficient depth to conduct UUV launch 
and recovery operations, 3 nominally sized ISR UUVs, and a mockup of the LRS control station.  Full 
system integration testing will require a dedicated VIRGINIA Class Block III submarine with an available 
payload tube, a LRS fully outfitted into the host sub, 3 nominally sized ISR UUV’s, sufficient water depth 
to conduct ISR operations and required support vehicles as well as divers in the water to observe launch 
and recovery operations.  
4.1.2. Test Sites and Instrumentation. No specific test ranges have been identified; however, the 
selected site will have to provide an ideal radiated noise testing environment as well as sufficient depth to 
conduct UUV launch and recovery operations.  Water clarity must be sufficient to allow video 
documentation of launch and recovery operation.   
4.1.3. Test Support Equipment. Underwater radiated noise equipment and testing personnel must 
be available to record noise levels associated with operation of LRS system.  Equipment and personnel 
(divers) to support underwater video documentation of the LRS operation is also required.  Sufficient time 
recording devices and personnel are required to record elapsed time of each of the LRS phases.    
4.1.4. Threat Representation. The test facility must also be able to simulate various 
environmental threats (sea state, water clarity, currents) to the launch and recovery operations of the 
system.  Radiated noise testing will determine system stealth to protect from acoustic threats.   
4.1.5. Test Targets and Expendables. The LRS will not use any expendable test articles.  The test 
ready LRS will be a fully functional system on an operational VIRGINIA Class Block III submarine.  
UUVs used for LRS testing will be actual mission capable UUVs.   
4.1.6. Operational Force Test Support. A VIRGINIA Block III submarine will be required for a 
16 week outfitting period and 2 week testing period.  DOD Communication satellites with submarine an 
UUV communications will be required for the 2 week testing period.  An operational support surface ship 
will also be required for the 2 week testing period.  
4.1.7. Simulations, Models and Testbeds. Early stage modeling and simulation was used to select 
concept alternatives.  The LRS is a mechanical system and limited, if any modeling and simulation will be 
required for follow on testing.  All components can be mechanically or electrically tested in their 
environment or simulated environment.   
4.1.8. Joint Mission Environment. Operational testing of the LRS will make use of long range 
ISR UUVs.  For some aspects of testing, dedicated UUV mission planning support will be required in the 
instances where a UUV is given an updated recovery location from the original uploaded mission plan.   
4.1.9. Special Requirements. The LRS is not scheduled to use any special instrumentation or 
analysis.  The testing strategy makes use of testing methods and instrumentation that is already developed 
and proven by the U.S. Navy.  
4.2. Test and Evaluation Funding Summary. NO LFT&E test are required for the LRS.   
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APPENDEX F – DECISION AND SCORING TABLES 
The decision scoring tables below show the weighted averages of the end users priorities with respect to 
system capabilities.  The “Maximax” principle, picking the highest scoring value, was used in selection of 
the recommended alternative.  Where only “0” is assigned for a particular category, either there is no 
rationale to differentiate the design characteristic from one alternative to another or other categories 
already encompass the information. 
 
Design Characteristic Weight 
Launch Speed 2.3 
Recovery Speed 2.3 
Reliability (Success) 1.7 
Operational Depth 1.7 
Charging Capacity 1.3 
Acoustic Signature (Detection) 0.9 
Shock Resistance 0.9 
System Weight 0.6 
Payload Space 0.4 

















Baseline 1 1 5 1 1 5 36.8 
ALT-1 5 5 2 5 3 3 71.3 
ALT-2 5 4 2 2 3 3 59.8 
ALT-3 5 3 2 3 3 3 57.5 

















Baseline 1 1 1 1 1 5 27.6 
ALT-1 5 4 5 5 5 1 78.2 
ALT-2 2 2 2 2 2 4 41.4 
ALT-3 5 3 3 4 3 3 62.1 

















Baseline 1 1 0 5 1 5 25.5 
ALT-1 3 5 0 3 4 2 44.2 
ALT-2 5 2 0 2 2 4 32.3 
ALT-3 3 3 0 4 3 3 37.4 

















Baseline 1 0 0 1 1 0 6.8 
ALT-1 3 0 0 3 4 0 23.8 
ALT-2 4 0 0 4 2 0 20.4 
ALT-3 2 0 0 2 3 0 17 

















Baseline 1 1 1 3 3 3 20.8 
ALT-1 3 3 3 5 1 5 31.2 
ALT-2 3 4 3 5 1 5 33.8 
ALT-3 3 2 3 5 1 5 28.6 

















Baseline 1 1 2 3 0 5 11.7 
ALT-1 5 5 3 5 0 1 21.6 
ALT-2 2 2 5 5 0 3 17.1 
ALT-3 4 4 4 5 0 3 21.6 
ALT-4 3 3 1 1 0 1 10.8 
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Table F-7 Shock Resistance Scoring Table 













Baseline 1 1 1 1 1 5 10.8 
ALT-1 3 5 5 3 4 1 27 
ALT-2 4 2 3 4 2 3 19.8 
ALT-3 2 4 3 2 3 3 21.6 
ALT-4 5 3 5 5 5 1 28.8 
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